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Abstract: 
This study is a comparison of the philosophical systems composed by the Indian 
philosopher Sankara (788-830 CE), and the Muslim mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240 CE).  
The primary thesis found in this study is that the conceptual systems constructed by 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi are not perfectly new creations derived from the core of their 
mystical realizations.  Rather, they contain fundamental pre-existing principles, concepts, 
and teachings that are expanded upon and placed within a systematic philosophy or 
theology that is intended to lead others to a state of realization.  A selection of these 
presuppositions are extracted from within each of these thinkers’ philosophical systems 
and employed as structural indicators.  Similarities are highlighted, yet the differences 
between Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s thought, witnessed within their philosophical systems, 
lead us to the conclusion that the two mystics inhabited different conceptual space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION      1 
CHAPTER ONE 
Methodology       11 
CHAPTER TWO 
Overview of Hindu and Islamic Mysticism   44 
CHAPTER THREE 
Sankara        58 
Brahman      71 
The Hierarchy of Brahman’s Manifestation  84 
Maya and Avidya     92 
Sankara’s Use of Negation    97 
Transmigratory Existence and Karmic Consequence 100 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Ibn Arabi       106 
Ibn Arabi’s Notion of God    121 
The Veils      129 
Revelation and Verification    135 
Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood   138 
Eschatology in Ibn Arabi    145 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Analysis       149 
CONCLUSION      175 
BIBLIOGRAPHY      188
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 The primary goal of this study is to compare and contrast the Indian philosopher 
Sankara (788-830 CE), and the Muslim mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240 CE).  To be more 
specific, this project is an examination focused on the non-dual mystical philosophies 
composed by Sankara and Ibn Arabi. 
 The mystical systems constructed by Sankara and Ibn Arabi are often viewed as 
being representative of the non-dual mysticism found within their respective traditions.    
A number of studies have compared Sankara and Ibn Arabi and some projects have 
focused on the commonalities between these non-dual systems.  Furthermore, the striking 
differences between aspects of Hinduism and Islam have garnered even more interest in 
the two mystics, who some have claimed have analogous systems of thought.  This study 
will be exploring the systems of these influential thinkers to ascertain if this is true.  The 
claim that a Hindu sramana (wandering ascetic) and an Islamic mystic composed 
markedly similar systems of thought warrants scholarly attention.  Comparing Sankara 
and Ibn Arabi also affords us the opportunity to make observations on religious 
mysticism and how certain esoteric systems of thought function within their surrounding 
religious environments.  A comparison of Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s systems allows for 
useful insights into each thinker’s philosophy and may also provide a better 
understanding of mysticism in general, as well as methodological issues faced in the 
scholarly study of spiritual, religious, or mystical experience.  
The primary thesis found in this study is that the conceptual systems constructed 
by the two thinkers are not perfectly new creations derived from the core of their mystical 
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realizations.  Rather, they contain fundamental pre-existing principles, concepts, and 
teachings that are expanded upon and placed within a systematic philosophy or theology 
that is intended to lead others to a highly valued state of realization.  A selection of these 
pre-existing principles will be extracted from within each of these thinkers’ systems, and 
employed as structural indicators.  Certain ideas in Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s body of work 
are of fundamental importance and cannot be divorced from their systems of thought, and 
a few of these, in particular, will serve as our focal points.     
The relationship between religion and mysticism will not be overly examined and 
the nature of the mystical-religious interaction will be purposefully vague.  Despite his 
enormously influential early scholarly study of mysticism, we need not go as far as 
William James in placing the personal experience at the root of religion.1  An example of 
the subjective experience being tied to religious experience can be found in James’ 
statement that “Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for 
us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they 
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.”2  
Instead, it is the interaction of thought systems that is of importance in this study, and we 
will attempt to treat mysticism - certainly articulations about mystical experience - as 
belonging to a larger family of thought.  These thoughts, as expressed in the writings of 
these mystics, are a legitimate object of intellectual analysis, and at the outset, define the 
boundaries of this project.     
                                                 
1 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern Library, 
2002), 36.   
2 Ibid., 36. 
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The study’s focus is on the comparison of particular features within writings 
about transcendental experience by two influential thinkers.  Reza Shah Kazemi, in Paths 
to Transcendence, regards such a focus as the “doctrinal dimension of transcendence” 
because the methodological focus is on doctrine rather than experience.3  However, this 
approach is tempered with periodic admissions that highlight the distance between 
subjective experience, the key feature to which both philosophies point, and the doctrinal 
language and context used to do the pointing.  It is the relationship between doctrine and 
experience that will provide a majority of our talking points. 
Chapter One discusses methodological issues within the study of mysticism.  
Specific scholarly approaches to mysticism will be examined, with the benefits and 
hindrances discussed.  This chapter will help to identify the aspects of mysticism that are 
deemed important to this study.  A loose definition of mysticism will be provided, yet the 
majority of attention will be directed towards the non-dual mysticism found within 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi.  Dualistic forms of mysticism and non-religious mysticism are 
acknowledged – types represented in Hindu and Islamic traditions --but these will only be 
passing observations that are intended to limit this paper’s scope.  Another limitation that 
the methodological chapter examines is the ineffable and noetic features that James 
recognizes as crucially characteristic of mysticism.  This will naturally provide another 
boundary to which the investigation will adhere.4  The methodological discussion that 
precedes the examination of Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s thought will identify the capacity 
for a structural approach to the study of mysticism that is situated within the doctrinal 
                                                 
3 Reza Shah-Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), 
Xiii.   
4 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 414. 
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level.  The topics selected to compare the two mystics will therefore be tempered by this 
methodology, and it is the goal of the first chapter to clearly identify this approach.  It is 
the comparison of ideas, not experience, that lies at the heart of this project; the 
discussions will be framed with a focus on concepts and philosophical structures. 
An overview of important theories and individuals within Hindu and Islamic 
mysticism will be provided in Chapter Two.  Mysticism found within the Vedas and 
Upanisads will be examined as possessing noticeable similarities and differences.  The 
sacrificial mysticism within the Vedas will be linked to the philosophical mysticism 
found within the Upanisads.  The Upanisadic internalization of sacrifice is an important 
difference between the Vedas and Upanisads, yet this need not constitute a major 
cleavage between the two texts.  It will be argued that Vedic and Upanisadic forms of 
mysticism can be linked if that is one’s interpretive goals; however, there are important 
differences between Vedic and Upanisadic forms of mysticism that should be recognized.  
Mysticism found within bhakti devotionalism and the Bhagavad Gita will be examined as 
being neither identical to, nor completely different than the mysticism found in the Vedas 
and Upanisads.  Bhakti is a spiritual tool more than a theistic belief set or a specific form 
of mysticism; therefore, bhakti can be identified within various forms of Hindu 
mysticism.  The devotional mysticism espoused in the Bhagavad Gita is not clearly 
defined and is frequently adapted to specific mystical goals. 
Chapter Two will also entail an examination of Muhammad’s role in Islamic 
mysticism.  The importance of Muhammad within esoteric Islam is to such an extent that 
Sufis have regarded his actions as possessing an element that is believed to be the 
embodiment of Quranic mysticism.  An examination of Sufi literature will reveal that 
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Muhammad has been interpreted as a prophet, esoteric exemplar, and as a metaphysical 
principle that is believed to be present in all previous revelations.  Muhammad serves an 
important role in Islamic mysticism that extends beyond scriptural revelation; rather, 
Muhammad is seen as embodying the totality of Islamic mysticism and as revealing a 
mystical path that others can follow.  Important principles within Islamic mysticism can 
be derived from interpreting Muhammad as a shaykh and exemplar of esoteric practices.  
This approach to Muhammad will also provide insights into the varied forms of Islamic 
mysticism and how the Prophet can be interpreted in situationally specific ways.  Like the 
Vedas and Upanisads, interpretations of Muhammad are not uniform and no single 
interpretation of Muhammad can be considered as being representative of Islamic 
mysticism. 
Chapter Three begins with a discussion of the philosophy of Sankara 
Bhagavatpada, whose literary works will provide one basis of comparison.  Because this 
is a comparative study with a circumscribed focus, it will solely deal with Sankara, and 
not Advaita Vedanta in general, or the thinker’s role in the history of Vedanta.  Reference 
will be made to Sankara’s teachers and his ideas regarding discipleship, but these 
discussions will still have the Hindu mystic as their focal points.  To be more specific, it 
is Sankara’s mystical philosophies that will be our main concern.5  Sankara’s idea of 
Brahma-vidya (enlightenment/realization) will be interpreted, but more importantly for 
our purposes, we will focus on the philosophical scaffolding that supports his idea of 
realization.   
                                                 
5 Please note that I do not use the term philosophy in a Western post-Enlightenment 
sense.  Rather, I employ the term philosophy as signifying a conceptual system that may 
or may not make reference to religious principles. 
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Essentially, the role of realization in Sankara’s system pertains to the acquisition 
of a transcendental knowledge “…that the Individual soul is the Supreme Lord 
Himself.”6  The study’s theoretical stance posits that we cannot directly access the 
transcendental knowledge regarding these subjective experiences, and that is why the 
methodological approach is to direct our discussions to Sankara’s philosophical 
scaffolding.  This contrasts with Kazemi, who, when undertaking a similar comparative 
project (on Sankara, Ibn Arabi, and Meister Eckhart), limits his focus to the “…vital 
connection between the awareness of transcendence as a notion, concept, idea, or 
principle, on the one hand, and the concrete modalities of spiritual attainment on the 
other.”7  I shall treat Sankara in a similar manner by acknowledging the relationship 
between literary teachings and experiential modalities, which is a twofold path that many 
view as being essential to the study of mysticism.8  However, this study does not dwell on 
the experiential modalities of spiritual realization.  Rather, it is Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s 
philosophical statements that constitute this paper’s focal point.  These conceptual 
artifacts (the philosophical statements) show many variations, particularly in the form of 
presuppositions.  By limiting our discussion to philosophical principles, and avoiding 
metaphysical speculation, it is possible to elicit features within the structures of 
mystically oriented thought systems that are notoriously elusive.  New perspective is 
offered when mystical statements are interpreted as possessing inherent presuppositions 
that have foundational influence.  Furthermore, this project will demonstrate that the 
metaphysics that govern one’s mystical ascent can be partially credited to the 
                                                 
6 Sankara, “Texts on the Soul and the Lord as Not Distinct,” in A Sankara Source Book 
vol. 3, trans, A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sadan, 2004), 64.  
7 Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence, Xii.  
8 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 496. 
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suppositions that each mystic employs before the mystical journey is embarked upon.  
Such foundational differences will also be shown as resulting in differentiated spiritual 
techniques (the methods used to attain realization).     
Sankara’s thought will be explored primarily through the Upadesasahasri, but 
also through a variety of other sources found in the corpus of works attributed to him.  
However, I have made particular efforts to restrict my examination to what the scholarly 
community has declared as being genuine works by Sankara.9  Many of the references to 
Sankara’s corpus will be combined with discussions on theoretical and methodological 
issues within the study of mysticism.  Quite notably, I attempt not to stray too far from 
what Sankara believed his teachings would reveal.  To do so would perhaps be a 
misrepresentation, because the true import of Sankara and his project among adherents of 
his teachings, as noted by Jonathan Bader, is believed to transcend his literary works and 
doctrinal positions.10 
 Muhyi al-Din Muhammad ibn ‘Ali ibn-al ‘Arabi will be treated in a similar 
manner, and is the focus of the discussion in Chapter Four.  The dual approach 
(recognizing the subjective experiential factors within mysticism and simultaneously the 
theoretical/textual components through which method and experience is expressed) is 
especially important in Ibn Arabi because we will see an even greater reliance on spiritual 
embodiment.  The Shaykh repeatedly states that spiritual reflection lies at the apex of his 
                                                 
9 A.J. Alston, “Sources of Sankara’s Doctrine: His Life and Works,” in A Sankara Source 
Book vol. 1 ed. A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sadan, 2004), 44-46.  
10 Jonathan Bader, Conquest of the Four Quarters (Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000), 7.  
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system and that it is a process of interiorization.11  Furthermore, many of Ibn Arabi’s 
accounts place the individual in a cosmological position that transcends their singular 
status, and it is for this reason that we must strike a balance with the metaphysical 
principles that are believed to operate outside of intellectual comprehension.12  This 
approach to Ibn Arabi will also examine his intellectual heritage and his status as a 
teacher.  Like Sankara, Ibn Arabi viewed his hermeneutical venture as being purpose 
driven and “meant to do something”.  Texts written by Ibn Arabi must be understood as 
being simultaneously philosophical and instructive (while pointing to something that is 
completely beyond description, namely, God).   
The text that will be mainly used to reference Ibn Arabi’s ideas is the Futuhat al-
makkiyya, where we will see a familiar combination of theoretical statements in relation 
to metaphysical propositions.  The Futuhat al-makkiyya, like Sankara’s works, possesses 
the trademarks of non-dual mysticism that continually seek to undermine strictly 
intellectual processes.13  Despite their supplementary nature, the theoretical statements 
offered by Ibn Arabi will be extracted and used as the material for comparison.  There is 
practical value that Ibn Arabi assigns to the scaffolding that raises one to realization, yet 
we must continually recognize the stated secondary importance of these spiritual aids.  
Included within these aids are theological statements that are derived from the Islamic 
religious structure that surrounds Ibn Arabi’s philosophies, and an investigation into these 
statements will reveal a set of foundational concepts that give direction to the Shaykh’s 
                                                 
11 William Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1989), 344.   
12 William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 86. 
13 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 154. 
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ideas of mysticism and transcendence.  The theological notions that Ibn Arabi extracts 
from the Quran are also used within his explanatory ventures outside of the Islamic 
tradition; such examples will provide us with important information regarding Ibn 
Arabi’s attempt to formulate a comprehensive mystical philosophy (and worldview) that 
accounts for itself and the surrounding religious systems.  However, we will also see that 
other discussion points reveal a more focused worldview that proves singular. 
Chapter Five is dedicated to a direct comparison and analysis of the philosophical 
systems espoused by Sankara and Ibn Arabi.  A number of similarities will be discussed 
and the metaphysical implications of these points will be highlighted.  Identification with 
a non-dual Absolute is of primary importance to both mystics and will be discussed as 
such.  Furthermore, both Sankara and Ibn Arabi will be shown as constructing 
philosophical systems that are directed towards the attainment of this state.  The topic of 
illusion, and the need to end it, is quintessential within both systems of thought.  
Differences in the way Sankara and Ibn Arabi expressed their ideas of illusion will be 
examined, yet the magnitude of this divergence is lessened when their usages of illusion, 
as unique conditions that operate in the unenlightened mind, are contrasted.  Another 
similarity will be found in the mystics’ opinions on revelation and sacred scripture.  Both 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi believed their systems relied on revelatory information that made 
esoteric knowledge possible.  The Vedas and Quran are approached as necessary conduits 
that espouse a means to correct understanding.  This correspondence will also be shown 
as demonstrating similar ideas in regards to the spiritual capabilities of the unenlightened 
individual and the constraints inherent within the unrealized mind.  The last likeness that 
will be investigated is Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s usage of seemingly dualistic statements 
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that are later negated through reference to the non-dual Absolute.  This will show both 
mystics as employing conceptual techniques that are deemed as being of secondary 
importance when they are contrasted with the goal of realization. 
 The comparison within Chapter Five will also present Sankara and Ibn Arabi as 
mystical philosophers with noticeable divergences in thought.  All the differences 
examined reside within the theological suppositions that support each mystics’ 
transcendental claims.  The role Sankara assigns to karma and samsara will be shown as 
different from Ibn Arabi’s ideas of death, judgment, and the afterlife.  This will be 
discussed as an important conceptual difference that distinguishes each respective 
worldview.  Another difference examined is Ibn Arabi’s idea of prophecy when 
compared to Sankara’s ideas on Vedic revelation.  Ibn Arabi provides a complex 
revelatory system that attempts to understand religious plurality and the metaphysical 
importance of revelation.14  The Shaykh makes an extended effort to place prophets and 
prophetic messages within a hierarchical system that leads to the primacy of the Quran, 
while still supporting revelations that had occurred previously.  The Abrahamic traditions 
were the point of Ibn Arabi’s main ecumenical focus but this did not prevent the 
Andalusian mystic from extending his ideas to non-Abrahamic traditions.  Sankara, 
however, will be shown as being much more divisive when it comes to matters of 
revelation; the Vedas (but more specifically the Upanisads) are recognized as being the 
sole textual sources that leads to esoteric realization.15  Sankara’s treatment of other 
                                                 
14 William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1994), 126.  
15 Sankara, “Texts on: The Self Can Only Be Known Through The Veda,” in Sankara A 
Source Book vol. 5, trans. A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sadan, 2004), 202. 
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Hindu schools (darsanas) will demonstrate a much more exclusive view of realization 
and the means to its attainment.16  Sankara believed that there were multiple ways to 
attain realization, yet these techniques centered on the Vedas (we should also note the 
importance of smrti literature within Sankara’s thought).17  The last difference that will 
be examined is the need for renunciation.  Sankara will be shown as stressing the 
importance of renunciation in the attempt to obtain realization.  Renunciation is not 
insisted upon, and other techniques are believed to lead to realization, yet Sankara 
believed renunciation was the most conducive to the attainment of esoteric knowledge.18  
Ibn Arabi does not hold renunciation in an equal regard and frequently turns to human 
relationships as being means to the attainment of realization (when understood 
properly).19  For example, Ibn Arabi believed that love could be an expression of 
religiosity.20  Sankara, however, downplayed the role of human relationships and stressed 
the need for detachment.  
These divergences will lead us to consider the possibility that the two mystics 
arrived at similar worldviews that were built upon differing presuppositions.  The 
conceptual principles that Sankara and Ibn Arabi drew upon and utilized were believed 
by them to be inherent features of reality.  That is, these principles are believed to have 
inherent mechanisms that operate within the specific worldviews of each of the thinkers.  
                                                 
16 Sankara, “Texts on: The Qualifications for the Path,” in A Sankara Source Book vol 5. 
trans. A.J. Alston, 71. 
17 Ibid., 71. 
18 Sankara, “Texts on: The Injunction to Adopt the Path,” in A Sankara Source Book vol 
5. trans. A.J. Alston, 65. 
19 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 157. 
20 Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, trans. William Chittick (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), 286.  
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To be more specific, we will note how such notions as karma, samsara, death, and 
judgment are particular concepts and principles that were accepted at the outset by Ibn 
Arabi or Sankara, as functioning within the realities of their Islamic or Hindu 
worldviews.  These notions have quintessential value to each mystic since they have 
foundational functions within each system.   
Although the actual existence and the metaphysical status of these principles may 
be eventually brought into question (an example being Sankara questioning karma from 
the perspective of a realized individual), such observations derive from the realized 
experiential perspective.  Appraising the ultimate realties of these principles is therefore 
beyond the boundaries we have drawn for the purpose of this study.  It is these mystics’ 
point of departure that is our concern -- the philosophical/theological frameworks and 
systems they have constructed either as a result of an experience of spiritual realization or 
as a template or guidebook for others -- and we are interested in examining the 
conceptual environment that shaped those systems.  This is echoed in William James’ 
second point in the study of mysticism when he claims that mysticism “…is an extract, 
kept true to a type by the selection of the fittest specimens and their preservation in 
‘schools.’ It is carved out from a much larger mass; and if we take the larger mass as 
seriously as religious mysticism has historically taken itself, we find that the supposed 
unanimity largely disappears.  To begin with, even religious mysticism itself, the kind 
that accumulates traditions and makes schools, is much less unanimous than I have 
allowed.”21 Borrowing a term from William James, we are examining how Sankara and 
                                                 
21 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 463.  
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Ibn Arabi’s mystical philosophies relate to the larger mass, and how the composition of 
this larger mass can bring about distinguished sub-systems. 
This study may therefore be viewed as a contextualist approach that binds 
mysticism to its surrounding religious structures, although, as we will see, religion is only 
a partner within the mystical process.22  However, our methodological approach provides 
a workable terrain that permits certain observations to be made about mysticism without 
breaching the issue of subjective experience.  It is in the region just shy of the personal, 
subjective, and experiential levels that our interpretive tools are most effective.  The 
theoretical examination that will occur is not intended to be constrictive or critical of the 
mystical experience, which is regarded as a realization that resides at the summit of both 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s philosophical systems.  Sankara and Ibn Arabi viewed 
themselves as elucidating systems formed upon what they believed to be metaphysical 
realities.  This study does not adopt the stance that their philosophies determined the 
reality to which they point.  Instead, this study takes as its point of departure the 
assumption that the systems erected by Sankara and Ibn Arabi derive from their ideas of 
the Absolute. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 465. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
METHODOLOGY 
It is important that we address the difficulties surrounding the study of mysticism 
at the outset of this project; an understanding of these problems will better enable us to 
provide an adequate definition of mysticism.  First, any proper discussion of mysticism 
should recognize the disconnection between mystical philosophies, mystical experiences, 
the academic study of mysticism, and the socio-religious context in which the mystical 
experience occurs.  One of the most challenging problems facing the academic study of 
mysticism pertains to how the student should understand the mystic’s description of 
his/her interior experiences, and furthermore, how an ineffable mental state can be 
understood without causing the object of study serious harm.  William James understands 
mystical experiences as possessing an ineffable and noetic quality that grants the 
experience a great deal of significance and meaning, despite the fact that mystical truths 
cannot be framed in an objective manner.23  Underhill, too, recognizes this problem and 
claims that it is our duty to understand mystical reports without directly challenging the 
mystic’s claim to having the experience, “… for the mystics are the pioneers of the 
spiritual world, and we have no right to deny validity to their discoveries, merely because 
we lack the opportunity or the courage necessary to those who would prosecute such 
explorations for themselves.”24  More contemporary theorists, such as Frits Staal, 
continue this line of reasoning by claiming that the study of mysticism requires the 
                                                 
23 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: The Modern 
Library, 2002), 414. 
24 Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (Stilwell KS: Digireads.com Publishing, 2005), 10. 
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suspension of belief, which in turn, permits the student access to higher levels of 
meaning.25  This sentiment is not limited to Western scholars/mystics, Dasgupta makes it 
abundantly clear that Upanisadic mysticism also contains an ineffable realization that 
transcends objective levels of understanding.26 
Related to the problem of ineffability are the admittedly insufficient descriptions 
of mystical experiences.  The philosophies rendered by figures such as Ibn Arabi and 
Sankara demonstrate intricate systems of thought that are ultimately subjected to the 
actual experience.27  Furthermore, mystics such as Ibn Arabi claim that mystical 
experiences differ between individuals (on account of God’s unlimited self-disclosure 
and the infinite number of ways this disclosure can be experienced).28  If this is to be 
accepted, then we are left with testimonial accounts of mystical experiences that are 
admittedly insufficient and highly variable.  Ninian Smart aptly frames this problem in 
claiming, “There are two different forms of intelligibility we need to contemplate here.  
First there is what may be called existential understanding, namely understanding what a 
given experience is like…Second, there is understanding the explanation of something.  
Thus we might be uncertain as to how we should understand Paul’s conversion.  Was it 
due to an inner psychological crisis of some kind? Was it really Jesus speaking to him? 
                                                 
25 Frits Staal, Exploring Mysticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 7. 
26 Surendranath Dasgupta, Hindu Mysticism (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), 42.   
27 Please note that I do not use the term philosophy in a Western post-Enlightenment 
sense.  Rather, I employ the term philosophy as signifying a conceptual system that may 
or may not make reference to religious principles. 
28 William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge (Albany NY: State University of New 
York Press, 1989), 212.  
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This kind of understanding may be called theoretical understanding.”29  Note that Smart’s 
approach further complicates the situation by trying to understand the psychological 
status of the mystic in an attempt to ascertain motivations (such as Paul’s psychological 
condition prior to his conversion).  The individuality of mysticism cannot be understated, 
for as James relates, the mystical experience is the sole property of the individual and any 
attempt to relate this experience is undermined by conceptual limitations.30  The attempt 
to translate subjective/intuitive feeling into a lucid account is impaired by the limitations 
of language and the problems inherent to the interpretation of deeply emotional accounts 
(despite the literary skills of the mystic, the account must be interpreted and understood 
by the reader, which adds another disconnect between the actual experience and our 
analysis of this experience).     
The relationship between religion and mysticism adds yet another degree of 
complication to our understanding of the topic.  A survey of mystics and mystical 
philosophies will demonstrate a myriad of relationships with organized religion.  At times 
some mystics seem to veer away from accepted dogma, while others fall into lockstep 
with a particular orthodox community.31  Underhill recognizes this fluctuating 
relationship and claims that “…at one end of the scale, pure mysticism shades off into 
religion- for some points of view seems to grow out of it.  No deeply religious man is 
                                                 
29 Ninian Smart, “Understanding Religious Experience,” in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis, ed. Steven Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 11. 
30 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 442. 
31 An example of a mystical statement being interpreted as heretical is Al-Hallaj’s 
statement: “I am the real.”  Sells claims that Hallaj’s execution was more to do with 
political matters than his mystical claims.  However, the controversy sparked by Hallaj’s 
statement is a pertinent example of how mystical claims can be understood as being 
heretical.  For more information regarding Hallaj and his mystical statements see Michael 
A. Sells, ed., Early Islamic Mysticism (New York: Paulist Press, 1996), 266.       
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without a touch of mysticism; and no mystic can be other than religious, in the 
psychological if not in the theological sense of the word.”32  This paper does not agree 
that mysticism is inextricably tied to religion, yet Underhill’s observation is still 
pertinent.  
An examination of what constitutes orthodoxy in relation to mysticism is beyond 
the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting that some scholars look to the relationship 
between mystical philosophies and sacred scripture as a contextual link that informs 
certain mystical philosophies.33  Furthermore, it can be claimed that sacred scriptures 
provide a foundation of theoretical suppositions that can be expanded and transformed to 
better facilitate mystical systems of thought.  An example of this can be found in Ibn 
Arabi’s interpretation of Noah, which sees the flood as a form of gnostic knowledge and 
those being drowned as mystics entering into a special union with God.34  It should once 
again be noted that this is not a condemnation of Ibn Arabi’s interpretation.  What I 
would like to bring attention to is the mystic’s use of traditional Islamic scripture (the 
Noah story) as an opening for mystical analysis.  Conversely, there are scholars who hold 
that mysticism transcends gods and theology: “The view that mysticism has nothing to do 
with gods is not as revolutionary as it may sound, at least if we remember a well-known 
fact that is all too rarely taken into account: two of the great religions of the world, 
Theravada Buddhism and Jainism, though replete with mysticism and divine personages, 
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are atheistic.”35  Staal’s idea of atheistic mysticism does not hold true for many of the 
western traditions that place knowledge of God as the primary mystical goal; however, it 
is important that we take notice of how mystical systems can range from being highly 
theological to atheistic in nature.   
Furthering this complication are the contradictory stances that many mystics take 
in concern to divine entities.  The works ascribed to Sankara contain many hymns to 
Visnu, Siva, and Isvara, yet it would be inappropriate to claim these deities as being 
synonymous with his idea of the highest reality (Brahman).36 What should be emphasized 
within these contradictory examples are the theological shades that mysticism can adopt.  
Furthermore, it is the student’s duty to decipher what is a second order theological 
proposition and what is of primary importance (by this I mean what theological ideas are 
meant to be transcended and what religious principles are inherently important to the 
philosophy).  
Another problem within the study of mysticism pertains to dualistic and monistic 
views of the universe.  Mystics such as Sankara and Ibn Arabi are strongly monistic and 
their ideas of monistic union have become predominant in the discussion of mysticism.  
Furthermore, many commentators and academics have taken this type of monistic 
mysticism as being the highest and most accomplished form.  L. Stafford Betty makes 
this point when criticizing an assertion that Eckhart was the most accomplished Christian 
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mystic because of his monistic worldview.37  However, there are examples of mysticism 
that do not draw upon monistic union.  Many bhakti mystics view the practitioner and 
deity as being separate and remaining separate, even during mystical states.  An example 
of dualistic mysticism can be found in the thought of the 13th century South Indian 
philosopher Madhvacarya, and his Dvaita Vedanta (Dualistic Vedanta), where it is 
asserted that the status of the liberated soul is different from god and will never be 
absorbed into the godhead (the individual is dependent on god for existence but separate 
from god in categorical manners).38  Contemporary Hindu commentators have stressed 
this important distinction: “The acceptance of difference amongst the liberated souls in 
the states of enjoyment and other privileges forms one of the cardinal doctrines of 
Madhva’s system; for, if it is not acknowledged, then the cardinal dualistic doctrine that 
all individual souls are always different from one another would fail” (sic.).39  Madhva 
claims that we as humans have similar qualities to that of God, yet this relationship does 
not extend beyond similarities.40  The monistic/dualistic difference is an important 
distinction and we must distance ourselves from the assertion that mysticism is always a 
uniformly monistic adventure.  To disregard dualistic forms of mysticism would greatly 
limit our ability to understand mysticism as a pan religio-philosophic phenomenon with 
substantial variations and complexities.   
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A final problem in the academic study of mysticism must be addressed before we 
can continue with our methodological investigation.  It is important we understand that 
the term “mysticism” is a Western academic construct that has been applied to existing 
religious acts and experiences that long precede the coining of the term.  We must be 
cautious when labeling something as being mystical, because adherents may not 
understand their practices, experiences, or traditions as such.  For instance, mantras and 
meditation might seem mundane to a yogic practitioner, while academics may label them 
as esoteric practices that are only taken up by the mystical minded sramanas (wandering 
philosophers). Such an academic evaluation is obviously untrue, and we would be remiss 
not to remember that mysticism exists in shades and degrees.41   
Furthermore, it would be misleading to ignore mystical aspects in people’s lives 
because they exist only in small degrees or in manners that do not fit particular 
definitions.  A proper study must not forget that mysticism is not clear-cut, nor can it be 
easily dissected from the context in which it is found.  An overly strict definition of 
mysticism might either ignore accounts of genuine mystical experiences or require 
linkages that are tenuous or nonexistent.  Prigge and Kessley warn of this when 
criticizing a useful, but very specific definition of mysticism.  They note that “…to say 
experiences are of the same kind is to say that they are the same in some respect taken as 
essential for the purpose at hand.”42  Alternatively, an overly inclusive definition often 
runs the risk of extending the idea of mysticism.  This paper agrees with Steven Katz’s 
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warnings regarding problems with an overly inclusive mysticism, which “…is more 
commonly found in the early literature on the study of mysticism, much of it having been 
generated by missionary and related activity which sought to find some common 
denominator among people…”43 Because of the tenuous position of mysticism, we must 
be ready to amend and alter our definition of it, if necessary.44  I must also state, 
however, that the practices and philosophies of mystics are at the center of our inquiry 
and we must not let our methodological leanings impede our observations.  W.C. Smith is 
completely correct to state that “However ‘scientific’ the methodological obsession may 
be, or may appear to be, if it gets in the way of our understanding of what we are 
supposed to be studying, as I fear that it may, then it is out of place in our work.”45  And 
it is for this reason that we should not limit ourselves by confining mysticism to a strict 
monistic definition or an overly broad generalization. 
With respect to these difficulties in studying mysticism it is particularly important 
that students take steps to make mysticism coherent and approachable (or as much as 
possible).  Firstly, reference to the context from which any given mystical philosophy 
arises will permit a better understanding of that mystical account.  Katz promotes a 
similar method by pointing to the strong ties religious mysticism has with sacred 
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scripture.46  An examination of religious mysticism will reveal that most mystics adhere 
to a worldview that is based upon sacred scripture: “Their deep and abiding concern with 
– and their extraordinary immersion in -- these texts is rooted precisely in the belief that 
the texts are transcendental markers of absolute significance.”47   
Sankara, for example, makes it clear that any person wishing to achieve union 
with Brahman must be well versed in the Vedas, Upanisads, and Dharmasastras.48  The 
aspiring mystic is also advised to have partaken in all the necessary sacrifices and 
performed all ritual obligations set out by the Vedas.49  Ibn Arabi is very similar in that 
he declares prophetic revelation as one of the three valid ways of gaining true 
knowledge.50  Ibn Arabi grants validity to prophetic revelations found in other traditions, 
yet it is safe to say that he regarded the Quran as being the most current and authoritative 
revelation to date.51  The relationship between religious mysticism and sacred scripture 
makes it possible for Smart to state that “This… [link] can be paralleled in the respective 
teachings of nearly every major mystical traditions vis-a vis its particular canonical 
source.  In other words, only if the Quran ‘unveils all the knoweldges’ (sic.)… [and the] 
Vedas ‘are unlimited and without end’ can the great mystical communities built on these 
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scriptural foundations function.”52  Likewise, I assert that non-religious mysticism 
regards certain theories as being foundational to their mystical approach and that 
subsequent theories and practices, within that particular mystical school, place 
themselves in relation to these fundamental theories (as articulated in texts).53  When 
sacred scriptures (or foundational mystical accounts in the case of nonreligious 
mysticism) are regarded as providing a backdrop to mystical narratives, then we are able 
to view mysticism as arising from a particular source (though the actual experience is not 
be reducible to that source).54  William Harmless proposes a similar approach to 
individual mystics and their mystical accounts when he claims that “… we need to step 
back behind the individual mystics we have studied and chart how the mystical 
communities to which they belong shaped the contours of their mysticism.”55  It is 
important that individual mystics (and the expressions of their mystical experiences) are 
understood as being influenced by sources outside of themselves.  Mystical communities 
and their shared beliefs, as found in certain accepted texts, can be considered as examples 
of this influence.     
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It is also important we recognize that mystical philosophies belong within a larger 
cultural superstructure that makes use of existing thought and theories.  By this I mean 
that mystics and their philosophies are not developed in isolation.  This does not mean 
that mystics necessarily have to accept these surrounding theories or traditions.  Rather, a 
survey of mystical writers reveals a common interest in philosophies outside of their own 
beliefs and an active dialogue with these rival or co-exisitng mystical philosophical 
systems.56 For instance, Sankara’s refutation of other darsanas (schools of thought) can 
be just as illuminating in informing us about those schools, as his explanations of his own 
thought.   
Despite the individuality of the mystical experiences of particular mystics, no 
mystical system, produced by any mystic in hindsight, from the perspective of his or her 
realization, is an island onto itself.  And so, “[i]f we wish to isolate mystical experiences, 
we must disentangle them from such superstructures.  We ourselves approach mystical 
experiences, like other kinds of experiences, always within existing perspectives and 
superstructures.  We must be aware of these before we can remove them or minimize 
their impact… After all, many philosophers, especially in the Orient, have constructed 
superstructures in order to make sense of mystical experience.”57  An understanding of 
the respective superstructure will permit a better understanding of that particular mystical 
philosophy.  James is correct in asserting that mystical experiences are ineffable and 
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extremely personal; however, this does not preclude us, as academics, from the right to 
evaluate and contextualize accounts of these occurrences.58   
Mystical experiences and truths challenge the rationalistic categorization of our 
worldview.  Yet “[n]o authority emanates from them [mystical philosophies] which 
should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations 
uncritically.”59  Included within these critical rights is our right as scholars to understand 
mystical philosophies as belonging within a larger context (social, linguistic, cultural, 
metaphysical, etc.) that influences the structure of mystical worldviews.  Ibn Arabi may 
have wished to expound a system that transcended rational thought, yet his commentaries 
are predicated on, and circumscribed by, the language and literary styles in which his 
arguments are presented.  Both Ibn Arabi and Sankara realized this limitation induced by 
language and other contextual constraints.  
Although the recognition of context and the surrounding conceptual 
superstructure should not be ignored, it is possible to fall into reductionism if we are not 
careful.  Reza Shah Kazemi, in Paths to Transcendence, warns us that context should not 
at all determine content: “While none would doubt the need to respect the context in 
which mystical experience occurs, there seems to be no reason to accept the axiom that 
the context will necessarily determine the content of all possible mystical experiences and 
consciousness.”60  To become overly dependent on contextualization binds the scholar to 
his/her respective methodology and does not permit for an unhindered representation of 
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mystical thought (as much as an unhindered representation is possible).  An example of a 
scholar falling into this trap is R.C. Zaehner, who claims the “otherness” of the Islamic 
God does not lend itself to mysticism and that the Sufis were introduced to monistic 
mysticism as a result of Abu Yazid’s promotion of Vedantic philosophy (instead of 
recognizing the immanence credited to Allah).61  Frits Staal comes to a similar 
conclusion, stating, “Zaehner’s approach contributes little to the serious study of 
mysticism.  It does not establish a position from which one can do more than scratch the 
surface of Hindu and Muslim forms of mysticism.”62  Staal credits Zaehner’s inability to 
accept Sufi mysticism to dogmatic reasons, yet I credit Zaehner’s shortcomings more to 
his overly strict categorization and contextualization of mysticism.63   
Conversely, it is possible to become an overly strong proponent of essentialist 
approaches that can ignore key differences in the study of mysticism.  This urge to find 
commonalities can lead to the dismissal of important theories and conceptual categories 
that should not be divorced from the mystic’s metaphysical system.  Essentialist 
approaches offer valuable insights into commonalities between esoteric practices, yet it is 
the duty of the academic to understand the totality of each metaphysical system in their 
particularities before generalizing extensions can be made.  Kazemi falls into this error 
when he claims that Eckhart, Sankara, and Ibn Arabi all experienced the same mystical 
summit despite their respective contextual differences.64  I contest that such an assertion 
falls into the same methodological problems that Smith warned us against, that mistake 
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being the urge to fit data into preconceived approaches, assumptions, and conclusions.  
This paper will later deal with Kazemi’s comparison of Ibn Arabi and Sankara in detail 
and explicate how key ideas are ignored or marginalized in the attempt to find and 
elucidate commonalities.65  Frithjof Schuon runs into the same problem when he 
comments on the different manifestations of God; “The diverse manifestations of the 
Good in the world clearly have their source in a principal and archetypal diversity, whose 
root is situated in the Supreme Principle itself, and which pertains not only to the Divine 
Qualities, from which our virtues derived…”66 This, however, rests upon the supposition 
that revelation can manifest itself in multiple forms with the same potency, and that all 
divine revelations are equally correct and informative.   
The need to find commonalities and justify differences has led many 
commentators and philosophers to engage in creative hermeneutics that stray away from 
the original intention of various mystics.  This is not to claim that the original intention of 
each mystic is easily discernable or widely agreed upon, yet there still remain touchstones 
in each mystical philosophy that ground a particular metaphysical system to a set of basic 
assumptions (such as the uniqueness Madhvacarya grants to the liberated soul in states of 
mystical euphoria).  Furthermore, the dismissal or radical reinterpretation of mystical 
philosophies is an inappropriate venture for the academic and should only occur with the 
explicit recognition of hermeneutical reorganization.  Katz agrees with this and claims 
that “… in the employment of all these mystical hermeneutical gambits, in the exercise of 
all these forms of creative reading, one notes the continual striving to uncover an inner 
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meaning, an essential verity, that can only be revealed by strenuous and unusual 
intellectual and religious exertion.”67   
Interpretation, in the attempt to ascertain commonalities, is perfectly acceptable 
and the application of these commonalities to a theory of unified mysticism is a natural 
and permissible venture.  However, these projects must recognize their own intentions in 
relation to the systems being analyzed.  The assertion that only mystics can speak to the 
“coming together of mystical paths” should be countered with the assertion that “… 
mystical feeling of enlargement, union, and emancipation has no specific intellectual 
content whatsoever of its own.  It is capable of forming matrimonial alliances with 
material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies, provided only they 
can find a place in their framework for its peculiar emotional mood.”68  Therefore, any 
essentialist attempt to unite all mystical experiences under one common understanding 
must first recognize the nature and purpose of its own hermeneutical pursuit. 
At this point it would be beneficial to put forth some perspectives that will 
demonstrate the aforementioned reductionist and essentialist perspectives.  This brief 
survey will provide the opportunity to show that neither position has to be taken in full 
and that a balanced approach to mysticism can avoid the pitfalls associated with hard-line 
reductionism and essentialism.  Steven T. Katz has often been labeled as being a 
reductionist and for that reason I have chosen his works as being representative of 
reductionism.  Yet as we shall see, the concept of reductionism and essentialism is not 
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static.  In Mysticism and Sacred Scripture Katz makes it abundantly clear that from his 
perspective, mystical accounts have to be understood through the use of contextual 
methods.  
“The role of scripture, contrary to much scholarly opinion, is 
essential to the major mystical traditions and to the teachings and 
experience of their leading representatives.  And because it is, I 
attempt to explain in this essay, consistent with my previously 
developed contextualist reading of mystical experience and 
mystical sources, how this seminal connection has functioned 
during the history of mysticism across traditions and why the 
failure to appreciate its correct value and inescapable significance 
leads to a mistaken morphological and phenomenological 
deconstruction of the relevant literary and experiential data.”69 
It is clear that Katz places mysticism within a contextual superstructure that is supported 
through a number of smaller suppositions that can be analyzed and understood.70  The 
benefit of following Katz’s example is that we are provided with a conceptual tool that 
allows for the identification of mysticism as a natural extension of existing forms of 
thought.   
This rationalizing tendency can be found to a lesser extent in Underhill, who 
identifies mystical approaches as being dependent on the temperament and intellectual 
disposition of the mystic.71  Underhill’s categorization of mysticism is of a mild manner 
but this does not negate the fact that she believed it beneficial to apply some form of 
categorization to the topic.  Staal also acknowledges mysticism as containing rationalistic 
aspects that can be analyzed as such; this is in contrast to the belief that mysticism is 
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irrational and beyond fruitful categorization.72  Recognition of rational/attainable and 
irrational/transcendent aspects within mysticism can lead to the conclusion that “… the 
experiential study of mysticism should obviously begin with the study of the former [the 
rational/attainable].  Whether the results of such an exploration will also be valid for the 
latter domain [irrational/transcendent] can only be determined after that domain has come 
within reach too.  But this step need not cause anxiety now, when we have not well 
begun.”73  The application of rational methods and categories to the study of mysticism 
need not be treated as an “all-or-nothing” method that forms permanent cleavages in the 
study of mysticism.  As demonstrated in the three aforementioned approaches, the use of 
rational/categorizational techniques can be done in a relative manner that does not 
challenge the core of the mystical experience.             
 However, we need only look as far as Ibn Arabi and Sankara to find a strong 
denunciation of rationalism within mysticism.  Ibn Arabi’s idea of wujud (unity with 
God), as the ideal form of knowledge, rapidly undermines the categories and labels 
employed within contextualist approaches to mysticism; this is because wujud is more 
related to “witnessing” than to logical understanding.74  A careful reading of Ibn Arabi 
will reveal that true knowledge (gnostic knowledge) is gained through the heart’s 
unveiling and not through processes/systems employed within rationalistic 
deconstruction.75  Since all knowledge leads back to God, at least according to Ibn Arabi, 
it is worthwhile to note that realization is believed to extend beyond the application of 
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rational thought.  “Rather, he [Ibn Arabi] wants to urge his readers to go beyond the role 
of learning, to achieve understanding of their own, and to realize and verify for 
themselves the truth that is written out in the signs and verses of scripture, the universe, 
and the soul.”76  It follows, upon sympathetic acceptance of Ibn Arabi’s situationally 
specific denunciation of rationalism, that the categories and contexts used to deconstruct 
mystical accounts are undercut by true realization.  Ibn Arabi does find a use for 
rationality and it can be frequently found in his philosophical musings.77  However, the 
rational process is understood as having a limited role in actualizing the subjective 
mystical experience.  Rationality can help to understand mystical statements and the 
philosophical presuppositions that those statements are built upon, yet rationality is 
believed to find its limit when it comes to the subjective mystical experience, which is 
understood as being beyond any form of rationalization.78  It would be a mistake to think 
that Ibn Arabi does not employ rationality.  Rather, rational philosophical analysis is used 
in a specific manner and is combined with reminders that philosophy is a provisional tool 
with limited scope. 
Similarly, Sankara and the Vedantins assert that rationality is useful but must be 
subjugated to the srutis (divinely revealed literature) and that any contradiction between 
divine revelation and reason must be settled on the side of revelation.79  This is an 
example of rationalistic thought being subverted to religious revelation.  With the 
identification of rational/categorical thought as second order beliefs, it is important that 
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we realize Katz and other accused reductionists employ epistemological methods that are 
denounced by mystics (in that rational thought does not properly describe the mystical 
experience nor can it give rise to one’s own mystical experience).    
 On the opposite side of the scale we run into approaches that group together all 
mystical experiences as being of a similar nature.  Furthermore, these essentialists assert 
that all mystics attempt to achieve the same end.  Kazemi claims that “…the forms of the 
traditions may be seen as so many paths leading to a transcendent essence, realized as one 
by the mystics only at the summit of spiritual realization; short of this summit the 
differences between the traditions are to be seen as relative but nonetheless real on their 
own level.”80  Seyyed Hossein Nasr is a strong proponent of this essentialist 
understanding of mysticism, and by extension, the religious traditions that provide the 
superstructure to the respective mystical traditions.81  Nasr’s discussion of the secular 
minded Promethean man and the theo-centric Pontifical man demonstrates a concerted 
effort to identify an inherent divine/religious nature to humanity, which is believed to 
have been diminished with the increase of secularization.82  Traditional Islam in the 
Modern World provides us with an excellent example of how Nasr sees traditional 
religious societies as being more organic and holistic, as compared to modern society that 
is believed to alienate the individual from the collective whole (this whole being 
comprised of the religious natures inherent within all people).83  Nasr’s call for the return 
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to a traditionalist worldview makes abundant reference to Massignon, Corbin, and 
Burckhardt, which demonstrates his essentialist perspective (in that he is not hesitant to 
reach beyond his own religious tradition to find justification).84  Such universalism can 
also be seen in Nasr’s idea that religiously minded individuals “… who are endowed with 
intellectual intuition can anticipate intellectually the Centre where all the radii meet, the 
summit which all roads reach.”85  It clear that Nasr views the ethos of traditional Islam as 
being able to accommodate other religious traditions, and furthermore, that all traditional 
religions have this complementary ethos.86  
Frithjof Schuon is another strong proponent of mystical essentialism.  Schuon, 
like Nasr, differentiates between what is recognized as dogmatic orthodoxy and the 
inherent spirit that binds all true religions together.87  It is also claimed that this 
understanding of religion shapes dogmatic differences into complementary opposites; 
“One should never lose sight of the fact that dogmas are key-coagulations of supra-
formal light; to acknowledge a coagulation is to acknowledge a form and hence a 
limitation and exclusion.  The Spirit can be manifested, but it cannot be enclosed…”88  
Schuon asserts, like Nasr, that religious experience are the fundamental principles within 
the world’s religious traditions and that any attempt to assert dogmatic difference over 
esoteric similarity would mistake the form for the essence. 
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 An issue that we, as religious studies scholars, encounter with the aforementioned 
essentialist theorists is their underlying postulation that esoteric realizations are more 
important than exoteric dogma.  We may acknowledge that in this regard, they are often 
better aligned with the opinion of the mystics whom they are studying than those theorists 
who opt for a contextualist focus.  However, as religious studies scholars, we are not 
constrained to submit to, and accept the hierarchical structures of religious value 
presented to us by practitioners, theologians, and other “insiders.” For instance, religious 
studies scholars do not only read the scriptures deemed canonical by a particular religious 
group and ignore other pertinent literature that is not valued or dismissed by parishioners.  
A balanced academic approach should grant a sympathetic ear to the practitioner without 
accepting the “truth-value” claims made by insiders.  In this context, we cannot let 
assertions of esoteric predominance and value come to influence our attention to exoteric 
matters to such a degree that we ignore the latter altogether.  The approach adopted by 
Nasr and Schuon, although illuminating, relies heavily on accepting the predominance of 
esoteric realization.   
Katz counters this by stating that an understanding of “…how mystical 
fellowships work and how individual mystics pursue their ambitious metaphysical 
goals… [means that] one not only has to concentrate attention of the rarified, and rare, 
moments of ecstasy, adhesion, supernal marriage, mindlessness, satori, nirvana, and 
unity, but one also has to pay close attention to the sorts of exegetical techniques, and the 
ways of studying scripture…”89 We must recognize that mystics place great value in 
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esoteric realization above exoteric dogma, however, we as neutral observers cannot adopt 
this position when taking a broad survey of mysticism.  The predominance granted to the 
content of the mystical experience has long been a popular focus within the study of the 
topic, with much less attention given to scholarly efforts to contextualize mystical claims.  
With the inherent supremacy of a necessary focus on the mystical experience deflected, it 
is easier for a religious studies scholar to evaluate features of mysticism as artifacts of a 
particular religious system (or more correctly, as artifacts of a particular metaphysical 
worldview).  
 This study aligns itself with Katz, who says, “In other words, mystics and students of 
mysticism have to recognize that mystical experience is not (putatively) solely the 
product of the conditioned act of experience as constituted from the side of the 
experiencer, but is also constituted and conditioned by what the object or ‘state of affairs’ 
is that the mystic (believes he) encounters or experiences.”90  We need not take this 
statement as claiming a Durkheimian reliance on culture for meaning.  Rather, I submit 
that a particularly beneficial methodological approach can be used to examine features of 
mysticism as products of a particular tradition and then understand them as instances or 
components within the category of “general mysticism”.91  This involves an explicit 
                                                 
90 Katz, Steven “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism,” in Mysticism and 
Philosophical Analysis, 64. 
91 I do not claim that this contextualist approach is the only proper method or that it can 
explain all instances of mysticism.  The mystical experience that turned Saul into Paul 
provides an apt rebuttal to my argument.  Paul’s mystical experience involved a rapid 
reorientation in his worldview, which led to the rejection his previous system of thought.  
This is obviously a problem in that Paul’s new metaphysical system cannot be directly 
attributed to principles in his old.  This shows how religious beliefs can be changed 
through mystical experiences and that the mystical experience need not be the direct 
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recognition of the exoteric superstructure that frames mystical accounts.  An examination 
of the surrounding superstructure will allow us to postulate on how each mystical 
philosophy is partially related to its religious (or cultural) context (even though it can be 
claimed that the realized mystic no longer needs the contextual support base provided by 
exoteric traditions).   
This is in keeping with William James’ assertion that non-mystics need not grant 
superiority to esoteric practices and the propositions rendered by mystics.92  Furthermore, 
the mystics that we are examining make it clear that knowledge of the exoteric tradition 
must precede any attempt at esoteric practices.  The later subjugation of exoteric practices 
to esoteric realization (especially in the case of Sankara) arises from propositions within 
the exoteric tradition that are interpreted as pointing to a higher reality.  Each instance of 
esoteric religious mysticism can be treated as having some form of conceptual 
relationship with the surrounding exoteric traditions, which is something the essentialist 
viewpoint devalues, focusing instead on esoteric similarities to the neglect of the 
surrounding conceptual and contextual landscape. 
 A middle position between reductionism and essentialism will provide us with a 
more suitable approach to the study of mysticism.  Sacred scriptures and the surrounding 
exoteric traditions are able to provide a contextual structure to our study, yet we need not 
reduce the positions examined to that exoteric context.  James attempts a similar line of 
                                                 
system of thought entailed a rejection of his previously held Judaic system.  This can be 
interpreted as a continued relationship between the pre-mystical and post mystical 
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of conceptual relationship (as Sankara and Ibn Arabi point out, a rejection does not entail 
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reasoning by questioning the relationship between mystical experiences and the 
underlying theological propositions.93  The rooting of mystical experiences within a 
theological foundation does not negate the mystical experience or the transcendence of 
dogma that is claimed to occur.  In fact, Underhill claims that most mystical philosophies 
are openly “… founded upon the formal creed which the individual mystic accepts.  It is 
characteristic of him that in so far as his transcendental activities are healthy he is 
generally an acceptor and not a rejector of such creeds (sic).”94  Similarly, the 
transcendence of dogmatic theology need not entail a complete rejection of orthodoxy.  A 
survey of religious mystics will demonstrate that there is great respect for the orthodox 
base that makes transcendence possible.95  I propose that religious orthodoxy can help 
provide a general indication of mystical direction and substance (please see footnote 91 
for the requisite caveats to this statement).  The subjective substance of mystical 
experiences cannot be fruitfully examined without running into major difficulties, and 
that is why second order descriptions and religious dogma should be used as indicators 
for general observations regarding mysticism.96  With this position, we need not go as far 
as Katz in claiming that “There are no pure (unmediated) experiences.  Neither mystical 
experience nor more ordinary forms of experience give any indication, or grounds for 
believing, that they are unmediated.”97  Understanding the relationship between religious 
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orthodoxy and mystical accounts provides us with general indications of mystical 
direction without forcing us to negate the claimed validity in unmediated-irreducible 
mystical experiences.  The treatment of mystical claims as being second order 
descriptions allows us, as academics, to point out how certain accounts and positions 
indicate a divergence or convergence in experience without actually speculating on the 
substance of those experiences.  Furthermore, the “context-as-second-order-indicators” 
approach permits us continued reference to context, which reduces problems when we 
deal with the mystic’s claims of transcending knowledge and orthodoxy.   
Kazemi is not able to completely overcome this problem and is forced to diminish 
the value of contextual meaning, as demonstrated in this quote: “The overriding 
conclusion is that, based on the pronouncements of the mystics studied here, one can 
justifiably speak of a single, transcendent essence of spiritual realization, whatever the 
religious starting point.  The stress here is on the word transcendent; anything short of 
this level inescapably entails multiplicity and hence differences as well as similarities, but 
not unity: unity in an absolute sense is only to be found at the level of the Absolute, that 
is, at the transcendent level…”98  The method propounded within this paper does not 
require the abandonment of contextual references when dealing with transcendent 
experiences, nor does it reduce these experiences to the context in which they are found 
and presented.  The ineffability credited to mysticism is still maintained yet not to the 
hindrance of our observations; all that needs to be conceded is the level on which our 
analysis occurs (that being second order). 
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 It is now appropriate, after this lengthy examination of methodological 
techniques, to render our working definition of mysticism that will be employed 
throughout this paper.  First, our definition of mysticism must include a theory of 
interconnectedness that takes place between higher and lower realms of consciousness 
(the idea of higher and lower realms of consciousness is intended to imply that there are 
objective and hierarchical levels of consciousness that can be achieved).  This 
interconnectedness also includes the transmission of special knowledge, which may take 
the form of experience or traditional revelatory moments.  James believes the noetic 
quality of mysticism to be one of its four major characteristics, and that mystical events 
are “…states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.  They 
are illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, inarticulate though 
they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for after-
time.”99  Second, as touched upon in the previous quote, mystical events carry with them 
a sense of authority that is believed to supersede forms of knowledge achieved through 
rational means.  As a point of sympathetic interpretation, this paper will not challenge 
this assertion, but it will, similar to Staal’s assertion, treat mysticism as being a partially 
rational system that can be examined as containing aspects common to all systems of 
thought.100  Third, mysticism need not be limited to a monistic experience where the 
mystic sees his/herself as being identical with God and the universe (pantheism).  As 
mentioned previously, Madhva and other bhakti mystics demonstrate that dualism can 
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accommodate mystical experiences.101  The binding of mysticism to monism is an 
unproductive view that greatly limits our understanding of mysticism.   
As informative as Underhill is on the topic of mysticism, I am forced to disagree 
with her in regards to her idea of mystical ascent, which is “…an ordered movement 
towards ever higher levels of reality, ever closer identification with the Infinite.”102  It is 
appropriate to conclude that a majority of mystical experiences are strongly 
monistic/pantheistic, yet in order to uphold neutrality, we cannot limit mysticism to these 
instances.   It is not our job to make mysticism a coherent, uniform, and pan-religious 
phenomena.  It must also be acknowledged that disagreement exists within the broad 
category of mysticism.  Staal similarly feels the need to highlight tensions found within 
mysticism, without actually coming to a solution; “Many of the different views of 
mystics on mysticism are inconsistent with each other; most of them result from prior 
convictions and are mere dogmatic assertions.  One may turn out to be the correct one; or 
all may be wrong; but, since they differ, they cannot all be right.”103  Our definition of 
mysticism must be left lacking in order to facilitate the different varieties of mysticism 
that we will encounter.  Nevertheless, I will venture to assert that mysticism is a noetic 
event that involves the transfer of special knowledge that is beyond rational thought.  
Furthermore, mystical events are believed to carry with them an authority that is 
bestowed upon the mystic by accessing a higher level of consciousness.  This is to be 
understood in an objective manner that indicates a hierarchical ascent of consciousness, 
which ultimately leads to a relationship with the Real (though it need not be a pantheistic 
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identification).  Throughout the course of this project our definition will be found to be 
incomplete, yet the project’s intention is to focus on Ibn Arabi and Sankara as mystical 
philosophers, and therefore, our definition of mysticism will be in relation to these two 
figures (as opposed to making these two figures fit my definition of mysticism). 
Another constraint to which this paper adheres is in regards to the ineffability of 
mystical experiences.  William James claims there is an inherent ineffability to the 
mystical experience that creates a cleavage between the actual mystical experience and 
the subsequent descriptions of that modality.104  Ineffability is an equally important 
feature in Sankara’s mystical philosophy: “Things are known determinately (vijnana) 
through the sense-organs and the mind.  But we cannot know the Absolute determinately 
as ‘such and such’ because the Absolute does not fall within their range.”105  Mystical 
experiences are claimed to reside outside the range of categorical thought, meaning that 
Sankara’s descriptive statements, regarding his own mystical experiences, are 
approximations based on his own ineffable experiences.106  Ibn Arabi makes a similar 
distinction between knowledge that is gained through reflection (aql) and the knowledge 
that is gained through the heart (qalb).107  The Shaykh believes that both forms of 
knowledge ultimately lead back to God, yet the knowledge gained through the heart is 
understood to be fluid in nature and is contrasted by reflective knowledge, which creates 
seemingly stable categories and logical formulations.108 However, the stability of rational 
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thought is claimed as a hindrance that binds the individual to specific concepts of God.109  
The ineffable knowledge that is gained through the heart is not limited to specific forms 
of belief and is thought to be more representative of God’s never ending, non-repeating, 
self-revelation.110  This is why Ibn Arabi frequently references the heart’s unveiling as 
being vital in the attainment of God knowledge (even though this knowledge does not 
produce stable forms of categorical knowledge). 
  This project focuses on the philosophical statements and presuppositions that are 
present in Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s mystical systems.  However, there will be continued 
recognition that the knowledge gained through esoteric realization is ineffable and highly 
subjective.  The philosophical presuppositions that this study discusses should not be 
understood as determining the nature of the mystical experience itself.  Furthermore, the 
philosophical and experiential statements that Sankara and Ibn Arabi provide are not 
direct translations of their own personal experiences.  Rather, these statements are 
believed to be indirect explanations that provide general orientation for those who want 
to attain their own mystical experience.  Both mystics recognize the need to achieve 
personal mystical experience and that the subject of mystical experiences “…immediately 
says that it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in 
words.  It follows from this that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be 
imparted or transferred to others.”111  The contextualization of the mystical experience is 
beyond the scope of this paper and is viewed as highly inappropriate by mystics and 
mystical commentators alike.  The contextual components of this paper are directed 
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towards the philosophical systems constructed by Sankara and Ibn Arabi (and not 
towards their ineffable experiences).       
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CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF HINDU AND ISLAMIC MYSTICISM 
This section consists of a brief overview of theories and figures within Hindu and 
Islamic mysticism.  Hindu mysticism will be examined as being neither homogeneous 
nor completely incongruent.  Similarities and differences become apparent when Vedic 
sacrificial mysticism is compared to the philosophical mysticism found within the 
Upanisads.  Certain Vedic sacrifices will be examined as vehicles that are believed to 
facilitate a specific type of mystical experience.  Mysticism is equally present in the 
Upanisads, yet there are substantial differences between Vedic and Upanisadic ideas of 
mysticism.  It will be argued that these differences are worthy of attention yet do not 
constitute a major cleavage within Hindu mysticism.  Mysticism will also be 
demonstrated as being present in the bhakti devotionalism espoused within the Bhagavad 
Gita.  Because bhakti is very adaptable we will encounter numerous ideas about the 
mystical goal of bhakti worship; furthermore, an investigation into the varied principles 
within bhakti mysticism will demonstrate that bhakti is a spiritual tool more than a 
theistic belief set or a specific form of mysticism.  Reference to Dasgupta, 
Radhakrishnan, and Dimock establishes that bhakti can serve as a commonality between 
mystical systems that would otherwise be seen as very different.  Study of mysticism 
within the Vedas, Upanisads, and Bhagavad Gita demonstrates a common concern for 
mysticism and a uniform account of Hindu mysticism can be found if that is one’s 
interpretive goal.  However, it is equally important that mystical statements derived from 
the Vedas, Upanisads, and Bhagavad Gita are understood as possessing important 
philosophical and theological differences. 
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Important principles within Islamic mysticism can be derived from interpreting 
Muhammad as a shaykh and exemplar of esoteric practices.  This approach to 
Muhammad will also provide insights into the varied forms of Islamic mysticism.  Sufis 
have frequently interpreted Muhammad as a shaykh that attained a transcendental union 
with God, and then provided a means for others to achieve this union.  This interpretation 
sees Muhammad as an archetypal Sufi that experienced the “…passing away of the 
human ego-self in union with the divine beloved.”112  Furthermore, Muhammad’s Night 
Ascent has been used as a prototype for the Sufi mystical path.  There has been a great 
deal of Sufi literature that interprets the Night Ascent, and much of this literature centers 
on Muhammad’s experience at the lote tree.  These interpretations are important because 
Muhammad’s “nearness” to God has been understood as the apex of Islamic mysticism.  
Muhammad is believed to have achieved a union with God that no other human had 
achieved, and for that reason Sufis use the Prophet as a model in the formation of 
mystical practices.  The importance of Muhammad within Islamic mysticism is to such an 
extent that Sufis have regarded his actions as possessing an esoteric element that is 
believed to be the embodiment of Quranic mysticism.    
Hindu Mysticism 
There are aspects within Vedic sacrifice that identify a non-particularized 
undercurrent to the worldly realm.113  Furthermore, this cosmic order is claimed to 
become accessible to the devotee through specific sacrificial rites.114  Zaehner claims that 
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participation in these rites involves a ‘creative self-immolation’ where the participant is 
transported to a primal and undifferentiated beginning.115  Dasgupta makes this claim 
when he states that “…Vedic mysticism prepared the way for the rise of the other forms 
of mysticism that sprang up in India.”116  Heat & Sacrifice in the Vedas by Uma Marina 
Vesci similarly describes how Vedic sacrifice became directed towards a center that was 
considered the matrix for all creation: “Sacrifice is, therefore, no longer an action which 
is directed towards the Deities, but an action which draws the Deities towards its Centre.  
Henceforth it is simply the very source of the existence of the Deities as also of men and 
of all the created in general.”117  There is a duality recognized within each human: one 
part biological that is bound to the earth, and another that possesses the ability to 
transcend earthly existence and become unified with the One (daiva atman).118  It should 
be noted that the idea of the One in Vedic and Upanisadic literature differs significantly, 
yet in both the Vedas and Upanisads there exists the idea of realms of consciousness and 
forms of esoteric knowledge that are mystically achieved.  
Mysticism found in Vedic ritualism is not far removed from the transcendental 
mysticism of the Upanisads.  Sacrifice is not abandoned within Upanisadic mysticism; 
rather, it is used as a “…reference point [and] metaphor, for the focus upon the 
realization of the self (atman) and the identity of the self with the all-important force that 
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animates the world.”119  Dagupta does not recognize a total abandonment of Vedic 
ritualism within the Upanisads.120  Differences between the Vedas and Upanisads can be 
claimed as a shift in focus, and are often described as a process where the material 
sacrifice is intellectualized.121  Upanisadic criticism of the overly formalized ritual does 
not constitute a complete rejection of the sacrificial system or of the Brahmin priests.  
“The authors of the Upanisads had a sufficient sense of the historic to know that their 
protest would become ineffective if it should demand a resolution in things.  They 
therefore ask only for a change in the spirit.  They reinterpret sacrifice and allegorize 
them.”122  The Upanisadic authors did not reject the Vedas nor did they seek a complete 
overhaul of Vedic rituals.  The aspect I wish to highlight is not the disjunction between 
Vedic Hinduism and Upanisadic Hinduism; rather, attention should be paid to the 
Upanisads’ innovative focus on the self as the vehicle for transcendence and mystical 
union.   
The Upanisadic internalization of sacrifice is a particularly useful view because it 
allows for continuity between the Upanisads and the Vedas, and accounts for new 
individualistic tendencies seen within the Upanisads.123  “Priests are no longer praised for 
the sacrifices they perform, but rather their marks of authority are teaching, discussing, 
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learning, and debating.”124  The Upanisads hold that the Brahmin class is no longer the 
principal spiritual linkage between the devotee and the Absolute.125  Rather, through the 
internalization of sacrifice, the Upanisadic follower is believed to gain the ability to 
independently actualize their spiritual goals (moksa).  No longer do the mystical powers 
reside “…in the external performances, but in specific forms of the meditator’s thinking.  
This represents an approach towards a consciousness of self and toward a recognition of 
the mystical powers of thought and meditation of a peculiar type.”126  The internalization 
of sacrifice is not against the Vedic ethos because Hindu sacrifice is considered a means 
to a spiritual end, and remains pertinent only through reevaluation of its function and 
form.127  Vedic mysticism does not seek Brahmanic identification as witnessed in the 
Upanisads; rather, the Vedas describe a form of transcendence and union with a cosmic 
center that is achieved through sacrifice.128  I argue that the conceptual base created 
within Vedic mysticism is still operative in the Upanisads, though the definition and 
means to transcendence has changed. 
It would be wrong to declare bhakti as originating in the Bhagavad Gita or the 
Bhagavata Purana; instead, bhakti should be considered as first being present within the 
Vedas.  David Lorenzen similarly recognizes bhakti devotionalism in certain Vedic 
hymns: “…what is missing in early Vedic texts is not bhakti in this wide generic sense 
but the association of bhakti with Puranic mythology, with the key ideas of Hindu 
metaphysics such as Brahman, dharma, karma, samsara, and moksa, and with the social 
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ideology of caste and class.”129  This is in keeping with Sharma’s assertion that the key to 
understanding bhakti is not the deity that is the object of devotion, but the emotional 
attachment that is exercised within bhakti worship.130  At this point it is important that we 
make a distinction, bhakti that is directed towards a deity (Krsna, Siva, or Kali) is called 
saguna-bhakti, while bhakti worship that is directed towards the formless Brahman is 
called nirguna-bhakti.131  Bhakti need not be directed towards Krsna or any deity, and 
there are many instances where the devotional approach has been applied to the 
attainment of realization. 
An even account of bhakti mysticism cannot be achieved because bhakti is 
incorporated in different ways.  “Bhakti as an emotive part of the religious quest has an 
important place in every religious tradition in a general sense of devotion.”132  However, 
mystical aspects are surely found within bhakti literature.  One commonality is the 
direction of bhakti mysticism towards a deity as being the endgame of religious 
adherence (this is to the exclusion of nirguna bhakti, to which I will later attend).  
Mysticism within saguna-bhakti seeks a personal relationship with god, a relationship 
that requires both parties remain distinct.133  Radhakrishnan claims that this particular 
type of devotee does not seek to be subsumed within god; a division between both parties 
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must exist for the ultimate state of bliss to continue between the devotee and the god.134  
The gopis longing for Krsna idealizes a form of devotional love because the gopis always 
have a degree of separation between themselves and their beloved (except for Radha, 
however, she is considered to embody a different form of bhakti love).135  In describing 
the Vaisnava-sahajiya cult Edward Dimock relates that “[t]he separation of lovers is the 
best illustration of the proper attitude of the worshiper towards God, because it draws the 
mind away from the satisfaction of the self…”136 Through longing the devotee is claimed 
to become transfixed on god, thus making god the sole object of contemplation.  Some 
bhakti commentators have claimed that this blissful state only occurs when the sole 
object of one’s contemplation permits the “…continuous stream of remembrance 
…uninterrupted like the flow of oil…”137     
The idea of loving devotion towards Brahmanic identification, as demonstrated 
within nirguna bhakti, should be understood as being derived from a number of different 
sources.  First, a practitioner can develop a longing for the realization of Ultimate Reality 
that is similar to the gopis’ desire for Krsna.  This might not include such a large degree 
of sexuality, however nirguna bhakti can still be considered a form of desire, as a lover 
feels lost without their beloved.  “Whereas saguna bhakti can be connected with various 
Hindu traditions and the worship of personal deities, the genesis of nirguna bhakti can be 
traced back to the Upanishadic speculations about the Nirguna Brahman and the monistic 
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view of reality.”138  The Atman-Brahman relationship (and the Atman’s tendency to seek 
identification with Brahman) is an instance of the Atman longing for the realization of its 
natural state.  The Upanisads need not be viewed as emotionless; rather, the Upanisads 
can be seen as entailing a form of nirguna bhakti that allows the Atman to achieve its 
desired end. Radhakrishnan claims that all forms of bhakti eventually lead to nirguna 
bhakti because the formless Brahman is the true pinnacle within the bhakti tradition.139      
“The Gita… recognizes nirguna bhakti, or devotion to the 
qualityless, as superior to all else, then the absolute becomes the 
most ultimate category. When devotion is perfected then the 
individual and his God become suffused into one spiritual 
ecstasy, and reveal themselves as aspects of one life.  Absolute 
monism is therefore the completion of the dualism with which the 
devotional consciousness starts.”140 
Practitioners of saguna bhakti would not agree to this claim (as explained previously, 
dualism is required for an eternal state of bliss within some forms of devotional worship).  
However, it is important to recognize that devotionalism can be attached to different 
mystical systems, and how it need not be assigned to Visnu, Siva, Kali, or any god.  
Rather, bhakti mysticism is a means that can be adapted to seek a particular ends.  
Islamic Mysticism 
The apex of Muhammad’s importance as an exemplar of esoteric practices can be 
found within the Isra and Mi’raj.  The Isra is Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to 
Jerusalem, where upon arriving he leads the prophets of Abrahamic descent in prayer and 
                                                 
138 Krishna Sharma, Bhakti and the Bhakti Movement: A New Perspective (Delhi: 
Munshiram Manoharal, 1987), 10.  
139 This includes forms of saguna bhakti because, in Radhakrishnan’s opinion, a deity is 
only a lesser form of Ultimate Reality that can be transcended.   
140 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy v.2, 565.  
 52 
then begins the second stage of his journey.  The Mi’raj is Muhammad’s ascension from 
Jerusalem, through various levels of heaven, to the “…Lote-tree beyond which none may 
pass.”141  It is here that the Quran claims that Muhammad “…saw some of the greatest 
Signs of his Lord…”142 This journey is used as the archetype for spiritual ascension 
within Sufism.  There is a horizontal and a vertical element in the Isra and Mi’raj.  The 
horizontal aspect is represented by Muhammad’s travel to the centre of Islam, which at 
this time was Jerusalem and not Mecca, and it is in Jerusalem that Muhammad 
demonstrates his seniority over the other prophets by leading them in prayer.143/144  Some 
commentators have interpreted Muhammad’s journey to Jerusalem as being 
representative of a spiritual journey to the center of one’s being.145  This can also be 
interpreted as travel to an axis mundi, where the link between earth and heaven can be 
bridged.146  The verticality of the Mi’raj can be understood as being comprised of 
hierarchical states that see Muhammad come to a center where “…the Prophet’s pure 
body could reach an immediate proximity to God that the normal believer, nay, even, the 
greatest saint, can reach only in the spirit.”147  Once again the superiority of Muhammad 
is observed in his unprecedented access to the divine.  Gabriel accompanies Muhammad 
through the different levels of heaven and his interviews with the residing prophets.  
Ultimately, Muhammad is lead to a point where even Gabriel cannot pass.  “This idea of 
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the Prophet’s superiority to all creatures, human and angelic, appears to have held 
considerable interest among the early Sufi sages in their discussion of the mystical 
meaning of the Ascension.”148   
There is a clear hierarchy within Sufi mysticism that can be partially credited to the 
hierarchical nature within accounts of the Isra and Mi’raj.149  Descriptions of 
Muhammad’s heavenly journey contain important language that uses “…spatial referents, 
such as proximity (qulb) and distance (bu’d).”150  Sells claims that the hierarchy of 
spiritual stations is greatly expanded upon in later Sufi descriptions of the different 
heavens and hells.151  The importance of this spiritual hierarchy is present in the works of 
Sufi commentators, and is particularly important within the works of Bistami and Ibn 
Arabi, both of who wrote accounts of their own spiritual ascent and union with the 
Divine.  It is even possible that the heavens and stations described in the Mi’raj 
influenced Dante’s Divine Comedy.152  I contend that Muhammad’s ascension into 
heaven and ‘nearness’ to the Divine acts more as an example of transcendence than an 
objective explanation of how to achieve transcendence.  At no point does the Quran 
clearly explicate the details of Muhammad’s ascent, however, the Isra and Mi’raj are 
briefly mentioned in Sura 17, where praise is sung to the servant who journeyed “…by 
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night from the Masjif al-Haram to the Majid al-Aqsa around which We have blessed so 
that We cause him to see Our Signs.”153  Detailed descriptions of the Isra and Mi’raj are 
found within hadith and later commentaries.  The formalization of techniques to 
transcend spiritual states and achieve a union with the Divine is a task left to later Sufi 
thinkers.  This is on par with other religious texts that identify a spiritual goal, yet do not 
provide an objective means of obtaining this goal.154  Furthermore, it is within the 
individual’s subjective emulation of the Prophet that he (Muhammad) is identified as the 
shaykh par-excellence.  This is in accordance with Schimmel’s claim that “In the 
understanding of classical Islamic religious theory, Muhammad’s sunna consists of his 
actions (fi’l), his words (qaul), and his silent approval of certain facts (taqrir).”155  A 
tripartite approach to understanding the Prophet allows for different truths and spiritual 
techniques to be found within his teachings and actions.  It follows that Muhammad can 
be viewed as embodying Quranic teachings and all the esoteric elements within. 
“On one occasion after the death of Muhammad when his favorite 
wife A’ishah was asked what he was like, she replied: ‘His nature 
was the Quran.’ This must be taken to mean that from her intense 
and intimate experience of the Prophet she formed the impression 
that he was an incarnation of the revealed Book.”156  
The esoteric insights achieved by Muhammad are claimed to have survived through 
chains of transmission (isnads) that are facilitated by the master-disciple relationship 
(wali to wali transmission- note that wali is a term that can be used to describe both the 
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master and the protégé).157  Manny Sufi orders believe themselves to be in possession of 
esoteric knowledge that is linked to Muhammad.   
It is clear that Muhammad is regarded as being more than a prophetic figure who 
transmitted the Quran.  The Prophet is also identified as the ideal Muslim who embodied 
all Quranic principles.  For this reason many Sufis have regarded his actions as 
possessing an esoteric element that is representative of the mysticism found within the 
Quran.  However, Sufi interpretations of Muhammad have expanded to identify The 
Prophet as being a manifestation of God’s revelation.  The Light Verse (24:35) is 
frequently referenced as a mystical passage that describes God’s revelation as being a 
light onto the world: “God is the Light of the heavens and the earth.  The parable of His 
Light is as a niche in which there is a lamp.”158  Schimmel credits early Sufis such as 
Muqatil and more importantly al-Tustari, as being the first proponents of the 
Mohammedan Light as a feature that, among many other things, links the creation to the 
Creator.159  Al-Tustari further interprets the Light Verse through reference to Sura 53:13, 
where Muhammad is claimed to have had a mystical experience of God that predates the 
Mi’raj: “Indeed he saw in another time, near the Lote Tree of the Final End…”160 In this 
regard, Muhammad can be seen as a cosmic principle that predates creation and provides 
the means for a relationship with God.  Al-Hallaj’s The TS of the Lamp claims 
Muhammad as the one “…who brought an eternal Word, not temporal, not spoken, and 
not made, which is united with God without separation, and which passes beyond the 
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understanding.”161  Some Sufis view Muhammad as more than an ideal Muslim and a 
transmitter of the Quran.  To many, the Prophet is the principle through which God 
makes himself known and a means in which God experiences himself.162  Schimmel 
claims that the identification of Muhammad as a metaphysical principle occurred 
relatively early within the Islamic tradition and that it is possible Hellenistic influences 
helped inform this mystical interpretation of the Prophet.163  Regardless of influencing 
factors, the idea of a Mohammedan Light had become accepted very early within the 
development of Islamic mysticism, and would later become a commonality within Sufi 
literature. 
A myriad of interpretations can be derived from the aforementioned sources and it 
has been the purpose of this section to highlight this potential plurality.  Vedic, 
Upanisadic, and bhakti forms of mysticism need not be understood as being 
harmoniously applied throughout Hinduism.  However, the differences between these 
forms of mysticism can also be understood as being stylistic differences that do not 
constitute major philosophical cleavages.  For this reason, mysticism can be viewed as 
being homogeneous within the Hindu tradition if that is the intent of one’s interpretation.  
Muhammad’s role in Islamic mysticism provides a similar hermeneutical opportunity and 
Sufi commentators continually find new meaning within The Prophet’s sayings and 
actions.  Reference to the Isra and Mi’raj demonstrated that Muhammad can be 
recognized as an exoteric prophet above all previous prophets, which is confirmed in 
Muhammad’s ascension through heaven and his leading the other prophets in prayer.  
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Certain interpretations of Muhammad also view him as an esoteric example.  Muhammad 
is claimed to have achieved an unparalleled “nearness” to God, and his experience at the 
Lote Tree is discussed in many mystical treatises and serves as a continued point of 
mystical reference.  Furthermore, some interpret The Prophet as being a metaphysical 
principle that extends beyond his role as a transmitter of the Quran and an exemplar of 
Islamic practices.  This metaphysical interpretation of Muhammad sees him as a 
prophetic light that makes possible God’s revelation.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
SANKARA 
The objective of this section is to examine Sankara as a mystical and 
philosophical thinker; however, such an examination would be lacking without some 
degree of historical contextualization.  Our historical examination of Sankara will not 
extend beyond a terse treatment of his teachers, stages of life, familial background, and 
ascribed works.  Given the overall contextual nature of this examination it would be 
problematic to devalue historical approaches to understanding Sankara, yet it should be 
remembered that this examination is mostly concerned with Sankara’s theoretical 
propositions, and therefore, historical contextualization must take a backseat to our 
philosophical focus.  It also should be noted that many hagiographic accounts of 
Sankara’s life are intended to provide a compelling narrative, rather than an objective 
historical account.164  In Conquest of the Four Quarters Jonathan Bader rightly points out 
that early biographers of Sankara were mainly concerned with “…locating Sankara in the 
realm of the sacred (hagios).”165  And, as we will see, there is much contention as to 
Sankara’s place in the Hindu landscape. 
It is generally held that Sankara was born in the town of Kaladi in central 
Kerala.166  Sankara’s date of birth and death is still debated within scholarly and religious 
circles, with a majority believing that the mystic was born around 788 CE. and died in or 
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around 820 CE.167 Recently, however, there has been a push to locate Sankara’s life 
somewhere between 650 CE. and 800 CE.168 Some religious commentators have even 
claimed that Sankara was born around 509 BCE, which vastly differs with the common 
scholarly consensus.169  We do know that Sankara, upon renunciation, traveled and 
studied under Govinda, who had been a student of Gaudapada.  Information regarding 
Govinda is lacking, yet it is known that Gaudapada lived from 640-690 CE.170   
An understanding of the historical Sankara becomes much easier to achieve if he 
is understood within the larger Hindu discourse.  This permits us, as scholars, to use the 
content of Sankara’s works as a means of dating him (in that Sankara was partially 
writing in reaction to existing schools and debates).  Dasgupta echoes a similar claim 
when he states, “Sankara did not claim to be the inventor or expounder of an original 
system, but interpreted the sutras and the Upanishads in order to show that there existed a 
connected and systematic philosophy in the Upanishads which was also enunciated in the 
sutras of Badarayana.”171  Teachers, opponents, rival schools and alternate theories can 
all be used as means to reconstruct the historical conditions surrounding Sankara’s life 
and works.  In a similar manner biographies/hagiographies are vastly important in 
understanding Sankara and the religious context in which he was immersed.  Bader 
provides an excellent comparison of hagiographic accounts of Sankara’s life in relation to 
                                                 
167 Bader, Conquest of the Four Quarters, 18. 
168 Ibid., 19. 
169 Ibid., 19. 
170 Sengaku Mayeda, “The Life and Works of Sankara,” in A Thousand Teachings: The 
Upadesasahasri of Sankara, trans. Sengaku Mayeda (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992), 4. 
171 Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy vol. 1. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 430. 
 60 
known historical facts.172  Such a historical/hagiographic undertaking is able to 
demonstrate certain historical trends in relation to Sankara and how he was adopted and 
interpreted by different Hindu groups. 
For our limited historical purposes we can divide Sankara’s life into three stages.  
This might not be the most ideal way of examining the historical Sankara, yet it allows us 
the opportunity to make distinctions that will later become beneficial for our analysis of 
features of his philosophy.  The first stage consists of Sankara’s childhood where he is 
claimed to have easily mastered Sanskrit and the Vedas.  The Sankara Digvijaya, written 
by Madhva posits that Sankara was born into the Brahmin caste and more specifically 
into the Nambudari sub-caste (jati).173  Other early instances of religiosity (or references 
to religious heritage) can be seen in myths that Sankara’s parents were childless and 
partook in intense tapas that impressed Siva so much that he granted the couple a child 
that was an incarnation of himself.174  Later hagiographic material contains a great 
number of assertions that Sankara was an incarnation of Siva.  Some academics have 
come to understand these claims of incarnation as later additions to Sankara lore; 
furthermore, modern scholarship has tended to attribute the mystic with Vaisnava 
sympathies.175  Alston believes that “When he [Sankara] comes to criticize the 
philosophical theories of the theists of his day, he praises the followers of Visnu for 
worshipping Narayana, whom he identified with the Absolute, but he can find nothing to 
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say in defense of the worshippers of Siva at all.”176  Mayeda also recognizes that the 
philosophies of Sankara are more aligned with Vaisnavism, rather than Saivism or 
Saktism.177   
There is, however, unanimous agreement that Sankara left home at an early age 
and became a sannyasin and disciple.  It is his time as a disciple that I arbitrarily term 
Sankara’s second stage.  Most traditional hagiographies relate that Sankara was destined 
to die young and was at death’s door when a crocodile snatched him from the banks of a 
river; it was only upon his mother’s promise to let young Sankara become a sannyasin 
that the crocodile let the boy go.178 Sankara’s near death as a boy provides an interesting 
parallel with the symbolic death that occurs when one adopts the sannyasin lifestyle.  It 
was shortly after his renunciation that Sankara met and became a pupil of Govinda, who 
himself had been a student of Gaudapada.179  The link between Sankara and Gaudapada 
is clearly evident in Sankara’s works.  Dasgupta claims that it is “…particularly 
significant that Sankara should credit Gaudapada and not Badrayana with recovering the 
Upanisad’s creed.  Gaudapada was the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Sankara, but he 
was probably living when Sankara was a student, for Sankara says that he was directly 
influenced by his great wisdom, and also speaks of the learning, self-control and modesty 
of the other pupils of Gaudapada.”180   
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There has been much debate surrounding Gaudapada’s relationship with 
Buddhism.  Dasgupta interprets Gaudapada as being a Buddhist who approached the 
Upanisads as consistent with Buddhist principles.181  Furthermore, Gaudapada’s writings 
show a great deal of respect to the Buddha and other prominent Buddhist thinkers.182  We 
should also note that commentators such as S.S. Roy, in The Heritage of Sankara, claims 
that the similarities between Gaudapada and Buddhist thought does not necessarily lead 
to the conclusion that he was a Buddhist.183  Regardless of Gaudapada’s affiliation, 
Mayeda sees the relationship between Gaudapada, Sankara, Vedanta, and Buddhism as 
important, for Sankara’s commentary on the Gaudapadiyakarika is believed to be an 
important reorientation of Advaita Vedanta away from Buddhist beliefs and towards 
more orthodox Hindu principles.184  Sankara’s refutation of what some commentators 
have termed “Buddhist Nihilism”185 demonstrates a firm commitment to Hinduism and 
the principles taught within the Vedas (for it should not be forgotten that Sankara is, first 
and foremost, a Hindu apologist).186  Roy declares that the three seals (mudras) of 
Buddhism are incompatible with Sankara’s system of thought, the three seals being 
“…(a) Sarvam ananatmanam (universal non-soul-ness) (b) Sarvam anityam (universal 
impermanence), and (c) Nirvanam santam (the quenching of everything in nirvana)… 
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Sankara on the other hand maintains (a) that the Atman is the highest reality, (b) that 
beyond the impermanent, momentary and fleeting procession of the appearances, there is 
the Brahman… (c) that in the highest state -- the state of absolution, nothing is quenched 
or annihilated, but everything attains to its real and noumenal form, which is non other 
than the form of Brahman…”187  For our purposes, we need not attribute Buddhism to 
Gaudapada; nor do we need to place Sankara within a Buddhist lineage.  All that needs to 
be conceded is that Sankara and Gaudapada formed metaphysical systems that were in 
some way cognizant of Buddhist philosophy. 
The third stage of Sankara’s life is marked by travel, philosophical debate, and the 
formation of religious schools (mathas).  An examination of Sankara’s corpus will 
inevitably reveal that Sankara viewed himself as a teacher propounding a specific system 
of thought; this sentiment is further reflected in his founding different mathas.188  A 
majority of hagiographic material claims that Sankara began to found different schools 
around the age of thirty, which “…were established in the following order: Dvaraka, 
Badarinatha, Puri, Srngeri and Kanci.  Sometimes, though, this sequence varies; and 
usually the list of monasteries is supplemented by other mathas in various 
combinations.”189  The actual role that Sankara had in forming these religious schools has 
been brought into question.  Bader warns us that Sankara’s hagiographic descriptions are 
prone to embellishment and that not all mathas have a historical link to the mystic.190  
Aside from theoretical similarities between the mathas and Sankara, many schools trace 
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their lineage back to Sankara for reasons of legitimacy (as opposed to direct historical 
linkages).191  This need not be a major issue in our understanding of Sankara, yet it 
should be regarded as another instance of historical fact being interwoven with myth. 
Another instance of history being combined with legend is found in Sankara’s 
infamous debates with rival darsanas.  While still a young man Sankara is believed to 
have traveled throughout India engaging other gurus in philosophical debate, and given 
the nature of these hagiographies, it is only natural that Sankara is said to have defeated 
every opponent.192  The focus Sankara had on oral debates can be found in his own 
writings; the question and answer format that dominates much of Sankara’s writing 
further indicates a strong disposition towards oral debates.193  Bader posits “Sankara’s 
own works clearly reflects his preoccupation with demonstrating the superiority of the 
way of knowledge over the way of ritual action.  Since his claim rests on the ‘true 
purport’ of the sastras, his compositions are filled with complex arguments concerning 
the interpretation of the sacred texts.”194  Prominent in most of the hagiographies is 
Sankara’s defeat of Mandana/Visarupa; accounts of Sankara’s life have this as an 
important event in which Sankara defeated one of the foremost Hindu ritualists.195  
Sankara’s philosophical debates also included Buddhist, Jain and Carvakin opponents; 
these debates not only provide us with insights into Sankara’s metaphysical system, they 
also provide a multifaceted account of how Sankara applied his system of thought.  The 
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myriad of opponents that Sankara is claimed to have faced is only mirrored by the 
quantity of his rebuttals.  Radhakrishnan aptly describes Sankara as a keen intellect 
pursuing ever-greater challenges and truths; 
“One sees him in youth, on fire with intellectual ambition, a stiff 
and intrepid debater; another regards him as a shrewd political 
genius, attempting to impress on the people a sense of unity; for a 
third, he is a calm philosopher engaged in the single effort to 
expose the contradictions of life and thought with an unmatched 
incisiveness; for a fourth, he is the mystic who declares that we 
are all greater than we know.”196 
It must be reiterated that this treatment of the historical Sankara and his hagiographic 
accounts are only a terse examination meant to provide context to the forthcoming 
philosophical discussion.  Much of Sankara’s life remains shrouded in mystery and 
legend, yet scholarly work has provided valuable insights into the historical Sankara.  In 
the quest to find the historical Sankara, one should acknowledge that the legendary 
Sankara described in hagiographies has been very influential on our current 
understanding of Sankara (which is something that seemingly strict historical 
investigations have a propensity to ignore). 
One more clausal issue must be examined before we launch into the substance of 
Sankara’s mystical philosophy, that being the issue of literary authenticity.  This has 
remained a point of contention within both the religious and academic community, and 
with more than three hundred different works ascribed to Sankara this issue will not be 
resolved in the near future.197  Paul Hacker is recognized as formulating the current 
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scholarly method for discerning authentic Sankara works from the inauthentic.198  “First 
of all, Hacker suggested that one should pay more attention to the colophons of the 
manuscripts, where the author (allegedly, Sankara) appears under different names and is 
bestowed with different titles…The second investigative method makes use of evidence 
from the immediate disciples of Sankara… And finally, the third principle consists in 
analysis of the content, as well as of the special terminology of the work in question.”199  
The Brahmasutrabhasya (A Commentary on the Brahmasutra) is commonly regarded as 
one of the indisputably authentic works of Sankara, and Mayeda holds it to be the yard-
stick by which all other works are measured.200  Mayeda established the authenticity of 
the Upadesasahasri (A Thousand Teachings) through a comparison of terminology to 
that found within the Brahmasutrabhasya.201  For example, the Brahmasutrabhasya 
categorizes avidya (ignorance) as belonging within the larger category of klesa 
(affliction/impurity, defilement); the Upadesasahasri follows a similar line of reasoning 
in stating that “…avidya (or ajnana) is the first member of a series.”202  Mayeda admits 
that the Upadesasahasri does not use the term klesa, yet Mayeda asserts that avidya, 
being a member of a series, is an indirect reference to klesa.203  With regards to Mayeda’s 
study and the Upadesasahasri, Alston claims “… the only verse work which it is safe to 
rely on as a source for Sankara’s doctrine is the verse section of the Upadesa Sahasri 
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[sic.].”204  Through the use of textual analysis the academic community has been able to 
make persuasive claims for the authenticity of certain works, which then serve as a 
platform for further inquiries into authenticity. 
The Upadesasahasri is particularly interesting because it is the only authenticated 
non-commentary work ascribed to Sankara.205  There are multiple non-commentary 
treatises ascribed to Sankara, including the Vivekacudamani, yet the authenticity of these 
texts has recently been called into question.206  The Upadesasahasri is divided into two 
sections consisting of a metrical and a prosaic part (Mayeda’s translation of the metrical 
part is rendered into prose, yet it is noted that the anustubh meter, with 8 syllables to a 
quarter, dominates much of the metrical section).207  The clarity and directness of 
language within the Upadesasahasri makes it an ideal text for introducing students to 
non-dualistic Vedanta; furthermore, the Upadesasahasri is one of the few instances 
where Sankara is able to control the direction of the text (as opposed to commentaries 
where the author is limited to a reactionary role).  The Brahmasutrabhasya eclipses the 
Upadesasahasri when it comes to in-depth analysis and the range of topics covered, 
however, the directness and relative simplicity of the Upadesasahasri can be regarded as 
a boon that provides a distilled account of Sankara’s philosophy.  This practicality is also 
reflected in the prosaic part that Mayeda feels “… must have been written on the basis of 
Sankara’s practical and pedagogical experiences.  The question and answer exchanges 
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between a teacher and his pupil in the Prose Part probably were based upon such 
interchanges between the author and his disciples.  The Prose Part is a handy guide for 
teachers, while the Metrical Part is, as it were, a textbook for the pupils.”208  It is possible 
that the prosaic part and the metrical part were once completely separate works that were 
then synthesized into the current form we have today, yet this should not factor greatly 
into our discussion.209  Although we do not have a precise date regarding the composition 
of the Upadesasahasri, it can still be maintained that Sankara had already formulated 
many of his theories that underpin the more general Upadesasahasri.  The question and 
answer format of the text further adds credence to the belief that the Upadesasahasri was 
composed around an already existent system of thought.   
Sankara’s direct exposition within the Upadesasahasri is particularly useful to our 
current purposes in that it allows for relative ease in cross comparison (as opposed to the 
multilayered Brahmasutrabhasya that requires a great deal of attention and internal 
comparison to discern through the enigmatic and contradictory statements).  A few 
quintessential points will be extracted from the Upadesasahasri and will be further 
supported through reference to some of Sankara’s larger and more thorough 
commentaries.  This paper will not provide a blow-by-blow account of the 
Upadesasahasri in relation to Ibn Arabi, for such an examination is beyond the scope of 
our current purposes and the Upadesasahasri would be lacking the requisite detail for 
such purposes.  However, the Upadesasahasri can be approached as a terse schematic of 
Sankara’s religious system, and as such, can be used as a functional example to compare 
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principles within Sankara and Ibn Arabi.  A further benefit in using the Upadesasahasri 
is the loose contextual nature of each section; early Upadesasahasri manuscripts indicate,  
“… that any single chapter could be selected, copied, and studied apart from the rest.  
This means that reading of the text may begin anywhere.”210  This is a great benefit to our 
purposes because many of Sankara’s metaphorical and symbolic statements should only 
be understood in the context in which they are presented (meaning that many statements 
made in commentaries on the Bhagavad Gita and Brahmasutra are later subjugated, 
within the same commentary, to more important principles).211  
The first topic that will be examined within the Upadesasahasri (and Sankara’s 
other works) will be Brahman as the immanent and transcendent matrix to phenomenal 
existence, the esoteric truth taught within the Vedas, and as being the unrealized 
individual.  Sankara recognizes two distinct modes of experiencing self-identification 
with Brahman, one that starts with Brahman and another that begins with the inner 
Atman.212  Our examination of dreamless sleep and Vedic revelation will explain these 
two techniques and comment on what this means for the individual’s spiritual potential.  
This will lead us to the second point of discussion, which is the hierarchies Sankara 
recognized within Brahman’s manifestation.  Despite the non-dualism that is espoused 
throughout Sankara’s project we can still witness instances of hierarchal organization.  
This ranking is present in Sankara’s interpretation of theistic statements and the benefits 
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of spiritual practices (some practices being more beneficial than others).  Sankara will be 
witnessed as placing smrti and sruti texts in a specific order that pertains to their 
metaphysical value.213  Even the physical world is believed to possess a certain hierarchy, 
in that material composition can be ranked from the most transcendent to the grossest and 
most limited (according to Sankara).214  Much of Sankara’s ranking and hierarchical 
interpretation is in reaction to what he perceives as the ignorance and delusion that 
pervades the un-realized worldview.215  An examination into Sankara’s ideas of maya and 
avidya will provide us better perspective on what Sankara viewed as the cause of 
bondage.  The metaphysical status of maya and avidya will also provide us with the 
opportunity to understand Sankara’s ideas on the power of illusion and the resultant 
phenomenal effects.  The importance of negation will become apparent as Sankara’s idea 
of misinterpretation becomes clearer.  Our discussion of negation, as used by Sankara, 
will be tied into his non-dual philosophy and his ideas on the correct way to express the 
non-dual Absolute.  The use of negation is also present in Sankara’s textual hierarchies 
and his understanding of Vedic revelation.  Negation will be investigated as a tool that 
Sankara employed to guide his way through seemingly contradictory revelations.  Lastly, 
we will investigate transmigratory existence and karmic consequence.  Karmic 
accumulation and the resultant samsaric rebirths will be shown as fundamental aspects 
within Sankara’s thought and will be tied into our previous discussions on maya, avidya, 
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and negation.  It will be demonstrated that Sankara viewed karma as an important aspect 
within reality that testifies to the individual’s existence within a world of illusion.             
Brahman  
The first line of the metrical section in the Upadesasahasri is in recognition of a 
transcendent being that permeates all existence: “Salutation to the all-knowing Pure 
Consciousness which pervades all, is all, abides in the hearts of all beings, and is beyond 
all objects [of knowledge].”216  This is a very apt beginning for it cuts to the core of 
Sankara’s teachings, namely, the need to realize Brahman as Pure Consciousness, or 
more appropriately, the realization of Brahman as one’s true identity and the only 
objective reality that can be experienced.217  Firstly, we should note that Brahman is held 
to be indivisible and transcendent of anything that can be thought or said about it (this is 
a good example of the ineffability that James and Underhill recognized in mystical 
experiences).218  Sankara looks to the sruti and smrti corpus for proof of this 
undifferentiated Brahman: “…the Self is not subject to determination by any means of 
knowledge other than the Veda as traditionally interpreted (agama).  Other entities are 
subject to determination by the empirical means of knowledge such as perception and 
inference conducted in a physical manner and independently of Vedic revelation.”219  
Moreover, Sankara claimed that Brahmanic realization constituted a unique type of 
knowledge because the individual is not able to separate him or herself from Brahman in 
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order to understand it as a distinct entity (in other words, to understand Brahman as an 
object of knowledge).220  The prosaic part of the Upadesasahasri goes to great lengths to 
demonstrate how a proper guru should instill within his pupil a sense of self-
identification with Brahman.221 Sankara further claims in the Brahmasutrabhasya that 
any quality ascribed to Brahman, as the ground of all reality and the locus of each 
individual, is negated through the collapsing distinction between object, agent, and 
experiencer (it should also be added that the atman, as the experiencer, is later subjugated 
to Brahman as the only experiencer possible).222  A common explanatory technique is to 
liken the phenomenal world to foam and Brahman to water; foam is regarded as different 
than clear water, yet the nature of foam is completely dependent on water for its 
manifestation.223  Similarly, the manifest world and the multitude of divisions within are 
experienced as being separate from Brahman, yet these manifestation are completely 
dependent on Brahman and will eventually return to Brahman and be reabsorbed into the 
undifferentiated state that is Brahman (just as foam is enveloped back into the tide).  We 
will later explore how Brahman is presented in different contexts, yet it is of primary 
importance we recognize that on the level of  “…transcendent Brahman there can only be 
one reality, and no qualifiable Brahman can exist in the ultimate sense in which this 
Transcendent has its being.”224 
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Realization of Brahman is considered vastly different than coming to learn about 
Brahman.  The reason for this pertains to the non-duality of Brahman and the duality 
implicit in the rest of existence.  Knowledge of Brahman entails a division between what 
is known and the knower (an inappropriate proposition in Sankara’s radical non-dualism).  
The following quotation is from Sankara’s commentary on the Bhagavad Gita and 
demonstrates the need for realization of Brahman as opposed to the impossible task of 
learning Brahman; 
“In the case of an object of knowledge, like a pot, the knower 
seeks to encompass the object with his knowledge.  If this were 
also the case with knowledge, the knower would seek to 
encompass every cognition with another cognition.  But (this 
would lead to infinite regress and) we do not find that this is so.  
Knowledge, therefore, is immediately evident, as also is the 
knower.  Hence no effort has to be made to gain knowledge of the 
Self.  It is to put an end to false identification of the Self with the 
not-Self that efforts have to be made.  The path of knowledge, 
therefore, is something perfectly within our grasp.”225 
This approach is in accordance to the Upadesasahasri where Sankara claims that 
transmigratory existence is the result of nescience and the lack of discriminating 
knowledge.226  The individual atman is believed to possess all the requisite means for 
self-realization, yet it is the overwhelming force of nescience that causes the atman to 
misinterpret its true inner-nature.227  Sankara credits this misinterpretation to Pure 
Consciousness permeating through the individualistic mind/ego; furthermore, the 
composite and ephemeral buddhi is then believed to be the seat of individualistic 
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consciousness (when in fact it is Atman that provides the impetus for the whole 
process).228 
The Upadesasahasri’s treatment of misinterpretation and discriminating 
knowledge (pramana) is found in the metrical chapter concerning the intellect.  Sankara 
claims that one without discriminating knowledge “…holds that the highest [Atman] does 
not exist, just so when there is discriminating knowledge, nothing but the highest 
[Atman] exists, not even [the intellect] itself.”229  It is important to our investigation of 
Sankara that we realize the mystic did not believe himself to be presenting new 
philosophical truths.  Rather, Sankara believed his project to entail an epistemological 
reorganization (the employment of discriminating knowledge), which would lead to self-
identification with Brahman. 
To be more specific, Sankara believed himself to be synthesizing truths already 
taught within the Vedas, Upanisads, Brahmasutra, and Bhagavad Gita.  This stance can 
also be found in Advaita Vedanta’s nearest relative engaged in scriptural apologetics, 
Purva Mimamsa.230  At no point did Sankara see himself as expounding anything other 
than a mystical path clearly laid out in sruti and smrti literature.  Radhakrishnan insists 
that Sankara’s interpretation of the Upanisads are true to those works’ original intentions, 
yet Radhakrishnan also states that the same cannot be said for Sankara’s treatment of the 
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Brahmasutras.231  Dasgupta echoes Radhakrishnan in claiming, “… dualistic 
interpretations of the Brahma-sutras were probably more faithful to the sutras than the 
interpretations of Sankara.”232  This project will not render an opinion on the original 
intention of the Brahmasutras, yet Sankara’s claim to textual synthesis and not textual 
exegesis should be taken with a grain of salt.   
Unlike the Brahmasutras, non-dual interpretations of the Upanisads are relatively 
easy to defend with a majority of academics and Hindu pundits referring to the discussion 
between Uddalaka and his son Svetaketu as idealizing this monistic ethos.  The most 
cited instance of monism within the Upanisads is found in the claim tat tvam asi (that 
thou art); “That which is the finest essence -- this whole world has that as its soul.  That is 
Reality.  That is Atman (Soul).  That art thou, Svetaketu.”233  These non-dual 
interpretations extended beyond the Upanisads and Brahmasutra; Sankara even found 
instances in the ritualistic Vedas to facilitate his non-dual metaphysical system.  An 
examination of sacrificial texts can identify a non-particularized undercurrent to the 
worldly realm, which is believed to be solely accessible through ritualistic action.234  The 
idea of a Vedic cosmological substratum is in keeping with Mimamsa apologists who 
concerned themselves with orthopraxy.  Mimamsa commentators, like their Vedantic 
cousins, claim the Vedas to be eternal and uncreated; furthermore, both darsanas place 
                                                 
231 Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy vol. 2, 469.  
232 Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy vol. 1, 421.  
233 Robert Ernest Hume trans., The Thirteen Principal Upanishads (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1931), 246. 
234 Brian Smith, “Ritual Perfection and Ritual Sabotage in the Vedas,” History of 
Religions vol. 35 no. 4 (1996): 289. 
 76 
high priority on the Vedas as retelling universal truths that were channeled through the 
risis and then passed down through the Brahmins. 
Is a relationship with a universal force, as partially seen in the Vedas, indicative 
of Upanisadic non-dual mysticism?  Sankara definitely believed so.  There are significant 
differences between Upanisadic and Vedic forms of transcendence, yet both contain 
mystical systems that emphasize the cosmic order (rta).  Dasgupta makes a similar claim, 
stating “…Vedic mysticism prepared the way for the rise of the other forms of mysticism 
that sprang up in India.”235  The Vedas speak about rta as a universal law that is beyond 
individuals, yet incorporates human participation.  Rta can be affected through ritualistic 
action from within the mundane realm.  The only way that this manipulation is facilitated 
is through the correct performance of rituals prescribed within the Vedas.  Smith 
describes rta as a cosmic blueprint, which he claims is prominent in the RgVeda but 
scholastically ignored.236  Brahmanic emphasis on correct procedure during ritual can be 
interpreted as being closely linked to the universal order (rta).  It is the deific ability to 
perform perfect rituals that make Vedic deities godlike, and the human intention is to 
mirror these perfect rituals.237  Heat & Sacrifice in the Vedas by Uma Marina Vesci 
similarly describes how Vedic sacrifice became directed towards a center that was 
considered the matrix for all creation. “Sacrifice is, therefore, no longer an action which 
is directed towards the Deities, but an action which draws the Deities towards its Centre.  
Henceforth it is simply the very source of the existence of the Deities as also of men and 
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of all the created in general.”238  Dasgupta also holds that the power of Vedic deities 
resides within their ritualistic control over rta, and it is the Brahmanic intent to imitate 
such powers.239 
Another example of Sankara finding monistic sentiment in an unusual place is the 
Bhagavad Gita; Alston cites the Bhagavad Gita as providing a major platform for 
Sankara’s non-dual system of thought.240  Theistic and dualistic statements are abundant 
throughout the Bhagavad Gita and it should be admitted that “…Sankara does in some 
cases have to bend the texts to make them conform to a systematic [non-dual] view.”241  
However, the subjugation of dualistic/theistic statements to more important non-dual 
interpretations is a constant theme throughout Sankara.242  The Upadesasahasri explicitly 
claims that any god deemed to be other than a second order manifestation of Brahman 
should not be dwelt upon nor seen as a stepping-stone on the path to liberation.243  
Sankara’s commentary on the Bhagavad Gita does recognize a theistic Lord that 
possesses control over maya, and it is through the power of maya that the Lord is able to 
hide his identity as Brahman (the Lord spoken of by Sankara is often identified with 
Visnu, Vasudeva, Krsna, Narayana, and Hari).244   
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An example of Sankara using divine personages to lead the pupil to realization 
can also be found in the Upadesasahasri, where Krsna’s conversation with Arjuna is 
cited; “Just as Vasudeva (=Krsna) said [to Arjuna] that He himself was the same in the 
holy asvattha fig-tree and in his own body, he who knows himself to be the same is the 
best knower of Brahman.”245 Sankara invested a great deal of effort to support his non-
dualist theory in regards to the Bhagavad Gita and other theistic literature.  We need not 
evaluate Sankara’s success at promoting jnana yoga as the highest form of yoga 
propounded in the Bhagavad Gita, nor do we need to reconcile Sankara with some of his 
more contradictory theistic statements; it is important, however, that we recognize the 
efforts put forth by Sankara to find a thread amongst the seemingly juxtaposed Hindu 
corpus.  Sankara’s commitment to describing Brahman as the highest reality within the 
Hindu corpus is quintessential to understanding Sankara as an apologetic interpreter 
rather than an innovative philosopher. 
Sankara’s approach to the Vedas, Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita demonstrate a 
reliance on sruti and smrti literature as a valid source of knowledge (pramana).  
Furthermore, Sankara viewed the Vedas as telling cosmic truths that could not be 
discerned through reason.246  Sankara, like thinkers in other darsanas, listed certain 
epistemological techniques as being able to bring about correct knowledge.247  However, 
it is also believed that certain metaphysical truths could not be attained through 
philosophical/spiritual reflection.  “According to Sankara, the two categories of 
knowledge inaccessible to all other pramanas and attainable exclusively through the 
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Vedas are dharma and Brahman.”248  The reason for this is related to the transcendental 
nature of Brahman, which is beyond empirical observation (this is not to say that 
Brahman cannot be partially realized through self-reflection and verbal testimony- 
sabda).  Sankara’s insistence on the need for Vedic revelation is found in his belief that 
“… the Absolute, like the unforeseeable results of our future deeds, is something that can 
only be known from Vedic revelation.”249  Radhakrishan claims the Vedas do not contain 
anything that one’s own intellectual faculties could not discover, yet I am more inclined 
to agree with Rambachan on the need for revealed truths in regards to Sankara’s 
metaphysical system (it should be noted that different darsanas accept different numbers 
of categories for the acquisition of valid knowledge).250  An examination of dharmic 
obligation in relation to the different Hindu yugas (cosmological time periods) will show 
a certain degree of flux and relational responsibility: “An act that may be sanctioned at a 
certain time and place and under some circumstances may not be approved with a change 
of these factors.  It is impossible therefore, to learn of dharma from any other source 
[than the Vedas].”251  This position might seem contradictory in relation to Sankara’s 
eventual denunciation of dharmic obligations (for the realized mystic), yet the 
transcendence of dharmic obligation only occurs as an end result, which in turn, has no 
effect on the unrealized practitioner’s dharmic obligation.  An opening line in metrical 
part of the Upadesasahasri directly states that the disciple must have performed all 
necessary rituals and have lived in accordance to dharmic obligation before that 
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individual can undergo Sankara’s path to liberation.252  Dharmic and theistic statements 
made by Sankara provide us with an opportunity to examine the theoretical base from 
which Sankara launches his mystical system; furthermore, understanding of mystical 
transcendence and non-dual realization cannot be scholastically appreciated if it is not 
seen as possessing some form of relationship to its theoretical birthing ground (even 
though the relationship can eventually be transcended).253      
Sankara believed the Vedas were meant to negate improper beliefs and positions 
more than they were meant to explicate a clear and precise means to the realization of 
Brahman.254  It can be stated that “… the negation employed by the sruti is twofold.  
Contrary attributes are side by side denied in order that the negation of one attribute does 
not lead to the supposition that Brahman is characterized by its opposite.”255  Sankara’s 
view that prescriptive Vedic statements are later negated by more important claims, 
meant to bring about realization, is suiting in a metaphysical system that is based on 
realization as opposed to actualization or the process of “becoming”.256  Sankara’s claim 
that the Vedas are a valid source of knowledge is a double-edged sword in that ritualistic 
injunctions are positivistic and layout clear rules, while the statements made in relation to 
Brahman are negative and attempt to bring about realization through the negation of 
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improper knowledge.  Recognition of Sankara’s hierarchy of Vedic statements is an 
important observation because this approach can be found in the Upadesasahasri, where 
hierarchical states of self-identification are amply evident; “The notion ‘[I am] this’ arises 
from the atman [which is identified with] ‘this’ (=non-Atman) and is within the range of 
a verbal handle.  As has its origin in the negated atman, it could not become [accepted as] 
a right notion again [as before].”257  Sankara’s interpretation of the Vedas as rendering 
both positive and negative statements that are hierarchical in nature can also be witnessed 
in the Brahmasutrabhyasa, where a Great Being is described as composing all categories 
outlined in the Vedas, and simultaneously, transcending all these categories.258 
As mentioned previously, Sankara held that an innate knowledge of Brahman is 
found in the human intellect.  More specifically, every person experiences a state of 
consciousness that sees their personal atman shed its limiting adjuncts and expand to a 
state of Pure Consciousness (albeit very briefly).259  However, before we examine this 
undifferentiated state of consciousness we need to understand Sankara’s other two 
categories of consciousness.  Firstly, the waking state of consciousness is marked by 
nescience and the illusory ‘I’ notion, which is comprised of a continuous series of mental 
impositions and limiting adjuncts (upadhi).260   Alston describes this situation as “The 
erroneous cognition that sets up the objects of the world is, when evaluated from the 
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waking standpoint, a beginningless and endless self-perpetuating mechanism.”261  In this 
state the individual believes his/herself to be the experiencer of pain, pleasure, anger, and 
love (most usually marked by statements such as ‘I am…’).  This can be understood as 
the Atman being attributed with specific qualities when filtered through mental 
activity.262  A helpful analogy that Sankara employs is in regards to water and how it 
takes on the qualities of the vessel that contains it (e.g. the water appears to be pink when 
it is contained within a pink glass).263  At no point can the water be considered truly pink 
and it is well understood that the pink hue is only a situationally specific attribution.  The 
same process also occurs in dreaming states where the mind continues to create images 
and effects.  The dreaming mind may not rely on sense perception, as in the waking state, 
yet “[a]nything experienced in the state of nescience is a superimposition on the Absolute 
and has no reality whatever except as the Absolute.  This holds equally true of waking 
experience, dream and sense-illusion.  For there can be no perception without a perceiver, 
and the perceiver himself, as we have seen, is the result of an erroneous mutual 
superimposition of the Self and the not-self.”264  A commonality between waking and 
dreaming states is the continuous employment of the ‘I’ as the base of all cognition (such 
as: I am an experiencer within dream consciousness that is experiencing pink cows, and I 
am currently seeing pink cows); and it is this inappropriate usage of the ‘I’ that Sankara 
is, in part, writing in reaction to.  In his interpretation of Sankara, Mayeda credits waking 
                                                 
261 A.J. Alston, “The Self and the Not-Self,” in A Sankara Source Book vol. 1 (London: 
Shanti Sadan, 2004), 90. 
262 Mayeda, “Atman’s Identity with Brahman,” in A Thousand Teachings: The 
Upadesasahasri of Sankara, 40.  
263 Kazemi, Paths to Transcendence, 34. 
264 A.J. Alston, “The Standpoint of Nescience and the Standpoint of Knowledge,” in A 
Sankara Source Book vol. 1, trans A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sadan, 2004), 105. 
 83 
and dreaming states as partially providing the locomotion for transmigratory existence.265  
As an interesting aside, we can interpret the continuity between waking states and 
dreaming states as Sankara identifying upadhi as the source of illusion (instead of sense-
perception being blamed for misinterpretation).    
These false attributions and functions of the mind are claimed to cease during 
dreamless sleep.  It is during this state of consciousness (or, more precisely, the state that 
lacks nescient consciousness) that the mind is silenced and the undifferentiated substrata 
(Brahman) is experienced.  Dasgupta aptly describes this dreamless state in relation to the 
bliss of realization: “As all being of the world-appearance is but limited manifestations of 
that one being, so all pleasures also are but limited manifestations of that supreme bliss, a 
taste of which we all can get in deep dreamless sleep.”266  It is correct for Dasgupta to 
explain that dreamless sleep is not the same as true realization, for the dreamless sleep 
must come to an end and nescient consciousness will thereafter return (the seed of mental 
turning still exists in dreamless sleep).  The state of dreamless sleep is an 
accidental/ephemeral event that is not brought about by realization or the realignment of 
one’s self-identification.  The truly realized individual possesses Brahmanic self-
identification that recognizes itself as the underlying, ever-present, consciousness behind 
all cognitions (even previous cognitions).  The Upadesasahasri credits the realized 
individual as possessing a state of consciousness267 that is self-dependent and objectively 
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real: “Whether in the state of deep sleep or of waking or of dreaming, no delusive 
perception appears to pertain to Me in this world.  As those [three states] have no 
existence, self-dependent or other-dependent, I am always the Fourth, the Seeing and the 
non-dual.”268   It is the potential power of upadhi (imposition/limitation), lying dormant 
during the dreamless state, which makes the dreamless sleep different from the realized 
individual who has completely negated the power of upadhi.269  Moreover, for most 
people there is no sense of consciousness when in the state of deep dreamless sleep.  
Thus deep dreamless sleep does not appear to be exactly the same as the realized state of 
consciousness, but for its potential to have the power of upadhi re-emerge.  Sankara 
emphasizes that the Fourth state is different from the nature of consciousness in the other 
three states (i.e., waking, dreaming, and deep, dreamless sleep), because it is always “the 
Seeing” state.  This appears to imply a qualitative difference in the nature of the Fourth 
and the deep sleep state.  Methodological constraints in this study inhibit further 
exploration into the nature of “the Fourth.”   
The Hierarchy of Brahman’s Manifestation 
 An examination of Sankara’s various commentaries will readily demonstrate a 
hierarchical cosmological organization, or stated differently, an order to the manifestation 
                                                 
being identical with Brahman has transcended the individuality associated with 
consciousness and has replaced it with a ‘world-consciousness’.  Therefore, any reference 
to the realized individual, as possessing a state of consciousness, should only be 
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of Brahman.  This organization pertains not only to the universe’s hierarchical 
manifestation but also to revelatory texts and spiritual practices.  A textual example of 
Sankara’s hierarchical system would be his belief that theistic statements were less direct 
and more metaphorical when compared to statements in regards to non-dual Brahman (or 
more precisely, statements that attempt to bring about realization of Brahman).270  Alston 
recognizes a similar type of organization when dealing with ritualistic meditation 
(upasana): “Sankara differentiated the performance of prescribed Vedic meditations 
(upasana) from knowledge on the one hand and from ritualistic action on the other.”271  
This hierarchical organization extends to Sankara’s understanding of material 
composition.  Sankara held that this manifestation ranged from the most subtle and 
transcendent to the grossest and most limited.272  We must keep in mind that all 
phenomenal existence is believed to be a manifestation of the one, non-dual Brahman; 
therefore, Sankara was forced to elucidate a cosmological system that could be “folded 
back into Brahman” and simultaneously be nothing other than Brahman.  The 
Upadesasahasri provides an example of this, which consists of Sankara describing his 
cosmological scheme from the standpoint of the Realized Individual: “As the intellects of 
all beings are always to be illuminated by My Pure Consciousness, all beings are the 
body of Me who am all-knowing and free from evils.”273  The process that sees the 
universe come into fruition starts with the finest element (ether) and progresses to the 
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grossest and least pervasive (earth).274  In regards to individual manifestation Sankara 
believes that it is the soul (atman) that is the finest aspect of human composition and it is 
the earth-based body that is the grossest.275  Earth (the body) is the least permanent, while 
the soul continues throughout transient existence.276  Furthermore, the unrealized soul is 
attached to a subtle seventeen-fold body that, when illumined by Atman, aids in the 
illusion of individual existence.  Sankara’s division of the seventeen-fold body goes as 
such: 
“These (five) sense-faculties277 are said to exist for the sake of 
knowledge, while the (five) powers of speaking, handling, 
walking, excretion and generation are for the sake of action.  The 
mind (manas), standing within the whole group and consisting the 
eleventh faculty, selects from the reports of the other ten.  The 
intellect (buddhi) stands for fixed determination.  And finally the 
ultimate knower, called the Self (atman), stands ever illumining 
the intellect with its own light as the latter goes on assuming 
different forms corresponding to the object of its cognition.”278 
What is crucial for us to recognize is that Brahman, as Atman, provides the impetus for 
our individual world experiences (the foundation).  Neither the illusory adjuncts attached 
to Atman nor the material elements energize the process (by this we mean that the 
Absolute is believed as a requisite principle within manifestation and nothing has the 
power to start the process of manifestation, save Brahman).279  
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We can further see how Sankara understands the grosser emanating from the finer 
with reference to the Upadesasahasri chapter entitled ‘Consisting of Earth’.280  It is here 
that Sankara reiterates an often used and important point; “Nothing which has something 
else as its nature can become an object of the latter, as fire can neither burn nor illumine 
itself.”281  Through this Sankara attempts to establish Brahman as the active principle that 
begets Unevolved Name and Form, which in turn gives rise to ether.  Unevolved Name 
and Form is highly important to Sankara because it is the first instance of materiality in 
his cosmological system.282  For obvious reasons Sankara could not attribute Brahman as 
being directly responsible for the composition of ether (for such a relationship would 
challenge the transcendent nature ascribed to Brahman, which as we have seen, is of the 
utmost importance to Sankara).  Unevolved Name and Form is given a vague and 
indeterminable status as the parent of ether, for “…Unevolved Name-and-Form is the 
supersensible seed of the world (jagadbijabhuta), which is not describable as ‘this’ or 
anything else and is known only to Brahman itself.”283  The idea of a supersensible seed 
that facilitates the cosmic building blocks is directly borrowed from the Upanisads but 
most notably the Chandogya Upanisad.284  A relevant passage in the Chandogya 
Upanisad is found in the fourteenth khanda; “Verily, what is called space (akasa) is the 
accomplisher of name and form.  That within which they are, is Brahma.  That is the 
immortal.  That is the Self (Atman, Soul).”285  We can interpret Sankara ascribing 
Unevolved Name and Form an intermediate status as a conceptual distancing of Brahman 
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from the specifics of material composition; no matter how fine and pervasive ether is 
considered, it still is bound to the limitations inherent to physical manifestation.286 
Mayeda recognizes Sankara’s theory of Unevolved Name and Form as an obvious 
attempt to rescue non-dual Vedanta from the pitfalls of duality that plague monistic 
creation accounts.287  Furthermore, Sankara directly recognizes this problematic situation 
and the need to ascribe creation to Brahman, while not limiting Brahman through 
creation.  He states “This name and form, being originally unmanifest, manifested out of 
this Self in the name and form of the ‘ether’ (akasa).  And in this way, the element 
(bhuta) called ‘the ether’ was born from the Supreme Self, like the impure foam from 
clear water, and yet it is not completely different from water, for it is never found apart 
from water.”288  Once again Sankara turns to the foam/water metaphor to explain the 
dependent relationship manifestation has on the world, and the simultaneous difference 
and independence water has from the altered foam.  The reliance foam has to water and 
ether to Unevolved Name and Form is yet another example of hierarchical dependence 
that leads to an Ultimate Principle (Brahman), which independently stands as the matrix 
of creation.289  If we approach this in a hierarchical manner we can readily see how foam 
has water for its nature just as the human soul is claimed to have Brahman as its real 
nature (it is also important to understand that neither water nor Brahman has its nature 
based in something below it, such as foam or the individual soul). 
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 Another important point in understanding Sankara’s hierarchical system is the 
function of Pure Consciousness as the active principle, which is experienced as 
individuality.  The Upadesasahasri asserts that when Atman is filtered through 
ephemeral notions of self and ego it results in delusion and rebirth.290  We can 
alternatively state, in congruence with the hierarchical structure of Sankara’s 
metaphysical system, that each intellect has Pure Consciousness as its nature and can 
therefore be reduced to a misappropriated manifestation of this Universal 
Consciousness.291  Sankara makes this causal relationship abundantly clear when he 
states, “The intellect receives a reflection of the light of the Self as Pure Consciousness 
first, since it is transparent and stands in immediate proximity to the Self.292  Hence even 
persons of discrimination identify themselves initially with the intellect.  Consciousness 
next illumes the lower mind, as the next inmost principle immediately through its contact 
with the mind, and next the body through its contact with sense-organs.”293 Pure 
Consciousness is not truly appreciated in Sankara’s system if we let the matter rest at this 
point.  It should also be noted that Sankara understood the Atman as being the actual 
witness to all these individual experiences brought about by Pure Consciousness, 
interpreted through nescience.294  Thus, in a roundabout way, it is actually Brahman 
experiencing Brahman through different individual experiences.  Dasgupta echoes this in 
his claim that Sankara regarded the perceiver and the perceived as possessing an identical 
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reality that is facilitated through the same cosmic principle (Brahman).295  “Moreover, 
being the Witness (saksin) of all other cognitions, it is itself changeless and omnipresent.  
If the Witness underwent modification of any kind, its range of knowledge would be 
limited, like that of the mind and sense-organs.  But there is no break in the seeing of the 
Seer, as there is in that of the eye and the other organs.”296  Sankara believed that 
misunderstanding, on the part of the individual, is a product of nescience that segregates 
the individual consciousness from the Universal Consciousness, and subsequently, it is 
upon realization that one’s personal atman is identical to the universal Atman that true 
understanding arises.297  It is the Atman that provides the light that illuminates individual 
experience and when this realization occurs, individuals are stripped of all personal 
adjuncts that had previously inhibited their understanding.   
As previously mentioned, a prolonged examination of Sankara’s ideas concerning 
self-identification reveals systematic and hierarchical organizations.  Sankara’s view of 
atman/Atman contains a great deal of ranking in the attempt to understand subjective 
experience.  And as we have previously seen, religious texts are rated in accordance to 
revelatory worth, with the most indirect being subjugated to the highly prized 
metaphysical texts that speak about one’s non-identity in relation to Brahman.  We are 
given an example of this when Sankara claims that theistic texts are a means to “…teach 
something else, and only to those persons who, while possessed of faith in the Veda, were 
not endowed with deep discrimination, and who consequently believed in the existence 
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and substantial nature of the world.  For them it is appropriate enough.”298  Sankara’s 
treatment of Vedic meditation (upasana) incorporates a multitude of contextual uses that 
are rated in accordance to function.299  Meditation and ritual action can be used to gain 
special knowledge that will garner the practitioner specific benefits; these practices can 
also be performed with the intent of gaining karmic merit, and most importantly for 
Sankara, these forms of practices can facilitate identification with Brahman.300  We have 
also seen that Sankara categorized deities in accordance to their ability to lead the 
devotee to identification with Brahman; “For instance, Sankara himself identifies Hari 
and Narayana (names of Visnu) with the Absolute in his Brahma Sutra commentary, but 
does not mention Siva in this way.  When he wishes to illustrate the processes of worship 
of a deity in the course of the same commentary, he does so seven times for Visnu-
worship but never once for the worship of Siva.”301  And at the beginning of this section 
we examined how Sankara developed a complex cosmological theory that relied on the 
grossest and least pervasive elements being absorbed into, and emanating from, the finest 
and most pervasive (as seen in the eventual emergence of the earth element from 
ether).302  However, much like Tibetan Buddhist sand mandalas, Sankara’s cosmological 
system is destroyed in its final step, being absorbed into the undifferentiated Brahman 
that contains no limits or distinctions.  Upon dissolution of the world nothing material 
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can remain, and will therefore not warrant Sankara’s system of explanation and 
realization.303  We therefore need not spend a great deal of time expounding this 
hierarchical system, yet I believe it important that we can partly recognize Sankara as a 
systematic theologian.  Moreover, the categories of material manifestation accepted by 
Sankara in his descriptive scheme belong largely to metaphysical systems within Hindu 
tradition (e.g., Sankhya and Yoga), and predate Sankara.   
Maya and Avidya 
Much of Sankara’s metaphysical system draws from his concepts of illusion 
(maya) and ignorance (avidya); we would be greatly remiss not to discuss the role and 
function of these two ideas.  Firstly, we should note that Sankara excluded the Self as the 
object of nescience, claiming that the transcendent and limitless status of Brahman surely 
excludes any relationship with maya.304  However, maya can also be used as a term 
referring to the creative power of the lord or as an indirect reference to the manifest 
world.305  Alston is not comfortable with crediting maya, as a form of power, to 
Sankara’s philosophy; rather, Alston claims “Sankara speaks of nescience not as a power 
(sakti) but as a state (avastha), an undesirable state or passion (klesa) which afflicts the 
individual.  He was not speaking about anything he conceived to be real but merely a 
hypothesis that would account for our everyday experience…”306  Alston is correct to 
downplay the status of maya, for it would surely be contrary to Sankara’s system to 
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establish an independent power (maya) that existed outside of Brahman.  However, 
Dasgupta is simultaneously correct to assert that Sankara treated maya as a power 
wielded by divine personages.307  These two explanations need not be contradictory, for, 
as we have often seen, Dasgupta’s claim can be accommodated on a lower theistic level, 
while Alston’s statements are more congruent with the abstract metaphysical Sankara.  
This distinction is echoed by Sankara in his treatment of personal perspective: “Before 
the rise of clear knowledge that man’s Self is the Absolute, all practical experience can be 
defended as real, just as dream-experience is real before waking.  Before he is aware of 
the unity and sole reality of the Self, no one entertains the notion that such transient 
modifications (ikara) as perception and other means of knowledge and the cognitions 
arising from them, are illusory.”308  A similar line of reasoning can be found in the 
Upadesasahasri, where Sankara claims that, in his oft used perspective as the realized 
individual, “I am the Beholder of modification of the mind and also of the mind 
[itself]…”309 For this reason that I propose we not spend a great deal of time explaining 
Sankara’s contradictory statements in regards to nescience; rather, as demonstrated in the 
previous discussion on hierarchy, we can understand Sankara as jumping between levels 
of meaning (and the implicit hierarchy that exists within those statements).     
Maya cannot be understood as being coeternal with Brahman, nor can it be 
properly understood as a property of Brahman.310  The reasons why maya cannot be 
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either is that it would limit Brahman and introduce a force existent outside of Brahman, 
something that is obviously unacceptable in Sankara’s radical non-dual system.311  In his 
commentary on the Bhagavad Gita Sankara credits maya as being coexistent and 
dependent on notions of division such as “My act” or “I am the agent”.312  It is through 
nescience that one becomes finite and the continuation of this mindset reinforces the 
power of nescience (note the vicious circle).313  A useful analogy that Sankara uses to 
explain this problem relates that a group of ten boys who sought to cross a river; upon 
reaching the far bank one of the boys took a head count to make sure all had crossed 
safely.  The boy counted everyone he could see and was thrown into a panic when he 
counted only nine boys, forgetting that he himself was the tenth.314  Such mistakes occur 
when the individual externalizes all phenomena and only accounts for what can be seen; 
“Just as [the lad who] was himself the tenth thought that he was among the nine [others], 
so these deluded folk [think that Atman is] among the objects of knowledge [such as the 
intellect] and do not [understand] otherwise.”315  The ethos of this story pertains to our 
external search for understanding, which in turn, only creates further misconceptions and 
ignorance (avidya).   
The famous rope-snake analogy is yet another example used by Sankara to 
demonstrate that mistakes in perception cannot be rectified by further reference to 
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external sources (such as claiming that there is a special type of snake that can change 
itself into a piece of rope and then back into a snake… instead of just admitting a mistake 
in perception).316  The only proper method to achieve understanding is through a process 
of internal reflection that leads one to the realization that phenomenal existence is an 
illusion that depends on nothing beyond the ignorance of the perceiver.  It follows that all 
experiences within nescience are false attributes  “…on the Absolute and have no reality 
whatever except as the Absolute.  This holds equally true of waking experience, dream 
and sense-illusion.  For there can be no perception without a perceiver, and the perceiver 
himself, as we have see, is the result of an erroneous mutual superimposition of the Self 
and the not-self.”317  It is abundantly clear that maya is not granted objective reality in 
Sankara’s metaphysical system and that maya is only an illusory effect.318   
Despite this lack of objectivity, Sankara readily admitted the phenomenal effects 
of maya.319  Avidya and maya bring about action and should not be considered 
completely non-real.320  Like objects seen in a dream, the individual “…sees objects of 
various grades and degrees of value and takes this knowledge for authentic perception, 
without, at the time, having the remotest suspicion that such perception is a mere 
appearance of perception.  In just the same way, one takes waking perception for genuine 
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perception before enlightenment…”321  Sankara maintains that all instances of duality in 
the Vedas can be considered true within the realm of maya.322  Therefore, injunctions and 
rules that do not lead to the realization of Brahman possess conditional relevance; this 
line of reasoning also leads to Sankara’s belief that the realized practitioner transcends 
certain Vedic rules.323  In the Upadesasahasri Sankara uses a very pertinent metaphor by 
comparing the effects of avidya to a fever that is cured through the use of medicine (the 
Vedas); however, after the fever has broken, continued use of these medicine can only 
create more problems.324  The conditional reality of maya also forces Sankara to deal 
with “states of being” in both the realized and unrealized individual.  Foremost, Sankara 
stresses that there is no substantive difference between the realized and the unrealized; to 
accept change in one’s personal atman would diminish the conditional status of avidya 
and give it objective status (meaning that avidya could force change upon the atman).325  
“Moreover, if bondage and liberation be taken to be two states following on one another 
successively, then the state of bondage must be taken as occurring first and as being 
begininningless and yet as having an end, and that contradicts known laws.”326   Sankara 
has no room in his metaphysical system for anything other than Brahman, therefore, 
maya must be granted a liminal/conditional status that permits functional explanations 
that do not challenge the non-duality of Brahman.     
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Sankara’s Use of Negation 
Sankara believed negation an important tool in the communication of his radical 
non-dual system.  Mayeda claims this as a strikingly realistic aspect within Sankara’s 
illusionistic worldview, yet we can more easily understand his negation as a practical tool 
in an illusionary universe.327  The previous examinations of avidya and the non-duality of 
Brahman should have made it abundantly clear that Sankara subjugated phenomenal 
existence and knowledge to the transcendental “other-ness” of Brahman.  Sankara looked 
to the Upanisads as teaching through the use of negation, yet “Sankara did not invent this 
method of interpreting the texts, but inherited it from earlier teachers such as Gaudapada 
and Dravida.  It is known as the method of false attribution and subsequent denial 
(adhyaropa and apavada).”328  Reference to the Katha Upanishad will provide us with a 
quintessential usage of negation that is employed by Sankara; “What is soundless, 
touchless, formless… Without beginning, without end, higher than the great, stable- by 
discerning that, one is liberated from the mouth of death.”329  In poetic fashion Sankara 
describes his method as traversing the perilous and doubt-filled forest of “this-ness”, 
meaning the path to the realization must occur within the illusory world of duality.330  
Our mystic did not employ this repudiating method as an attempt to form a concrete idea 
about Brahman, for that would undermine his assertion that Brahman is beyond the realm 
of ideas; rather, the use of negation can be seen as a conceptual exercise that 
demonstrates the futility of epistemological categories, which in turn, encourages the 
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disciple to move beyond such means.331 This line of reasoning (if negation can be called a 
form of reasoning) is intended to lead the individual to Brahman as the Universal 
Principle that underlines all negated categories; “Without negating a previous notion, a 
following view does not arise.  The Seeing (= Atman) is one alone, self-established.  As it 
is the result [of the right means of knowledge], It is not negated.”332  In an Upanisadic 
commentary Sankara claims that the realized individual sees nothing to negate or affirm; 
this is because the realized person has found their way to the undivided state333 of 
being.334   
In constructing his metaphysical system Sankara did not completely rely on 
negation.  Many attributions find their way into Sankara’s explanations and ignoring 
these would miss a key methodological technique.  For example, Sankara states that “The 
supreme Self can very well have the attribute of ‘Controller’ in the sense of abiding 
within this whole complex of modifications (i.e. the universe), differentiated into the 
various realms such as that of the gods, and subjecting it to his control.  For that which is 
the material cause of all modifications can very well be thought of as possessed of all 
powers.”335  Similar attributions can be found in the Upadesasahasri, where Sankara 
claims the realized person to be all knowing and all pervading.336  These statements 
should not be completely dismissed as Sankara speaking down to the unrealized, for as 
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our discussion of avidya has shown, certain statements can be conditionally true when 
they are considered within a larger hierarchical system of thought.  Firstly, Sankara 
claims that the path of negation incorporates inherent assertions that work to negate 
corresponding adjuncts.337   
To be more specific, Sankara believes that the unreal cannot be fully rejected 
through reference to correspondingly unreal properties.  For this reason, and in 
accordance to his hierarchical system of truths and quasi-truths, Sankara uses attributing 
statements as tools to negate certain adjuncts.338  This should not be confused with 
subjectivism or relativism, Sankara’s appointment of Brahman as Ultimate Reality 
provides an objective grounding that limits this regress.  Instead of being turtles all the 
way down; Sankara uses turtles to refute other turtles until all turtles are eliminated and 
Brahman remains alone in an undifferentiated turtle-less reality.  When turtles 
(attributions) are used by Sankara, our attention should not focus on each turtle; instead, 
focus should be directed to the space that is created between refuting turtles.  An example 
of these refuting turtles can be seen in Sankara’s approach to emotional states and how 
“… contradictory notions are successively superimposed onto one and the same Self in 
the form of such feelings as ‘I am happy, sad, deluded, born, subject to death… But 
amidst all these various conflicting notions, the notion of the Self is constant and 
identical…”339 In many ways there is a negating aspect to Sankara’s attribution related 
statements.  While the term neti-neti (“not this - not this”) is most synonymous with 
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Upanisadic negation, we can also view the contradictory nature of attributes as also being 
a form of negation.  Sankara is abundantly clear that attributes do not lead to objective 
truths; rather, attributes only lead to further contradictions.  This hypothesis is in keeping 
with Sankara’s refutation, for “… in order to show that it [Brahman] exists, it is first 
spoken of in its false form set up by adjuncts, and fancifully referred to as if it had 
knowable qualities… For there is the saying of those who know the tradition 
(sampradaya-vid) ‘That which cannot be expressed (in its true form directly) is expressed 
(indirectly) through false attribution and subsequent denial.’”340  And, as we have seen, 
contradictory attributions can be used as a form of denial. 
Of course, this means that the entirety of Sankara’s metaphysical system, 
including teachings such as found in the Upadesasahasri, could be said as belonging to 
the realm of indirect attribution through false attribution.  The ultimate validity of this 
intellectual or descriptive superstructure would be ultimately denied or regarded as false 
in the face of the highest realization.  
Transmigratory Existence and Karmic Consequence 
Cessation of the pain and suffering associated with phenomenal existence lies at 
the heart of Sankara’s project.  However, a large amount of attention is paid to the 
waking, dreaming, dreamless states, and the enlightened state called turiya.  While 
investigating these states, Sankara claims that “[t]he soul exists in these three abodes 
alternately, identifying himself with them through natural nescience, afflicted for ages 
with an overpowering sleep from which he does not awake even under the hammer-like 
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blows of many hundreds of thousands of painful disasters.”341  Waking, dreaming, and 
dreamless states are not just experiences within the larger category of transmigratory 
existence; rather, they constitute their own form of transmigratory existence (that being 
the movement between states within the larger category of samsara).342   
Mayeda claims that Sankara’s understanding of samsara inherently includes the 
migration between waking, dreaming, and dreamless states; Mayeda further claims that 
Sankara was most concerned with the differences in mental states, for these states were 
believed to provide a key to realization.343  Future lives were viewed as nothing more 
than a continuation of samsara and another opportunity to attain the state of realization 
(turiya).344  It is the fluctuating states experienced within daily life that provide insights 
into one’s hidden nature.  Most important of these states is dreamless sleep because it is 
understood as a state similar to realization; this being a similar experience because 
mental activity remains in unmanifest seed form, ready to reactivate upon awakening.345  
In a manner that is very characteristic of his style, Sankara interprets Vedic claims of 
heavenly residence as indicating the difference between dreamless sleep and true 
realization: “The text calls the Absolute ‘heaven’ in order to indicate that apart from what 
happens in dreamless sleep, on the death of the body, too, knowledge of the enlightened 
one will necessarily bear fruit (and he will be once and for all united with the 
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Absolute).”346  Consequently, our discussions of samsara within Sankara must be 
multidimensional, recognizing the atman’s continuance into future lives and its 
persistence through the three mental states (turiya cannot really be considered a mental 
state because the realized individual surpasses all notions of individual mentality).347 
It is the atman’s persistence through these cognitive states and into future lives 
that helps separate Sankara from his Buddhist contemporaries.  We can also understand 
the continuation of the individual atman as yet another objective aspect in Sankara’s 
philosophy.348  Despite the heavy dose of illusion in Sankara’s system, he still felt the 
need to recognize a continuing agent that persisted through mental states and into the 
future.349  Furthermore, this continued agent is cited as the means and end to individual 
transmigratory existence.  An examination of Sankara will reveal two different styles of 
arguments concerning the continuation of the atman.  Firstly, we can witness a 
metaphysical argument in statements such as: “If your true nature as Consciousness were 
lost in dreamless sleep then it would stand destroyed or could be negated as non-
existent.”350  This type of argument makes use of Brahman as the ground to all existence 
and as a necessary principle within Sankara’s cosmological system.351  We can also find 
psychological and cognitive arguments for a continued self; “The Knower, the Absolute, 
pure Consciousness, rests in that external adjunct called the inner organ… In order to 
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minister to its empirical experience, the inner organ is said to assume the following 
modes to convey both external objects and mental states…”352  This line of reasoning 
looks to knowledge and memory to prove a continued psychological agent that remains 
relatively static throughout the different mental states.  The Upadesasahasri combines 
both approaches in claiming Brahman as the source of the manifest world, and crediting 
individual experience as being enabled through Universal Consciousness.353  This is 
markedly different than Sankara’s Buddhist rivals that staunchly rejected a continuing 
self (the anatman doctrine). 
Sankara’s Advaita Vedanta, like many of the other Hindu darsanas, referenced 
karma as being quintessential to bondage and the samsaric cycle.  At no point does 
Sankara overtly question the existence of karma, instead taking it as a fact of life.354  This 
is a common occurrence in Hinduism writ large and some prominent scholars have even 
declared karma as a pre-Vedic phenomenon that can be traced to early agrarian tribes.355  
We need not spend a great deal of time investigating this point, yet the prominence of 
karma in Indic religions was, and continues to be, so definite that many Hindu 
commentators did not feel the need to justify or explain its existence.  This does not, 
however, mean that the idea of karma has remained static throughout the history of 
Hinduism.  Tull rightly asserts that the composite nature of the Hindu corpus has lead to a 
myriad of opinions regarding karma and its role within the tradition (if we can refer to 
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Hinduism as a single tradition).356  For example, karman in the Vedic sense can simply 
refer to action with emphasis on ritualistic action, yet Upanisadic usage of karma is more 
in line with the formulation of a complete doctrine.357  Furthermore, it is during this 
transition that Upanisadic texts denouncing karmic sacrifice become informative; such an 
example can be found in the Mundaka Upanisad, where Brahmins are criticized for 
“Thinking sacrifice and merit is the chiefest thing… Having had enjoyment on top of the 
heaven won by good works, They re-enter this world, or a lower.”358  The use of karma 
as an explanation of good and bad deeds is still valued in the Upanisads, yet the 
incorporation of karmic consequence into a system of transcendental enlightenment 
quickly altered certain understandings of karma and made it a much more relational 
concept (by this I mean karma no longer stood on its own as mere good and bad, but was 
approached through the desire to break samsaric existence).  
It can be said that Sankara adopted a post-Upanisadic view of karma that is 
related to previous Vedic treatments of sacrifice and karma: “Each sort of activity garners 
its own result; whereas meditation in the forest leads to the acquisition of a certain 
esoteric knowledge and thus eventually to the path of the gods and freedom from rebirth 
and sacrifice, giving gifts to the priests leads to the attainment of the path of the fathers 
and rebirth in the world.”359  Reference to Sankara’s ideas of realization readily 
demonstrates an action-less state that has overcome the accumulation of karma.360  This 
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is not the attainment of a new state of being that is beyond the accumulation of karma; 
rather, it is the negation of nescience that spurs on karmic accumulation.  The prosaic part 
of the Upadesasahasri relates that nescience is the superimposition of unreal qualities 
onto the real, which then forms a receptacle of karmic consequences.361  It is the 
individual who has realized his/her Brahmanic nature that comes to exist for his/herself, 
and these individuals find their sole sustenance in this knowledge.  Sankara’s rhetorical 
guru tells his pupil that this form of independence negates the karmic acquiring desire, 
which is associated with nescient existence: “So, then, you exist for you own sake since 
you are conscious.  You are not driven [to act] by an other.  A conscious being is neither 
dependent on another nor driven [to act] by another, for it is not reasonable that a 
conscious being should exist for the sake of another conscious being since they are equal 
like to lights.”362  In his commentary on the Bhagavad Gita our mystic denounces the 
desires of a householder in order to direct the aspirant to a state that is self-sufficient, in 
that there is nothing outside of that individual that would cause longing and karmic 
accumulation.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IBN ARABI 
For our purposes it is particularly important that a historical investigation of Ibn 
Arabi precede a philosophical examination of his works.363  The reason for this is 
twofold: firstly, an understanding of Ibn Arabi within the context of his predecessors and 
intellectual environment will better enable us to understand the various components 
within his system of thought.  Secondly, a historical understanding of Ibn Arabi is 
important to the spiritual transmissions (silsila) that he claimed to inherit.364  And, as we 
will later see, Ibn Arabi places himself within a specific spiritual heritage that proves 
quintessential to understanding his larger system of thought.365  We need not go to the 
contextualist extremes of Katz, yet it is of the utmost importance that Ibn Arabi is 
understood as a link within a greater chain of spiritual transmission.366  Our historical 
inquiry will not extend beyond a terse treatment of his familial background, education, 
travels, and intellectual environment.  As a result of this historical approach we will see 
distinctive phases of Ibn Arabi’s life that relate to his spiritual status (or stated 
differently, the waystations that he came to inhabit).367  The thoughts and experiences 
related by Ibn Arabi are of primary importance to us, and under no circumstances should 
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a theoretical examination of Ibn Arabi subject his thought to mere historical 
contextualisation.  Underhill is amply correct to state that mysticism “… shows itself not 
merely as an attitude of mind and heart, but as a form of organic life.  It is not only a 
theory of the intellect or a hunger, however passionate, of the heart, it involves the 
organizing of the whole self, conscious and unconscious, under the spur of a 
hunger…”368 It is for this reason that we must simultaneously meet our obligation to 
historical facts while not letting these assertions undercut Ibn Arabi’s theoretical 
propositions.  
Ibn Arabi was born into a noble Arab family in Islamic Spain in 1165 C.E.  
Hirtenstein posits that Ibn Arabi’s father was a high-ranking military officer who had 
access to Andalusian courts and nobility.369  However, Claude Addas is not prepared to 
make such a specific assertion, instead claiming that Ibn Arabi’s father was some type of 
high-ranking dignitary in Ibn Mardanish’s government and held a similar position in the 
following Almohad government under Abu Ya’qub Yasuf.370  Onomatology suggests that 
Ibn Arabi’s paternal relatives emigrated from Yemen to the Iberian Peninsula shortly 
after the Muslim invasion.371  This assertion cannot be completely validated, yet in his 
writings Ibn Arabi frequently celebrates his Arab lineage.372  Ibn Arabi’s mother is 
understood to have descended from Berber nobility and to have been well educated.373  
Ibn Arabi’s “…writings seem to not contain even the slightest allusion which would help 
                                                 
368 Underhill, Mysticism, 66.  
369 Stephen Hirtenstein, The Unlimited Mercifier (Oxford: Anqa Publishing, 1999), 33.  
370 Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 18. 
371 Ibid., 17  
372 Hirtenstein, The Unlimited Mercifier, 33.  
373 Addas, Quest for the Red Sulphur, 24.  
 108 
us to form at least an approximately accurate picture of her personality.  However, she is 
mentioned twice in the Ruh al-quds.  From the first passage it emerges that Ibn Arabi was 
an obedient son who was extremely respectful towards his mother… From the second 
passage we learn that his mother died shortly after his father.”374  The death of both 
parents left a young Ibn Arabi responsible for both his unwed sisters.  This proved to be a 
problematic scenario for the young mystic, who had already renounced many mundane 
concerns in his quest for spiritual development.375  A myriad of family members pleaded 
with Ibn Arabi to take his worldly responsibilities more seriously and care for his sisters, 
yet he remained dedicated to his spiritual vocation.  The mystic relates that he was 
preemptively warned by his teacher, Salih al-‘Adawi, that mundane concerns would 
challenge his spiritual dedication.376  Ibn Arabi did, however, move his family to Fez 
where his sisters were quickly married, allowing Ibn Arabi to dedicate himself to spiritual 
goals.377  In addition to his immediate family, Ibn Arabi had a multitude of paternal and 
maternal uncles who are described as being pious and faithful Muslims.378  Ibn Arabi 
even relates multiple stories of his uncle’s religious awakening and subsequent 
devotion.379  From this we are able to assert that Ibn Arabi, previous to his first 
revelation, was no stranger to esoteric matters or religious devotion. 
As a youth Ibn Arabi did not receive any extraordinary teachings nor did any 
famed Sufi masters instruct him.  Chittick relates that a majority of Ibn Arabi’s childhood 
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was spent in the innocent gaiety that is afforded to the wealthy and privileged.380  Unlike 
his poorer Muslim neighbors, Ibn Arabi did not attend a Quranic school; instead, he was 
privately tutored in Quranic matters (as was the norm for wealthy families at the time).381  
It initially appears that Ibn Arabi was being groomed to follow in the steps of his father 
and enter into a life at court.382  Furthermore, recent scholarship has shown that Ibn Arabi 
underwent military training and was briefly employed as a scribe.383  There is little 
known about the formal education he received prior to his first revelatory experience.  
However, an education in 12th century Spain should not be scoffed at, for Moorish Spain 
was very much a cultural and intellectual icon of its time.   
This period witnessed an Islamic renaissance of sorts, consisting of revivals in 
philosophy, science, architecture, and literature, which accompanied intensive studies in 
the traditional Islamic sciences.  It was during this period that the famed Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) reintroduced the works of Aristotle to Europe and composed many lengthy 
commentaries on these philosophical treatises.384  Ibn Rushd is present in the intellectual 
development of young Ibn Arabi.  This influence did not come in the form of instruction, 
rather, Ibn Rushd provided the opportunity for the youth to demonstrate his inherent 
understanding of spiritual truths.  The only physical meeting between the two occurred 
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around 1179 CE; Ibn Rushd asked for the boy to be sent to his house so that he could take 
stock of the boy’s insights.385  Ibn Arabi writes of the encounter:  
“One day I went to Cordoba to visit the qadi Abu al-Walid Ibn 
Rushd. He wanted to meet me personally because of what he had 
been told concerning what God revealed in my retreat, for he 
showed great astonishment at what he had heard.  So my father, 
who was one of his friends, sent me to him on the pretext of doing 
some errand or other, but really in order for him to meet me.  At 
the time I was still a boy, without any hair on my face.  When I 
entered, he rose from his place, greeting me with great warmth 
and honor.  He embraced me and said: “Yes!”, to which I replied; 
“Yes!” He was even more pleased with me because I had 
understood him.  Then I became aware of what had given him 
pleasure and said to him: “No!” At this consternation gripped 
him, the color went out of his cheeks and he seemed to doubt his 
own thought.  He asked me: “What kind of solution have you 
found through divine unveiling and illumination? Is it identical 
with what we have reached through speculative thought?” I 
replied ‘Yes-No! Between the Yes and the No, spirits take wings 
from their matter, and necks are separated from their bodies.” Ibn 
Rushd turned pale, started to tremble and murmured the phrase: 
‘There is no power or strength save in God.’ For he knew what I 
had alluded to.”386   
The role of revelation and spiritual “tasting” is essential to Ibn Arabi and to 
understanding his denunciation of rational logic.  The previous quote demonstrates a 
form of knowledge that Ibn Arabi explains as being superior to any form of rational 
knowledge.387  In the Fusus Ibn Arabi reflects on the division between rational 
knowledge and unveiling that is demonstrated in his meeting with Ibn Rushd: “The way 
of gaining knowledge is divided between reflection (fikr) and bestowal (wahb), which is 
the divine effusion (fayd).  The latter is the way of our companions…”388 From the outset 
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of Ibn Arabi’s intellectual journey there is an emphasis placed on revelation and 
unveiling over rational knowledge and this principle serves as a longstanding pillar in the 
Shaykh’s intellectual system. 
 How exactly did Ibn Arabi arrive at such a definitive theory regarding 
knowledge? Furthermore, how did the young Andalusian come to such a complex 
metaphysical stance with no formal training?  The answer to these questions can be found 
in a tomb outside of Seville, or so relates the haphazard descriptions that Ibn Arabi gives 
of his initial illumination.389  Addas echoes this sentiment when she claims Ibn Arabi was 
purposely silent on matters relating to his realization.390  What we can gather from Ibn 
Arabi is that around the age of eighteen he attended a dinner party with friends; upon 
accepting a goblet of wine Ibn Arabi claims to have heard a voice telling him that such 
frivolities were not what he was made for.391  Upon hearing this “…he threw down the 
goblet and left in a daze… He decided to stay in the cemetery: in the middle of it he 
discovered a tomb in ruins, which had turned into a cave.  He entered it and started 
practicing the invocations (dhikr), only coming out at the hours of prayer.”392  It is during 
this retreat that Ibn Arabi had a vision of Jesus, Moses, and Muhammad; this vision 
would reveal to Ibn Arabi the secrets and esoteric truths that he would later impart in his 
writings.393  What makes this episode particularly interesting is that young Ibn Arabi was 
granted immediate illumination (fath) that tradition holds can only be achieved through 
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divine intervention.394  The importance of his instantaneous realization is fully supported 
by Ibn Arabi’s subsequent treatises that promote fath as being the most dependable form 
of knowledge; “Sound knowledge is not given by reflection, nor by what the rational 
thinkers establish by means of their reflective powers.  Sound knowledge is only that 
which God throws into the heart of the knower.”395   
 Addas understands Ibn Arabi’s vision of Moses, Muhammad, and most 
importantly of Jesus, as being representative of the mystic’s first three teachers; 
furthermore, it is Jesus who Ibn Arabi considers his first Shaykh.396  Hirtenstein similarly 
claims Jesus as Ibn Arabi’s first teacher, and as a figure who holds a salient position 
throughout Ibn Arabi’s corpus.397  Jesus is later credited as transferring special 
knowledge to Ibn Arabi: “For example, he [Ibn Arabi] declares that thanks to the spiritual 
influx (rujaniyya) of Jesus he obtained at the start of his wayfaring the station of the 
famous Qadib al-Ban, who through his ‘imaginal strength’ (quwwat al-khayal) had the 
power to assume any form he desired.”398  This special relationship is understood as not 
challenging the role of Muhammad, whose final revelation permitted Ibn Arabi to 
actualize his spiritual destiny as the Muhammadan Seal (according to Addas).399  Rather, 
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Ibn Arabi and Jesus are believed to be linked through their both being Seals400 -- Ibn 
Arabi being the Muhammadan Seal and Jesus being The Universal Seal of Sainthood.401 
 One last figure should be mentioned in Ibn Arabi’s spiritual development and 
that is the mythical figure Khidr.  Khidr is featured in numerous Islamic myths that have 
the immortal sage imparting valuable information to prophets and saints.402  The Quranic 
telling of the Khidr story involves his travels with the prophet Moses; during this voyage 
Khidr is claimed to have performed a multitude of puzzling acts that brought Moses to 
repeatedly question Khidr.403  In explaining the reasoning behind his actions, Khidr 
revealed that God had instructed him to perform the actions and that each act had a 
specific purpose, despite Moses’ initial interpretation.404  Sufis have interpreted this 
encounter as pertaining to esoteric meaning that runs contrary to appearance.405  
However, Khidr’s involvement with Ibn Arabi, according to the Shaykh’s biographical 
accounts (despite Khidr’s mythical nature), is far less enigmatic and much more direct.406  
The first meeting between the two took place in Seville after Ibn Arabi’s first revelatory 
experience.407  Khidr’s appearance occurred when Ibn Arabi questioned his master’s 
(Abu l-‘Abbas al-‘Uryabi) interpretation of a prophetic utterance.  Khidr apparently 
approached Ibn Arabi after this disagreement had occurred, reprimanding the young 
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mystic for his lack of proper courtesy (adab).408  Despite the fact that Ibn Arabi had been 
correct in his rebuttal, Khidr declared that it is not the role of the disciple to question the 
master.409  The second encounter reportedly occurred off the cost of Tunis.  Ibn Arabi 
testified that Khidr walked to his boat without even getting the soles of his feet wet, and 
upon reaching the boat Khidr spoke a language that none could understand save Ibn 
Arabi.410  The third meeting with the mythic master occurred while Ibn Arabi was 
traveling with a person who denied the existence of miracles.411  Upon stopping for 
midday prayers, Khidr and a group of ascetics approached Ibn Arabi and his companion.  
“At the end of the prayer… I stood talking with him at the door to the mosque, when the 
man who I said was Khidr took a prayer-rug from the mihrab of the mosque, stretched it 
out in the air seven cubits above the ground and got onto it to perform the supererogatory 
prayers.”412  Khidr later explained to Ibn Arabi that he had performed this act for the sake 
of his disbelieving friend.413 Hirtenstein interprets these three encounters as being 
hierarchical in nature, and as possessing a special degree of knowledge that relates back 
to God.414  For our purposes we need not elicit the esoteric meaning of Khidr’s actions; 
rather, it is important for us to note the continued presence of Khidr in Ibn Arabi’s 
autobiographical accounts.  Khidr’s repeated interventions within Ibn Arabi’s life can be 
used as an indicator of the mystic’s self-proclaimed spiritual importance and the 
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Shaykh’s assertions regarding his realization of the Muhammadan inheritance 
(wiratha).415 
 It should be noted that Ibn Arabi did not follow one particular master, nor did he 
belong to a specific Sufi order.416  This was not particularly unusual for Western Sufism 
at the time.417 Addas claims that “Suhba, ‘spiritual companionship’, was still an informal 
practice and had not yet acquired the characteristics of a structured and more or less 
regulated institution that it began to assume at the close of the twelfth century -- in the 
East, where an organized and therefore more rigid system came into being which would 
soon be given the name tariqa.”418  Therefore, much of Ibn Arabi’s spiritual development 
and the direction of his progress rested solely on his shoulders, for he did not have one 
particular master to walk him through the waystations he would later achieve.  It can also 
be stated that the initial revelation Ibn Arabi received outside of Seville indicates an early 
level of spiritual development/insight that surpassed many of the masters he would later 
visit.419 In congruence with Ibn Arabi’s spiritual autonomy, our Shaykh often refers to 
Khidr as being master of the masterless and claims the appearance of Moses, Jesus, and 
Muhammad during his first vision as his spiritual masters revealing themselves.420  
Morris, in The Reflective Heart, comes to a similar conclusion regarding Khidr and Ibn 
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Arabi’s spiritual wandering; it is during this “…period of nearly constant journeying, 
throughout the wider Maghrib, that gave rise to many of the significant spiritual 
encounters with memorable saintly personalities later recorded in the Ruh al-Quds”.421  
The importance of Ibn Arabi’s independence can be seen as a precursor to his later 
actualization of the Muhammadan Inheritance (in that Ibn Arabi would attain a spiritual 
station that none of his teachers possessed).  It is therefore important that we keep Ibn 
Arabi’s future achievements in mind when we are approaching his spiritual development. 
 A final biographical detail must be included before we can embark on our 
analysis of Ibn Arabi’s mystical philosophy.  As we have previously seen, Ibn Arabi was 
forced to balance his worldly responsibilities with his spiritual aspirations.422  The death 
of both his father and mother required the young mystic to take his sisters into his care 
and find them suitable husbands, yet the solitary path of religious devotion remained 
dominant in his mind.423  After relocating to Fez and the subsequent betrothal of his 
sisters, Ibn Arabi was quick to continue his spiritual wanderings; however, this does not 
appear to be the end of his worldly relationships.424  Addas claims that “[v]arious 
references in the Futuhat indicate that he had at least two wives.”425  It is also known that 
Ibn Arabi fathered a child with his wife Fatima bint Yunus Amir al-Haramayn during his 
stay in Mecca (the date of his son’s birth is believed to be around 1203).426  These 
familial relationships are particularly important because they not only allow us a glimpse 
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into Ibn Arabi’s private life, but such relationships also indicate that the Shaykh did not 
find it problematic to reconcile his spiritual aspirations with his husbandly obligations.  
By no means can Ibn Arabi be considered a mystic who withdrew himself from the 
mundane world in an attempt to attain realization; rather, the Shaykh immersed himself in 
his surrounding environment and took on the inherent responsibilities of a worldly life.427  
Ibn Arabi’s relationship with his family runs contrary to Underhill’s assertion that “[t]he 
unitive life, though so often lived in the world, is never of it.  It belongs to another plane 
of being, moves securely upon levels unrelated to our speech; and hence eludes the 
measuring powers of humanity.”428  It is important that we see Ibn Arabi not as a naked 
ascetic that lived on the fringes of society; rather, he was an active participant that held 
his worldly responsibilities as non-contradictory.  This paper will not embark on a 
discussion of non-dualism in respect to ascetic lifestyles, yet it is worthy to note that a 
non-dual worldview can accommodate a variety of lifestyles.  It can be (yet need not be) 
argued that non-dualism allows the mystic to see his/herself as actively participating in 
the same mystical reality they desire to “taste”; or stated more directly, mystics may 
undertake worldly activity while still recognizing the non-dual environment in which 
they act.  Ibn Arabi’s family life should not be interpreted as his “stepping back” from 
mystical aspirations, the balancing of his spiritual responsibilities with his familial 
responsibilities appears to have posed little problem to the Shaykh, who viewed the 
prophets (most notably Muhammad) as worldly participants that fully embraced their 
surrounding environments. 
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 The longing that lovers feel for each other did not pose a problem to Ibn Arabi.  
In a manner that is very characteristic of Ibn Arabi’s interpretive style, the Shaykh claims 
that human beings love what corresponds to themselves and love what they see as God’s 
reflection in other people and worldly things.429  In the Futuhat the Shaykh declares that 
when a person loves another person, “…there is nothing in himself which does not find 
its corresponding part in his beloved.  There remains nothing left over within him which 
would allow him to remain sober.  His outward dimension is enraptured by his beloved’s 
outward dimension, and his inward dimension by his inward dimension… Hence love of 
God and love of his similars absorbs man totally…”430 Thus, in a roundabout manner, Ibn 
Arabi’s familial love can be understood as being a particular manifestation of his love for 
the Divine.  Ibn Arabi is far from the disimpassioned ascetic that rejects all relationships; 
rather, Ibn Arabi’s mystical system incorporates emotion as a form of divine longing and 
celebration.431   
 Emphasis should be placed on the aspect of longing within Ibn Arabi’s theory of 
love, for the Shaykh believed that love strives for what it does not possess.432  Chittick 
further states that when the universe is viewed as being identical to God (as Ibn Arabi 
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did), “…the object of human love can only be God.  And since God in His Essence is 
forever nonmanifest, unknowable, and unattainable, the true object of love is always 
nonexistent in relation to human beings.”433  For our current biographical purposes we 
need not go into depth relating Ibn Arabi’s theory on divine love and how it factors into 
his cosmology, yet it is important that we note Ibn Arabi’s incorporation of “mundane 
love” into a longing that is directed towards God.  From his metaphysical standpoint on 
love, it becomes apparent how Ibn Arabi did not feel his relationships drew him away 
from God; on the contrary, such emotions were viewed as a manifestation and longing 
that each human has for their Divine Origin.434  Another spiritual interpretation of sensual 
love can be found in Ibn Arabi’s The Crown of Epistles and the Path to Intercessions, 
where he describes his love affair with the Kaba.435  In this account Ibn Arabi describes 
the Kaba as taking “…the form of a young girl such as I had never seen and of a beauty 
that cannot even be imagined.  On the spur of the moment I improvised some verses 
which I addressed to it in order to calm its irritation towards me.”436  It may seem odd to 
view the Kaba as an object of sensuality but in the poetic style of Ibn Arabi, a style that is 
fraught with meaning, it aptly demonstrates a concerted focus on God as the object of all 
love. 
 The metaphysical and theological topics discussed in relation to Ibn Arabi 
cannot be considered as being completely representative of the Shaykh’s system of 
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thought.  Rather, this paper has selected a limited number of topics that will be discussed 
as being partially representative of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical system.  These topics have 
been identified as being important to the Shaykh’s larger system of thought, but I do not 
wish for these talking points to be contextually divorced from the topics that will not be 
discussed.  Ibn Arabi’s notion of God will be our first point of examination and will be 
demonstrated as residing at the apex of the Shaykh’s metaphysical system.  The non-dual 
Absolute will be shown as permeating throughout the Shaykh’s philosophy and will serve 
as a continued point of reference in our subsequent discussions.  The non-duality of the 
Absolute will lead to our discussion on the veils and how veiling acts as a sign of God’s 
immanence and transcendence.  Themes of immanence and transcendence are common in 
Ibn Arabi’s writings and we would be remiss not to discuss the veils as facilitating this 
duality (and the underlying unity behind this apparent duality).  Divine revelation and 
spiritual verification will follow our discussion of the veils.  The importance Ibn Arabi 
assigns to revelation will be examined as demonstrating principles that the Shaykh 
believed inherent to the spiritual condition of humanity.  Issues of spiritual realization 
and the human potential to arrive at these ‘truths’ will be of vital importance and will 
lend itself to a better understanding of Ibn Arabi’s mystical thought.  Related to spiritual 
potentiality is the topic of prophetic and saintly Seals (and the figures who hold these 
titles).  The importance of these spiritual figures will reveal certain metaphysical 
mechanics that Ibn Arabi believed quintessential within the Islamic cycle of prophecy 
and to the attainment of realization.  Lastly, the Shaykh’s ideas on death and judgment 
will be explicated.  Many of Ibn Arabi’s prescriptive statements are in regards to death 
and the individual’s preparedness for the subsequent judgment.  Matters of spiritual 
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preparedness are vital to the Shaykh’s eschatological system and a discussion on 
revelation and veiling will further situate spiritual preparedness within Ibn Arabi’s 
worldview.  
Ibn Arabi’s Notion of God 
 The importance of God in Ibn Arabi’s mystical system cannot be overstated nor 
can it be understood outside of its proper context; stated more precisely, God is the be all 
and end all of Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical system.437  Ibn Arabi does not have room for 
anything other than God and certainly does not grant any objective existence to “things” 
outside of God.  It is for these reasons that our first discussion of Ibn Arabi must be 
anchored in the concepts that he identified as being fundamental.  One such touchstone is 
the notion of wujud that permeates our mystic’s writings.  On a definitional level wujud 
can be understood as Being and in the context of Ibn Arabi it can be understood as God’s 
essential unity with all of creation (for there is nothing outside of Being).438  It is 
important that we understand Ibn Arabi’s insistence that all existent beings and all their 
components subsist through God, and it is through this dependence that God is 
considered the essential Wujud.439  In many instances created beings are said to exist 
within the Sea of Necessity, meaning that it is only through God’s wujud that beings can 
come into existence.440  Wujud can also be used to denote the Essence of God; in this 
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usage Wujud implies our inherent inability to truly understand how this Essence is 
manifested throughout the universe in its apparent plurality. Chittick states: “What do we 
know about wujud as wujud? First, we know nothing.  Or rather, we know that wujud is 
indefinable and inaccessible, because we can know it only to the extent that we have 
it.”441  In a certain respect wujud can be approached as the underlying fabric of reality 
that supports all of creation; at no point can it be fully conceptualized nor can it be 
divided or compounded.  Wujud is the basic structural makeup of God’s creative 
manifestation.  Furthermore, the disclosure of Wujud is never-ending and non-repeating, 
meaning that God’s cosmic self-disclosure is an endless display of His unity, which is 
perpetually renewed at every instant.442  The perpetual and non-repeating disclosure of 
Wujud points to God’s omnipotence; moreover, the all-encompassing nature of wujud 
points to the singularity of God and the non-existence of anything considered to be other 
than God.  Both these topics will be examined in detail below, but for now it is worth 
noting how Wujud/wujud can be used as a blanket term that signifies humanity, God, 
creation, and the potentiality of future creations.443 
 Another touchstone that we must regard is Ibn Arabi’s theory on the Divine 
Names of God.  Chittick makes some important distinctions in regards to Ibn Arabi’s 
theory of the divine names; firstly, the Names are considered different than the words 
used to describe them.444  Just as our notion of God does not encompass the Essence of 
God, the usage of the name Power does not embody the totality of God’s Power.  
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Secondly, the names are not independent entities that stand outside of God; Chittick 
stresses that the names should be considered as relationships and not as existent 
entities.445  This point has created quite a bit of confusion, for Ibn Arabi has authored 
texts where the Names are anthropomorphized and hold a dialogue amongst 
themselves.446  These conversations can be found in The Book of the Fabulous Gryphon, 
The Composition of the Columns and Circles, and chapter 4 and 66 of the Futuhat al-
makkiyah.447  However, as we will later see, these anthropomorphic characterizations are 
ultimately subjected to Ibn Arabi’s idea of non-dualism.448  We can therefore credit these 
anthropomorphic conversations to a provisional literary technique and not a concrete 
statement regarding the Names.  Thirdly, each Name performs a twofold function by 
pointing to the Essence and then to the particular relationship that the Name comes to 
specify in manifest existence.449  Fourthly, what a Name comes to represent is its root or 
reality; to be more specific, the microcosmic representation that a Name displays is 
rooted within the larger essence of that power (the transcendent aspect of the Name).450  
Lastly, the essence of a particular Name determines how the name relates and functions 
within manifest existence.451  Ibn Arabi relates that the relationship between Name and 
Essence is like that between a sign and what is signified.452  In a certain respect we can 
consider Ibn Arabi’s theory on the Divine Names as forcing a duality onto our 
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understanding of the Names; on one hand the Name specifies a particular manifestation 
of God, while on the other, the Divine Names points back to their transcendent roots.  
Peter Young sums this divergence eloquently when he explains that “What enables a 
symbol to be a symbol -- to stand for something else -- is the fact that it is essentially 
identical to that which it stands.  That is the ground.  But the difference lies in the plane 
of manifestation, the form resulting from the place.  So here we have the essential unity 
and the empirical diversity.”453  The Divine Names cannot be treated as if they were 
definite representations; the Names are signs that are meant to turn the viewer towards 
their Source.454 
 Ibn Arabi furthers his theory of Divine Names by hierarchically ranking the 
names in accordance to the reality or level to which they point.455  This theory of levels 
does not pertain to the Essence and does not introduce any form of division whatsoever; 
rather, it is the nonexistent aspects in creation that superficially manipulate the hierarchy 
of Names.456  “The Speaker reveals himself through the attributes of creation as Merciful, 
Alive, Knowing, Powerful, Speaking, and so on down the list of the most beautiful names 
that he pronounces in the Qur’an.”457  Manifestation is sustained through Being (God) 
and it is through the diversity of Names that each existent thing takes on its particular 
characteristics.458  The Names of God are reflected throughout the universe and it is 
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manifestation that reflects these individual Names back onto God (for God is the origin of 
the Names and the source for all ‘loaned’ existence).459  Certain Names that get reflected 
back onto God are more representative of his totality when compared to other Names, 
and it is through this provisional order that the universe and man comes to display the 
hierarchy of God’s Names.  The term provisional is important because the hierarchy of 
Names does not possess its own continued existence and will eventually be folded back 
into the indivisible Essence.  The transience of manifestation witnessed throughout the 
universe, and most notably in human beings, can be partially credited to a change in the 
reflected names; “Things increase or diminish, but their immutable entities do not, by 
definition, undergo any change.”460  This does not mean that every existent thing can 
choose what Name it will reflect; rather, Ibn Arabi credits humans as the only beings that 
are able to reflect all the Names.461  In the Fusus Ibn Arabi declares that this hierarchy of 
reflected Names is a necessity for, “If there were no ranking in degrees in the cosmos, 
some of the levels would remain inoperative (mu’attal) and uninhabited.  But there is 
nothing in existence inoperative; on the contrary, all of it is fully inhabited.  Every level 
must have inhabitants whose properties will be in keeping with the level.  Hence He 
made some parts of the cosmos more excellent than others.”462  We can therefore see that 
something base does not have the potential to display the vast array of Names, unlike 
human beings that have inherited this ability from their primordial ancestor, Adam. 
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 Humans, Ibn Arabi claims, have an inherent ability to reflect the Names back 
onto God (and with the achievement of their theomorphic potential, these people gain the 
ability to reflect all the Names back onto God), yet it is impossible for the Essence of 
God to be comprehended or compacted so that it could be represented in its totality.463  
The summation of all Levels and the Essence can only be referenced through the name 
Allah, which is the most comprehensive of all the Names.  Ibn Arabi credits the name 
Allah with certain transcendental qualities that extend beyond the bounds of its linguistic 
shell: “You say ‘Allah.’ This name brings together the realities of all the divine names, so 
it is impossible for it to be said in a nondelimited sense (‘ala’l-itlaq).”464 We should note 
the independence that Allah has in comparison to the other names, for no name is as 
comprehensive nor can any name, save Allah, be used as a capstone designation for the 
Essence and the Levels.  Ibn Arabi claims the supremacy of Allah derives from our 
ability to understand the Name, yet the inability of the Name to “step down” and become 
manifest.  “So the Level of the name Allah is known, but it is impossible for its property 
to become manifest within the cosmos, because of the contrariety (taqabbul) it 
contains.”465  Chittick claims al-ism al-jami is an adjective for Allah, in that the term is 
understood as representing a unitive principle.466  We should also note that the term jami 
can be used in accordance to the perfect human’s ability to unite all names.  However, on 
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the divine level the use of jami harkens to Allah’s combination of the Names and the 
Essence.467 
Ibn Arabi, in explicating his mystical philosophy, often makes provisional 
distinctions that can be used on particular levels of analysis, but many of these 
distinctions are later rendered inappropriate or misleading when used within a different 
level of analysis.468  The previous examination of the Divine Names offers us a useful 
example of how an attribute can be used in situation X, yet the same attribute would hold 
no existence in comparison to the all-encompassing Essence.469  Such distinctions 
continue in Ibn Arabi’s understanding of the Divinity and the Essence.  Chittick renders 
this relationship as such: “The Divine Essence is God in Himself, without reference to the 
relationships which may be established between God and the creatures.  In contrast, the 
Divinity is the Essence considered in relation to created things.”470  The Divinity is the 
active principle in the name Allah and can be considered the Lord overseeing creation.  It 
is made clear that the Divinity can be reached through rationality and it is the Divinity 
that makes demands onto existent beings (such as the prohibitions laid out in the 
Quran).471  Furthermore, the Divinity can be considered the requisite principle that 
creation rests upon: “Since the cosmos has no subsistence except through God, and since 
the attribute of Divinity has no subsistence except through the cosmos, each of the two is 
the provision (riqz) of the other; each takes nourishment (taghadhdhi) from the other so 
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that its existence may subsist.”472  The Divinity cannot be considered absolutely 
free/unbound (as the Essence is) because the Divinity relies on the relationship between 
created and creator.  The Divinity depends on the manifest universe to fulfill its position 
as the Divinity, and as such, the Divinity requires a relationship for its status to remain 
intact.  In Ibn Arabi’s theory of causality we see that cause and effect demand each other; 
therefore, any reliance on manifestation, which is a partially unreal effect, cannot be 
ascribed to something that is absolutely free (the Essence).473  We can find Ibn Arabi 
walking this fine line in the Fusus where he states that “…the Real’s creation cannot be 
assigned a cause, this is what is correct in itself, so much so that in Him nothing can be 
rationally conceived of that would require the causation of this creation of His that 
becomes manifest.  On the contrary, His creation of creatures is a gratuitous favor toward 
the creatures and a beginning of bounty, and He is independent of the worlds.”474  There 
is a definite tension in the previous quotation between the need to base the phenomenal 
world on a cause/effect relationship, yet we also witness a simultaneous distancing that is 
meant to protect the Essence from inappropriate conditions.475  This is a particularly 
important distinction because much of Ibn Arabi’s theoretical approach draws from the 
distinctive levels of Divinity and Essence; however, the distinction between the Divinity 
and the Essence is another set of provisional distinctions that cannot be left to stand on its 
own.  Thus, Ibn Arabi forces us to simultaneously confirm and negate the duality in 
creation and even in God; for, “It is vital to preserve the ‘vision with two eyes’ or the 
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taste with many tongues.  Unified vision, yes.  Single origin of water, yes.  But we must 
also revel in and give thanks for the sights, sounds, and tastes of God’s infinite 
manifestation in forms.”476  Indeed, Ibn Arabi places his readers in a precarious spot 
between confirmation and denial, multiplicity and non-duality, yet it is in this state of 
bewilderment that Ibn Arabi feels the mystic is best suited. 
 
The Veils 
Our discussion of the veils could have been inserted into numerous places 
throughout this paper.  The reason for this pertains to Ibn Arabi’s usage of the veils as 
being both personal and cosmological in nature; stated differently, the veils possess 
immanent (tashbih) and transcendent aspects (tanzih).  Furthermore, the veils hold a 
precarious position as being both real and unreal at the same time.  Chittick is adamant 
that Ibn Arabi considered the veils as the manifestation of God, which grants the veils an 
aspect of reality.477  Unfortunately, the unrealized individual does not understand this 
immanent disclosure and makes wrongful judgments in ignorance.478 We can therefore 
understand a certain duality when Ibn Arabi contests that “…There is no veil and no 
curtain, nothing hides Him save His manifestation.”479  It is only through the use of veils 
and occasions (another term used by Ibn Arabi to describe veils) that God, in his manifest 
form, is able to come forth from the indistinguishable Essence.480  It follows that the veils 
facilitate existence and therefore cannot be completely escaped, this permanence within 
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manifestation makes the veils real; however, the veils can be misunderstood and credited 
to something other than God; it is through this mistake that the veils introduce unreality 
into our worldview.481  “Since His Entity is identical with the curtain, nothing veils us 
save the fact that we make what we see a curtain, so our aspiration attaches itself to what 
is behind the curtain, that is, the curtained.”482  The veils possess a degree of immanence 
(tashbih) because they are partially composed of God’s direct manifestation, yet this 
immanence is also laden with signs of transcendence (tanzih).  Transcendence, indicated 
through the veils, is in respect to the fact that the veils point to the transcendental Essence 
that is beyond the immediate representation and humanly comprehension.483 
Ibn Arabi furthers his idea on veiling by positing that we, as human beings, are 
veils onto ourselves.484  The veiling that occurs through human individuality is credited to 
our mortal nature, which has subjectivity at its base.  Ibn Arabi believed that individuality 
also possess the immanent and transcendent marks of God that accompany all veils; 
“So He Has made you identical with His curtain over you.  If not 
for this curtain, you would not seek increase in knowledge of 
Him.  You are spoken to and addressed from behind the curtain of 
the form from which He speaks to you.  Consider your mortal 
humanity.  You will find it is identical with your curtain from 
behind which He speaks to you.  For He says, It belongs not to 
any mortal that God should speak to him, except by revelation, or 
from behind a veil [42:51].  Hence, He may speak to you from 
you, since you veil yourself from you, and you are His curtain 
over you.”485 
 
Our Shaykh posited that it is the inability to recognize God’s essential Wujud, including 
this unity with one’s own self, which leads to the creation of dualistic worldviews.  
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However, human beings have an inherent knowledge (or a longing for) that leads them to 
seek the transcendental source behind their theomorphic manifestation (we should note 
that humans are still claimed to be theomorphic entities before the realization of this 
status occurs).486  An end to this longing is not reached through the rational faculties, just 
as veils cannot be understood through the employment of logic; rather, the imaginal 
ability inherent within each person is able to access the barzakh487 between the immanent 
veils and the transcendental source to which the veils point.488  Mirroring this 
transcendent/immanent barzakh is Ibn Arabi’s concept of the veils, which possesses 
degrees of unreality and Ultimate Reality.489 
Ibn Arabi considered the Quran and all previous revelations as being veils. 
Revelations that indicate certain aspects of God, such as the Names, are believed to 
contain God in a form that is intelligible to human beings.490  Chittick claims that Ibn 
Arabi’s idea of revelation pertains to a “…specific form of divine self-disclosure in 
which God addresses certain creatures from behind a veil with a message directed toward 
their specific situation.”491  Our understanding of Ibn Arabi would be greatly remiss if we 
failed to recognize that the Shaykh understood revelation to be a barzakh itself.  The 
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revelations received by Muhammad contain specific Names, attributes, and demands but 
these statements also point to the Essence beyond these categories.492  In a certain manner 
revelation has an immanent (tashbih) aspect that pertains to specific qualities or demands, 
yet the gnostic is not satisfied with this level of devotion.  Ibn Arabi’s mystical system 
rests heavily upon experience that goes beyond the rules and regulations stipulated in the 
Quran; therefore, Ibn Arabi’s interpretation of the Quran also points to the transcendental 
aspects of God that lies beyond exoteric submission (islam).493  Through the process of 
spiritual development (or direct revelation in rare instances) the gnostic is able to 
experience the esoteric reality that the Quran alludes to.  To achieve this form of 
realization, according to Ibn Arabi, one must “…transcend the limitations of all modes of 
knowing save the one mode that recognizes the relative validity of each mode while not 
being bound or restricted by any.  This is precisely ‘the station of no station… It is 
achieved by ‘the Muhammadans,’ those who receive the inheritance of all prophetic 
wisdom from Muhammad.”494  Furthermore, revelation can act as a negative influence if 
it is inappropriately followed or employed in a manner that wasn’t the original intent (as 
witnessed in the need for the cycle of prophecy).  In commenting on the difference 
between faith and reason, within Quranic interpretation, Ibn Arabi claims that “Reason 
possesses a light through which it perceives specific affairs, while faith possesses a light 
through which it perceives everything…”495 It is possible to apply reason to revelation, 
yet the most appropriate method is the balancing of faith and reason, just as the veil must 
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be understood as being simultaneously immanent and transcendent, or stated differently, 
revelation possess a dual nature of immanent decrees (the dos and don’ts) and 
transcendental signs (aspects that encourage personal experience). 
There is an obvious duality that Ibn Arabi recognizes within the veils and signs; 
this requires the gnostic to employ a spiritual method that is able to discern these 
divergent principles.496  Being in possession of two eyes is an important, and oft-used, 
allusion that Ibn Arabi employs to describe the gnostics that are able to realize the 
immanence and transcendence of God.497  The Shaykh makes this abundantly clear when 
he asserts that “The eye which looks in the direction of the nonmanifest declares God’s 
incomparability and places all emphasis upon His Unity…The eye which looks in the 
direction of manifest acknowledges the reality of manyness and declares His similarity, 
since it sees all things as God’s self-disclosures.”498  This divergent approach is clearly 
evident in Ibn Arabi’s method and it is very appropriate that he eventually ‘switches’ the 
roles assigned to the immanent and the transcendent; more specifically, Ibn Arabi claims 
that we must recognize the veil as the face of God and the face of God as a veil.499  This 
reversal keeps the gnostic in an awkward state of bewilderment that does not permit static 
understanding.  Furthermore, Ibn Arabi’s bewilderment is an ideal state of recognition 
when dealing within a metaphysical system that is based on God’s perpetual, non-
repeating, self-disclosure.500  Ibn Arabi makes it evident that the true gnostic sees “…God 
as he discloses Himself within the limits of the created things.  Inasmuch as they know 
                                                 
496 This duality should be considered provisional and impermanent. 
497 Ibid., 362.  
498 Ibid., 361.   
499 Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God, 123.   
500 Ibn Arabi, “The Imprint of the Bezels of Wisdom,” trans. William Chittick, Journal of 
the Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi Society vol. 1 (1982): 90.   
 134 
the self disclosure for what it is, the limits serve to increase them in the bewilderment that 
is one of the highest stages of knowledge.”501  It is also important that we recognize God 
as the constant behind each veil and form; at no point does the multitude of veils or the 
myriad of forms challenge God’s Wujud. 
There are an infinite number of veils and the mystic cannot expect to penetrate all 
veils; furthermore, the state of bewilderment cannot be completely transcended by the 
mystic.502  Chittick aptly states this problem when he claims “Veils are inescapable, yet 
people need to recognize the face of God within them and beyond them.  The test of their 
humanity is tied to knowledge discernment, recognizing things for what they are, giving 
things their haqqs, and putting things in their proper places.”503  Ibn Arabi was extremely 
dedicated to a mystical system that was based on personal experience, yet the 
achievement of gnostic tasting should not be confused with the attainment of a permanent 
state.504  Because the veils are infinite, one cannot expect to achieve a static form of 
knowledge that will carry into the future.505  The limitlessness of God’s self-expression 
does not allow for stability in one’s mystical experiences; rather, each gnostic is granted 
moments of illumination and then is forced back into the tensions of bewilderment.  Ibn 
Arabi warns of this when he states “Beware of becoming delimited by specific knotting 
and disbelieving in everything else, lest great good escape you.  Or rather, knowledge of 
the situation as it actually is in itself will escape you.  Be in yourself a veil for the forms 
                                                 
501 Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God, 83.   
502 Ibid., 106.   
503 Ibid., 106.   
504 Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, trans. William Chittick, 349.  
505 Osman Yahia, “Theophanies and Lights in the Thought of Ibn Arabi,” The Journal of 
…the Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi Society vol. 10 (1991): 40.  
 135 
of all beliefs…”506 To achieve what Adam, the first gnostic, was endowed with one must 
have a metaphysical/spiritual plasticity that can transform with God’s infinite self-
expression.  It can be argued that the achievement of pure reflection on the part of the 
individual is a permanent state, but attention should also be paid to the fact that this 
reflective ability entails a flexibility that allows for continued reflection.  In Imaginal 
Worlds, Chittick describes this position as such: “The human task is to embody the divine 
attributes in a manner that does not allow any of them to play too great or too small a 
role.  Actualizing the divine form in oneself results in nearness to God, whereas failing to 
keep the proper equilibrium among the names leads to imbalance, or a distorted divine 
form, and the result is distance from God.”507  
 
Revelation and Verification 
 The role of revelation is immensely important in Ibn Arabi’s mystical philosophy.  
As previously noted, the Essence is beyond any form of conceptualization nor can it be 
reached through rational thought alone.  But Ibn Arabi becomes even more insistent on 
the need for revelation when he claims that all forms of knowledge eventually lead back 
to God and we, as humans, depend on God’s self-expression to achieve any form of 
knowledge whatsoever.508  This principle can be found in Ibn Arabi’s discussion on 
human beings as microcosms of God’s cosmic revelation; “God never ceases creating 
within us ad infinitum, so the knowledges extend ad infinitum.  By ‘knowledge’ the Tribe 
means only that which is connected to God through unveiling (kashf) or denotation 
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(dalala).”509 Ibn Arabi does claim that rational thought can lead to the realization of a 
“transcendent God of necessity”, meaning that one can use logical suppositions to realize 
the need for a divine orderer.510  However, our Shaykh claims that this form of reasoning 
depends on logic and the arbitrary distinctions made within logical thought; because of 
this dependency the rational approach is “…lower than the first way [revelation], since he 
who bases his consideration upon proof can be visited by obfuscations which detract 
from his proof, and only with difficulty can he remove them.”511  Through this principle 
any form of knowledge can be considered a veil of sorts, an associated idea is that 
knowledge, in its immanent nature, denotes multiplicity and rejects unity.512  Instead of 
realizing the inner-meaning of revelation, a person can become fixated on the outward 
form of revelation, or the outward form of any type of knowledge.  This results in a 
superficial knowledge that does not extend beyond external appearances (or to use 
another veil metaphor, the external form of understanding only witnesses with one 
eye).513  Without revelation stipulating the correct methods for the attainment of 
knowledge, and the true nature of that knowledge, the devotee is doomed to become 
mislead.514 
In accumulating revelatory knowledge it is “… not enough to simply accept 
prophetic instructions and put it into practice.  The full and integral inheritance demands 
receiving knowledge directly from God by way of ‘bestowal and witnessing.’ The 
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messengers themselves, the paradigms of human perfection, received their knowledge 
precisely by this route.”515  The need for revelatory knowledge is obvious, but Ibn Arabi 
believes that true understanding of revelation can only come through verification 
(tahqiq).516  What is required is a “knowing through the heart” (qalb), which is vastly 
different than the epistemological means employed by philosophers and theologians.517  
There is an inherent actualization within Ibn Arabi’s idea of verification that demands the 
individual extend beyond rational thought and rational approaches to revelation; 
“Realization is true knowledge of the haqq that is demanded by the essence of each thing.  
The person gives it its full due in knowledge.  If it happens that he also puts it into 
practice as a state, he is the one over whom the authority of realization prevails.”518  In 
the Fusus Ibn Arabi makes this clear when he asserts that it is only the spiritual knowers 
(arif) who comprehend the totality of God’s revelation.519 When describing the 
attainment of spiritual knowledge, Ibn Arabi follows Quranic precedence and looks to the 
heart as being the true seat of one’s understanding and actions.520  Furthermore, it is the 
heart that reflects the individual’s spiritual status; overdependence on rational 
understanding will result in a heart that is unable to capture the multidimensional ethos of 
Quranic revelation (in that the Quran speaks to a multitude of spiritual levels and 
dimensions).521  Morris describes the process of unveiling as being the soul’s awakening 
to its interior reality and the actualization of its potentiality; the combination of spiritual 
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actualization and revelatory understanding becomes synonymous within Morris’ 
assertion.522  In this extended example we can find Ibn Arabi combining the idea of 
revelation with the subjectivity of experience: “…start employing the forms of 
knowledge given by the divine revealing (shar) in (purifying) your own essence; and use 
the knowings of the Friends and the true Knowers who took them from God in your own 
spiritual exercise… For if you cannot distinguish between those waters (i.e., which ones 
are truly pure and divinely revealed, and which polluted by human interference), then 
know that something is wrong with your nature.”523  The individual is encouraged to use 
revelatory accounts from saints and prophets, yet these testaments are employed as a 
means to reach self-verification.  Revelation is absolutely necessary in Ibn Arabi’s 
system, yet it does not and cannot replace the verification that each individual gnostic 
must achieve.  Ibn Arabi further claims that the prophetic traditions, ending with 
Muhammad, were aids in the endeavor to actualize the individual’s original disposition 
(that being the reflectivity that Adam once possessed).524   
 
Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood 
 In the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood we once again encounter a subject that 
could have easily been inserted into numerous places throughout this paper.  Ibn Arabi’s 
ideas on the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood could have been placed in his biographical 
section, yet the metaphysical implications of this title warrants its own discussion.  Our 
initiatory point of adherence is Ibn Arabi’s identification of three cosmic Seals; the first 
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being Muhammad as the Seal of Prophecy, meaning that no other revelation will be 
extended from God.525  Muhammad being the end to the cycle of prophecy is a very 
orthodox notion: we need only look to the Quranic passage 33:40 to find scriptural 
support for this claim.  There, it is clearly stated that Muhammad “… is the Messenger of 
Allah and the Last of the prophets.”526  Secondly, Ibn Arabi turns to Jesus as the Seal of 
Universal Sainthood.527  It is the eschatological role assigned to Jesus that leads Ibn Arabi 
to label him as the Seal of Universal Sainthood.528 The identification of Jesus as Seal of 
Universal Sainthood is obvious and no ambiguity can be claimed to Ibn Arabi’s 
identification of Jesus: “When Jesus descends at the end of time, he will judge only 
according to the Law revealed to Muhammad.  He is the Seal of the Saints.  One of the 
favors accorded to Muhammad was that the sainthood of his community and the 
sainthood in general be sealed by a noble Messenger prophet.”529  Looking back to our 
biographical discussion of Ibn Arabi, we can see sustained linkages that the Shaykh 
makes between himself and Jesus.530  Firstly, Jesus was present during Ibn Arabi’s first 
revelatory experience outside of Seville.531  Secondly, Ibn Arabi frequently claims Jesus 
as his first spiritual master.532  We will also see that Ibn Arabi considered himself and 
Jesus to be mutually encompassing Seals.  In another eschatological passage we can see 
the role our Shaykh assigned Jesus as “…the Seal of Sainthood in an absolute sense. He 
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is the saint who par excellence possesses the non-legislative prophetic function in the 
time of this Community…When he descends at the end of time, it will be as the heir and 
the Seal, and after him there will be no saint to be the holder of prophethood in 
general…”533 In the previous passage Ibn Arabi makes a concerted effort to maintain 
Jesus as a subordinate messenger (rasul) to Muhammad, despite the fact that they are 
both Seals.  When Jesus is employed as the Seal of Sainthood it does not affect his status 
as a prophet; furthermore, Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical system makes it impossible for any 
prophet to supersede Muhammad, for Muhammad was granted the most comprehensive 
of all revelations.534  The Shaykh considered Muhammad the archetypal prophet that had 
been partially represented by all previous prophets.  Stated differently, all previous 
prophets displayed revelatory aspects that were to culminate in Muhammad and his 
message.535 We can see Ibn Arabi employ Muhammad as the apex of God’s revelation 
when the Shaykh claims, “The Koran is God’s Speech and His attribute, Muhammad in 
his entirety is the attribute of God.”536  Ibn Arabi terms this the Muhammadan Reality 
(haqaqiqa muhammadiyya), and points to Muhammad’s claim that he, in his prophetic 
function, predated Adam’s creation.537  This can be understood as Muhammad asserting a 
prophetic link that originated within himself and then became present in all subsequent 
prophets and finally reaching its pinnacle with Muhammad and the Quranic revelation.538  
Regarding the contextual function that Ibn Arabi assigns to each Seal, it is safe to claim 
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that the Shaykh’s understanding of the three Seals incorporated a hierarchical order that 
was built upon situational importance.539 
As previously mentioned, Ibn Arabi believed the Seal of the Saints (Jesus) and the 
Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood were mutually encompassing positions.  This is made 
clear in Ibn Arabi’s account of how the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood was elected: 
“He [i.e. the Prophet] saw me behind the Seal [i.e. Jesus], a place where I was standing 
because of the community of status that exists between him and me, and he said to him, 
‘This man is your equal, your son and your friend.  Set up for him before me the Throne 
of Tamarisk’… Then the Seal set up the Throne in that solemn place.  On its front was 
written in blue light: ‘This is the most pure Muhammadan station!’”540  The Seal of 
Muhammadan Sainthood is believed by Ibn Arabi to be the individual who had attained 
the station of no station.  The Shaykh claims that the station of no station is only achieved 
when the individual has come to display all the divine Names in perfect equilibrium, 
meaning that the they reflect God’s self-disclosure in the most appropriate way 
possible.541 Referring back to the hierarchy of Divine Names, we can see that some 
names are more reflective of God than others, therefore, the individual who reflects a 
specific Name or attribute is said to inhabit that station (with each station being 
designated by a particular Name or aspect of God).542  Chittick understands each 
particular station as a place where the individual stops and meets God: “Hence the term 
manzil or ‘waystation’ is the place where one descends from one’s mount to rest during a 
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journey.  In a ‘mutual waystation,’ both God and the servant descend in order to meet 
each other, as travelers might descend from their horses in order to meet in camp.”543  
When an individual comes to inhabit a waystation, that person is in fact coming to 
display a degree of God’s manifestation and being within a specific waystation means 
that one is not displaying the full spectrum of God’s revelation (the individual is only 
reflecting the particular waystations that they inhabit).544  However, Ibn Arabi believes 
that the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood is more than an individual who belongs in the 
station of no station; rather, the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood is said to be 
Muhammad’s plenary inheritor.545  By this the Shaykh means “… no one after him [the 
Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood], with the exception of Jesus, would inherit the totality 
of prophetic works, states, and knowledge -- a totality that had been realized only by 
Muhammad among all the prophets.”546  Therefore, the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood 
is the individual who is able to inhabit the station of no station in a manner that only 
Muhammad could teach and to a degree that cannot be repeated within this epoch.547 
So who did Ibn Arabi identify as the Seal of Muhammadan Sainthood and the last 
individual to display the totality of Muhammad’s teachings? Ibn Arabi claimed that title 
for himself.  While describing a vision that he had during his stay in Mecca (599 CE), Ibn 
Arabi maintains that his “…place among the followers, in my own category [i.e. the 
category of awliya], is like that of the Messenger of God among the prophets, and 
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perhaps it is through me that God has sealed sainthood.”548  Ibn Arabi was speaking about 
himself when he claimed the Prophet demanded that Jesus take him as an equal and set 
him upon the Throne of Tamarisk.549 Chodkiewicz believes that Ibn Arabi came to 
solidify this position within his greater cosmological scheme during his stay in Mecca; 
however, Ibn Arabi and Chodkiewicz both claim there were early indications of the 
Shaykh’s spiritual destiny.550  Ibn Arabi regarded himself as the complete manifestation 
of Muhammad’s revelation, all other gnostics and “Friends of God” would be partial 
inheritors of Muhammad’s prophetic message.551  In a certain respect this self-proclaimed 
title can be theologically accommodated within the Islamic cycle of prophecy. This is 
because within each prophetic cycle there is a natural degradation of the revealed law, 
which further implies that there would be an individual who would display the greatest 
degree of that revelation before revelatory degradation began.552  Ibn Arabi considered 
himself the capstone to Muhammad’s prophetic cycle; all the following inheritors of 
prophetic lineages would originate from other prophets or would be partial inheritors in 
the case of Muhammad’s spiritual lineage.553  By no means should this be considered as 
Ibn Arabi claiming to be the only person who has inhabited the station of no station.  
Rather, “[t]he modalities of the inheritance will be defined by their connection to specific 
prophets embraced by Muhammad’s all-comprehensive prophethood.  After the 
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Muhammadan Seal, ‘No Friend will be found upon the heart of Muhammad.’”554  Many 
have criticized Ibn Arabi on his self-proclaimed title; however, when such claims are 
understood within the context of the Shaykh’s cosmological system, they become less 
controversial.  Much like Jesus being a Seal, Ibn Arabi’s claim to the Seal of 
Muhammadan Sainthood belongs within a strict hierarchy that is meant to protect the 
status of the prophets, and ultimately, Muhammad as the climax of all prophecy.  Ibn 
Arabi makes it clear that his role is one of facilitation and not revelation: “As God has 
sealed legislative prophethood through Muhammad, through the Muhammadan Seal he 
has sealed the sainthood which comes from the Muhammadan heritage, not the sainthood 
which comes from the heritage of other prophets: among the saints, in fact, some, for 
example, inherit from Abraham, some from Moses, some from Jesus, and after this 
Muhammadan Seal there will be others; whereas no other saint will ever be ‘on the heart’ 
of Muhammad.”555  Ibn Arabi’s concept of sainthood is very specific in that the 
Muhammadan community is able to display all previous revelations through their 
saints.556  The saint’s revelatory embodiment includes knowledge and a spiritually active 
quality that is best termed realization.557  Within the idea of realization it is important that 
we note the active aspect that is claimed to realign one’s worldview and spiritual 
disposition.  When Ibn Arabi claims to have been the Seal of Muhamadan Sainthood he 
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means that he demonstrated the totality of this revelation, and not to have introduced 
anything new to the existing revelatory system initiated by Muhammad.558 
 
Eschatology in Ibn Arabi 
 Death plays an important function in Ibn Arabi’s mystical philosophy.  To 
properly understand the Shaykh’s eschatological system we must start by making 
reference to knowledge and spiritual preparedness.559  We have previously noted Ibn 
Arabi’s assertion that all forms of knowledge lead back to God; therefore, our spiritual 
awareness and level of understanding is, in part, tied to our ability to recognize the 
underlying Divine Reality.560 The spiritual embodiment of this knowledge is believed to 
permit us the ability to actualize our full theomorphic potential (in that we are purported 
to display all the Signs and Names of God).561 The synthesis of understanding and 
spiritual embodiment can be seen in Ibn Arabi’s statement regarding The Folk of Allah: 
“The Folk of Allah display their poverty toward God through their faith in Him, in order 
to reach knowledge of Him, which he has prescribed in the Law.  They know that what 
God desires for them is their return (ruju) to Him in that and in every state.”562  This 
struggle is claimed to be the main objective to human life and it is only the gnostics who 
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are able to reflect God in this manner.563  The attempt made to actualize this state, and the 
degree to which this is achieved, becomes very important in Ibn Arabi’s eschatological 
system.564 
Upon death the Shaykh believes that our spiritual condition becomes our outward 
form.565  Ibn Arabi speaks of this as an inversion of sorts, in that “God created man in an 
inverted configuration, so he finds the afterworld in his inwardness and this world in his 
outwardness.”566  The shade to which one reflects God’s Light back onto God becomes 
that person’s outward form after death.567  Furthermore, God will confront the individual 
on the Day of Resurrection and it is only through a recognizable form that the individual 
will come to acknowledge God.568 The form that the individual will recognize as God 
will correspond to their spiritual nature; “… on the Day of Resurrection He will 
transmute Himself in self-disclosure from form to form.  But that form from which He 
transmutes Himself does not disappear from Him, since the one who believed that 
concerning Him will see it.  Hence He does nothing but remove the veil from the eye of 
the one who is perceiving the form…”569 The gnostic who is able to reflect the 
summation of God’s Light will be the one best prepared to recognize God on the Day of 
Resurrection; it is only the Perfect human that is able to reflect the totality of God’s self-
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disclosure, therefore, it is only the Perfect human that will be able to recognize the 
infinite forms that God will display on the Day of Resurrection.570  This state of 
preparedness must be honed and refined during one’s lifetime, for after death the internal 
spiritual form will become one’s external and permanent form.571  The individual best 
prepared to reflect God will know themselves as nothing more than a microcosmic 
manifestation of God’s self-disclosure, but those ignorant of their spiritual responsibility 
will only reflect in degrees and shades.572  Ibn Arabi progresses this claim by stating that 
the ignorant are bound to introduce multiplicity and incorrect notions of the ‘I’.  While 
describing this feature Ibn Arabi often turns to the servant as the locus of perceived 
multiplicity: “The entity of the servant possesses a specific preparedness that displays its 
effects in the Manifest and gives rise to the diversity of forms within the Manifest which 
is the Entity of the Real.”573  When death occurs all preparations end and one’s spiritual 
status becomes fixed.  The Day of Resurrection will entail judgment in accordance to 
each person’s (now external) spiritual form. 
Ibn Arabi believed that all created things eventually return to God.574  This type of 
return is labeled as the compulsory return to God, and as a stipulation within engendered 
existence.575  The voluntary return to God is much more limited and only pertains to 
human and jinn.  Only humans and jinn have the ability to enact spiritual change; 
therefore, the development of one’s spiritual potential is considered the voluntary return 
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to God because there is an aspect of free will within the process.576  This type of return is 
also voluntary because it requires the seeker’s spiritual development and metaphysical 
awakening (coming to see that they are nothing more than a microcosmic reflection of 
God’s Light).  The following quote by Chittick nicely sums up the idea of spiritual 
potential and the individual’s voluntary return to God; 
 
“The crux of knowledge, then, is to understand one’s own soul. 
The voluntary return teaches people how to interpret themselves 
by discerning the wisdom present in both revelation and the 
cosmos.  The return reaches its fruition on the Day of 
Resurrection.  What we should want to learn is who we are now 
and who we will be when we arrive back at the meeting with God.  
All other knowledge should be subordinate to this knowledge.”577 
 
Included within this process is a realignment of self-identification.  The voluntary return 
to God involves the servant coming to realize that they have no objective status of their 
own; all ideas of independent existence are dismissed and the individual sees themselves 
as nothing more than reflections of God.578  While in this state of recognition, the 
individual is best prepared to reflect the totality of God’s Light, for the delusory ego is no 
longer present and able to inhibit one’s power of reflection.579    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast the mystical philosophies 
of Ibn Arabi and Sankara.  This comparison is not a comprehensive examination of all 
aspects in Ibn Arabi and Sanakra; rather, it will be limited to the topics covered in the 
preceding sections.  A number of commonalities will be presented but it is important that 
we remember the limited nature of these philosophical assertions.580  Sankara and Ibn 
Arabi both believed their philosophies were of secondary importance when considered in 
relation to their ideas of mystical realization and the attainment of this state.581  The 
mystical philosophies being discussed are only aids in their respective system and in the 
attainment of realization; both mystics insist that we not mistake the ends (realization) for 
the means (the philosophies being employed).  Furthermore, this analysis will not render 
an opinion on the subjective mystical encounters that lie at the heart of both philosophies.  
Underhill is perfectly correct in stating that the subjective experience “…is the valid part 
of mysticism, the thing which gives to it its unique importance amongst systems of 
thought, the only source of its knowledge.  Everything else is really guessing aided by 
analogy.”582   
The current task is to examine the philosophical scaffolding that both mystics use 
to help explain their mystical summits; both mystics ultimately pull their scaffolding 
down, yet the nature of these conceptual aids will display important aspects within each 
mystic’s worldview. William James treats these mystical discoveries as phenomena that 
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undermine “…the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based 
upon the understanding and the senses alone.  They show it to be only one kind of 
consciousness.  They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as 
anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.”583  It is the 
constant subjugation of conceptual assertions to subjective experience that forces this 
project to walk a fine line.  As academics within the discipline of religious studies we 
ought not to render statements that bind or limit the mystical experience; to do so would 
run the risk of collapsing the entire system that we seek to study.  Moreover, the 
philosophical statements made by the mystics cannot and should not be understood as 
conveying the totality of their mystical experience, because they themselves state that 
these statements are inadequate.  Thus both sets of writings (academic and mystical) are 
subordinate and distanced from the subjective mystical experience that form the core of 
the topic we label “mysticism”.  A sympathetic approach to mysticism must force itself to 
make balanced observations in regards to the whole system of thought (contrasted by 
investigations that embellish certain mystical aspects to the detriment of the conceptual 
whole).  The similarities between Ibn Arabi and Sankara will be first examined because it 
is particularly important that we take note of how these two conceptual systems function 
in similar manners.  Investigating these similarities will also allow us to properly 
understand the philosophical divergences and how each system has its own special 
mechanisms that are adapted to perform within a specific set of suppositions.  
Understanding similarities will better enable us to decide what issues are matters of 
diverging emphasis and what constitutes true difference.  
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Similarities 
The first similarity that we will discuss is the non-dualism that pervades both 
mystical systems.  We can look to Sankara’s discussion of pure consciousness to find 
non-dual assertions that see the individual as being identical with Brahman: “I am one 
alone; No other than that [Brahman] is thought to be Mine.  In like manner I do not 
belong to anything since I am free from attachment.  I have by nature no attachment.  
Therefore I do not need you nor your work since I am non-dual.”584  This statement goes 
beyond identifying the individual with Brahman; it states that all things in manifest 
existence belong to a singular cosmic principle.  Sankara directly states that the process 
of Brahmanic self-identification is not the attainment of a new type of knowledge; rather, 
the individual is claimed to recognize their Brahmanic nature by employing a means of 
discrimination that enables realization.585  This discrimination entails a rejection of 
singularity and individuality, making it impossible for the non-realized individual to see 
themselves as Brahman: “According to Sankara, the true nature of the Self must ever 
remain a mystery for the mind in its thinking capacity, for in this capacity it inhabits the 
realm of subject-object dualism, which the Self transcends.”586  The transcending of 
individualism and the attainment of universal identification is similarly found in Ibn 
Arabi when he addresses self-knowledge.587  The base of God knowledge is found in 
one’s recognition of the self as a theomorphic being.  This principle is readily evident in 
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Ibn Arabi’s oft-used statement that “[t]he root of the existence of knowledge of God is 
knowledge of the self.”588  We must be careful at this instant because the Shaykh 
emphasizes that each person only knows his or her personal Lord, which is God’s self-
disclosure to that particular person.589  However, the Perfect Man (the realized individual) 
is able to reflect the totality of God’s revelation, and with this ability the individual 
recognizes himself or herself as nothing more than a non-different aspect within this 
revelatory process.590  Both mystics clearly place a singular principle (God or Brahman) 
at the centre of their mystical systems and explain all manifestation and plurality as 
emanating from this point.  Furthermore, both Sankara and Ibn Arabi credit ignorance as 
being the impetus for all perceived duality. 
In Paths to Transcendence, Kazemi makes an important distinction between 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi when it comes to matters of non-dualism, Sankara adopts an 
approach that primarily focuses on the individual as being the transcendent Brahman, 
while Ibn Arabi’s theory centers on God’s immanence.591  This results in Sankara 
focusing a great deal of attention on maya and the falsity of appearance.  By contrast, Ibn 
Arabi urges people to understand themselves and the world around them as being an 
aspect of the Divine Manifestation.592  However, this divergence need not pose us a 
problem; Kazemi is perfectly correct to state that Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s focus is not on 
the denial of the complementary/divergent position (as immanence is to transcendence 
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and viceversa).593  Both Ibn Arabi and Sankara recognize the immanent and transcendent 
aspects within their philosophies and both thinkers balance these positions despite their 
particular focus: “As between the respective dialectical positions of Sankara and Ibn 
Arabi, then, it is again a question rather of emphasis and point of view than of mutually 
exclusive alternatives: the difference of emphasis is real enough on its own level, but it is 
a difference which is overcome inasmuch as the complementary perspective is 
simultaneously affirmed within each perspective.”594  Aspects of immanence and 
transcendence can be found in both theories and it would be incorrect to view either 
mystic as not holding these principles in balance.  In accounting for the effect of maya, 
Sankara is explicit that the Absolute does not lose its transcendent aspects when it is 
considered as being immanent.595 Ibn Arabi combines ideas of the transcendent and 
immanent within the gnostic’s bewilderment.  Chittick nicely summarizes Ibn Arabi’s 
idea of bewilderment when he claims that “[a]ll things, inasmuch as they are God, are 
unknowable, but, inasmuch as they are other than God, they display nothing real to be 
known.  Bewilderment (hayra), then, is one of the highest stages of knowledge.  It is the 
realization of the incapacity to know…”596 The focus that Ibn Arabi places on the 
immanence of God’s Self-Disclosure is offset by the transcendence that keeps the gnostic 
in a state of bewilderment.  Each mystic employs immanence and transcendence in 
situationally specific manners, yet these usages do not threaten their idea of metaphysical 
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non-duality.  After all, the tension between immanence and transcendence is itself a 
dualistic notion.   
The idea of illusion plays a major role in both mystical philosophies, yet it would 
be inappropriate to identify this idea as illusion.  Sankara is adamant that illusion does not 
hold its own objective status. Thus we should not understand the term illusion as being an 
independent function.597 Nescience is a subjective problem and not an objective 
condition. Sankara’s insistence on there being nothing outside Brahman requires the 
notion of illusion to reside within the subjective individual who then mentally extends 
this chimera (it should be noted that there is a difference between the ignorance (avidya) 
of the individual and the idea of illusion (maya) as a form of cosmological power).  The 
falsity of illusory perceptions means that Sankara “…speaks of nescience not as a power 
(sakti) but as a state (avastha), an undesirable state or passion (klesa) which afflicts the 
individual.”598  We can see Sankara, in the Upadesasahasri, assigning the pain of 
individual existence to the inadvertent projection of false perception.599  Many of 
Sankara’s prescriptive statements are in regards to this projection and how to break the 
samsaric cycle by ending these illusory mental extensions (and the resultant karmic 
accumulation).  When the mind ceases to turn and misappropriate Brahmanic experience, 
then the nescient worldview “…is brought to an end… and transmigratory experience no 
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longer continues.”600  The individual is the source of multiplicity and is the driving force 
behind karmic accumulation and the cycle of samsaric rebirth.  
In Ibn Arabi we see a similar account of the reality and unreality behind 
subjectively processed understanding.  The people who suffer from these delusions are 
believed to be those who have not come to realize the theophany that surrounds them and 
equally consumes them.  The Shaykh claims that on a superficial level God’s veils can be 
understood as something that hides the face of God from humanity.601  However, the veils 
are nothing but God’s disclosure and it is the interpretation of these veils that leads to 
misappropriation; once again we can point to the subjective individual as the one who 
initiates this process.602  Ibn Arabi understands this misappropriation as relating to 
wrongful association and not as an objective mechanic within his cosmological system; 
“Those human beings who are overcome by the veil of nature associate others with Him. 
At root, they are not in the habit of hearing, obeying, and worshiping any but a Lord that 
they witness.”603  We have partially touched upon this when we discussed each individual 
witnessing their own personal Lord, which is nothing more than what they have come to 
accept as being associated with God; it is the Folk of Allah that are able to reflect God’s 
disclosure without superimposing anything onto this disclosure.604  These are the people 
who “…return to God in knowledge of Him.  They leave reflection in its own level and 
give it its full due (haqq): They do not make it pass on to that which it is improper to 
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reflect.”605  Within this appropriate mode of behavior the individual seeks to reflect God 
as perfectly as possible and not extend beyond this reflective vocation; by doing this one 
hopes to cease imposing illusory notions onto God’s theomorphic manifestation. 
The importance that Ibn Arabi and Sankara place in subjective interpretation and 
the subsequent cognitive extensions should be apparent by now.  It is this principle that is 
believed to separate the realized from those who are under the sway of their delusory 
mental projections.  Sankara terms these people as being influenced by maya and further 
credits their own mental activities as being the guarantor of this illusory system: “Hence 
it is nescience itself which appears to cause the subject to feel attachment to a happiness 
which is not really part of its own true nature… that is, it makes that (the Self) which is 
essentially unattached to appear to be attached and that (the non-self, including the body 
and mind and their states) which intrinsically has nothing to do with happiness, to appear 
to be happy.”606  This approach can also be found in Ibn Arabi who adopts an immanent 
stance in regards to the veils being God’s self-manifestation, yet he remains similar to 
Sankara in that it is the un-realized subjective experience that is believed to shackle non-
reality to these immanent manifestations (the veils).  The existence of illusion within both 
mystical philosophies is a mundane observation that does not add anything innovative to 
the discussion, but, this correspondence indicates that both Ibn Arabi and Sankara 
interpreted plurality as an illusory mechanism within their non-dual systems.  Ibn Arabi’s 
comments on God being the First and the Last displays this ethos by explaining the 
underlying wujud (unity) to manifestation: “God does not disclose Himself in the name 
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One, and there cannot be self-disclosure within it, nor in the name God.  But self-
disclosure does occur in the other names that are known to us.”607  The necessary 
plurality in manifestation and the inherent unity in Essence is a feature within both 
systems of thought.  Furthermore, this feature can be simultaneously found in the 
subjective/illusory experiences that are projected onto the world.608 
Another important similarity can be found in the need for revelation.  Both Ibn 
Arabi and Sankara hold that the human cognitive ability is unable to reach the 
cosmological reality that is described as Brahman or as God’s wujud.  These two 
conclusions are framed differently, yet we can still find parallels in how revelation is seen 
as an embedded principle within their mystical systems.  Looking to Sankara, we can find 
these assertions in regards to his refutation of rationalistic thought as a means to 
liberation.609  Attempts to gain knowledge of Brahman, without Vedic revelation, are 
equated to knowledge of the future, for both are believed to be out of the purview of the 
rational process.610  The Absolute “…having no color or other perceptible quality, is not 
an object of perception.  And because it can have no inferential signs (which are derived 
from the observation of regular patterns in previous perceptions), it cannot be the object 
of inference or of other indirect means of cognition…”611  Sankara did believe that one 
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could catch glimpses of this undivided reality through dreamless sleep and testimony 
(sabda-pramana); however, these are only glimpses and momentary phenomenon.  
Sustained realization depends on the Vedas for knowledge of “…the true nature of Being, 
utterly transcendent as it is, and the cause of liberation from earthly existence, cannot be 
so much as conceived except in the light of Vedic revelation as interpreted in a traditional 
school…as there can be no inferential sign.”612  Testimony (sabda), as witnessed within 
the teacher-student relationship, is claimed to be able to impart insights and general 
understanding, however, this understanding is ultimately rooted in the Vedas and then 
imparted by those who have actualized this path to realization.  The importance of Vedic 
testimony is such that we must acknowledge the Vedic roots behind this form of 
transmitted knowledge (even though no knowledge about the transcendent Brahman can 
be truly imparted).   
Ibn Arabi’s insistence on revelation is a little different in nature when compared 
to Sankara’s revelatory interpretation.  The Shaykh explains that reason has limits to its 
applicability and that spiritual matters do not reside in this territory.613  Chittick claims 
this as the Shaykh insisting that “…man must come to know God through God, or at the 
very least, through the revealed guidance of God.  Any attempt to know God without 
taking the Law into account is simply a lack of wisdom and courtesy.”614  Ibn Arabi takes 
the existence of prophets and the cycle of prophecy as indicating reason’s inability to 
properly guide.615  It is believed that our usage of rationality would skirt past areas of 
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spiritual understanding that can only be accessed through the heart (qalb).616  The heart’s 
understanding qualifies as a form of knowledge to Ibn Arabi.  Furthermore, the type of 
knowledge that is received through the heart is subsequently reflected as that person’s 
spiritual nature.617  It is important to note the spiritual ramifications of this type of 
understanding, which is contrasted by the one-dimensional form of knowledge that is 
purveyed through the rational faculties.   
“They only came to know God through that which He reported 
about Himself: his clemency, His tenderness, His loving kindness, 
His descent into limitation that we may conceive of him in 
imaginal form (tamthil) and place Him before our eyes within our 
hearts… Or rather, we do indeed see Him within ourselves, since 
we have come to know Him through his giving knowledge, not 
through our own rational consideration.”618 
The previous reference gives evidence of revelation being a necessity within Ibn Arabi’s 
system.  Knowledge of God is the explicit result of the heart’s unveiling (qalb) and not 
the result of an intellectual process.619  Therefore, revelation becomes a necessity because 
love for God is only made possible through the love that God shows within his 
revelation.620   
 Another similarity between Ibn Arabi and Sankara is a methodological approach 
that makes use of theological statements that are seemingly dualistic; however, these 
statements are later negated through reference to a transcendent Lord that exceeds all 
forms of dualism.  Sankara made use of theological statements to provide a frame for his 
                                                 
616 Ibid., 180.   
617 Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, 180. 
618 Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, trans. William Chittick, 180.   
619 Ibn Arabi, The Self-Disclosure of God, trans William Chittick, 112.  
620 Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, trans. William Chittick, 180.   
 160 
non-dual philosophy.621  Examples of this include the idea of a supreme Lord as ruler and 
controller of manifest existence and theism of this nature can be found in Sankara’s 
discussion of the Lord’s conformity to external adjuncts.622  However, these statements 
are always accompanied by claims of non-duality and a shared identity between the Lord 
and the individual jiva: “And within the realm of human experience, he rules over the 
conscious being called individual souls (jivas), who are in truth nothing but his own Self, 
but who assume the limitations of body, mind and senses in the same sense in which the 
ether assumes the shape of the pots in which it is apparently enclosed.”623  We can also 
look to the Upadesasahasri for examples of Sankara paying homage to Indra who is 
claimed to be the teacher of teachers and upholder of the srutis.624  Alston makes a 
similar observation when he claims that Sankara praised the worshippers of Narayana and 
dismissed those who worshipped Siva.625  As previously mentioned, Sankara did not view 
this theism as problematic within his non-dual system; his theological assertions are 
undercut by non-dual statement that recognize the individual as being identical to the 
transcendent Brahman.  In a particularly telling passage we can find Sankara relating the 
Lord’s worth to his ability to bring about knowledge of the Atman: “If the Lord is non-
Atman, one ought not to dwell upon [the knowledge] ‘I am He’. If he is Atman, the 
knowledge ‘I am the Lord’ destroys the other [knowledge].”626  In many instances 
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Sankara writes from a perspective that pertains to the un-realized individual who is 
subject to the thralls of nescience; in other instances, Sankara takes the vantage point of 
the realized individual who has transcended the Lord of cause and effect.627 
 A similar methodological approach can be found in Ibn Arabi, however all his 
theological and dualistic statements must be understood in the context of monotheistic 
Islam.  For examples of theistic statements that imply dualism we can look to Ibn Arabi’s 
employment of the Divine Names and Relationships.  The Shaykh recognizes a 
provisional duality in the Names: “One form is with us in our breaths and in the letters 
we combine.  These are the names by which we call upon him…Then the divine names 
have another kind of form within the Breath of the All-merciful in respect of the fact that 
God is the Speaker (al-qa’il) and is described by Speech…”628  It is through the Names 
that God enters into a relationship with his self-manifestation.629  Names such as The 
Speaker, Merciful, Powerful, and Avenger openly suggest a relationship with their 
surrounding environment.630  To be called The King requires some form of relationship 
where there is a ruler and a subject.  This title is an obvious referral to God’s role as the 
governor of the universe, however, these theological statements are subverted by the 
Essence that is believed to stand beyond such titles.631 “In other words, although the 
Essence is non-determined and nondelimited (mutlaq) in Its absolute Ipseity (al-
huwiyyah).  It manifests Itself outwardly in certain modes that can be summarized as the 
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Divine Names mentioned in the Koran.”632  The Names can be approached as being 
conditional indicators that serve as aids in God-knowledge.  These aids are provisional in 
nature and do not possess continued value (by this I mean the Names are only applicable 
to entities under the purview of God’s manifestation).  Ibn Arabi makes this provisional 
status evident when he claims “The names of the names are diverse only because of the 
diversity of their meanings (ma’na).  Were it not for that, we would not be able to 
distinguish among them.  They are one in God’s eyes, but many in our eyes.”633  The 
Divine Names are obviously different than Sankara’s discussion of Narayana and Siva, 
yet our current point of interest is the usage of theological statements that are later 
subsumed within the larger non-dual system.  The existence of second order indicators 
within both systems can be understood as conceptual mechanisms that help bring rise to 
transcendental understanding (realization).634  
Differences 
 The differences examined between Ibn Arabi and Sankara will reside within the 
theological suppositions that support each mystic’s transcendental claims.  It must once 
again be stated that these difference pertain to the theological realm, and therefore, any 
difference discussed within this section will not make assertions regarding the subjective 
aspects within mysticism.  William James was correct in being apprehensive about the 
rigid categories that scholars apply to mysticism.635  These subjective experiences are at 
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the root of both mystical philosophies and should be understood as the pinnacle of each 
mystic’s account.  It is for this reason that the conceptual differences examined will 
remain within a specific context (that being theological and second order).  Yet, this 
subjective imperative need not handcuff us in regards to our comparison; both mystics 
have clearly developed systems of thought that are built upon premises and assertions 
that permit some degree of examination. And it is within these suppositions that this 
paper presents the divergences between Ibn Arabi and Sankara.   
 The first bifurcation that we will examine is how karma and samsara contain 
fundamental dissimilarities when compared to Ibn Arabi’s philosophical system.  The 
cessation of karmic accumulation and the subsequent end to samsaric rebirth is a core 
principle within Sankara’s system.  Sankara is very much in parallel with other Hindu 
darsanas in using both samsara and karma as major touchstones.636  Considering the 
importance of this stance, we will offer another extended quote that illustrates Sankara’s 
thought; 
“In the present life, merit and demerit are amassed and their fruits 
experienced solely through attachment and aversion arising from 
false identification with the body-mind organism.  And we are 
bound to infer that the same must have been the case in the 
previous life too, and also in those before it, so that 
transmigration is a beginningless and endless process resting on 
nescience.  And this shows that the total cessation of 
transmigratory experience can only occur through devotion to the 
path of knowledge, associated with the renunciation of all action.  
And because self-identification with the body is based on 
nesceince, when nescience is brought to an end, one is no longer 
embodied, and transmigratory experience no longer continues.”637   
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637 Ibid., 9. 
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Among other things, karma performs a binding function that links consequence to one’s 
samsaric status.638 Barbara A. Holdrege, in describing karma and samsara within Hindu 
orthodoxy, claims it as an unavoidable and fundamental feature.639  Sankara does not 
avoid the suppositions that karma and samsara affix to the Hindu worldview.  The tree of 
transmigratory existence is said to take root in the Absolute and is an inherent, although 
avoidable, aspect within manifestation.640  This extension from the Absolute, in Sankara’s 
view, cannot be considered as anything other than an aspect of Brahman.641  Furthermore, 
Sankara’s claims this cosmic tree as a principle expounded by the theomorphic deities.642  
Karmic accumulation and rebirth is fundamental to Sankara’s system and the greater 
Hindu cosmological outlook; any consideration of Sankara’s project must include these 
features; to not do so would be a mistake.   
Ibn Arabi does not address the idea of karma, samsara, or any of their subsequent 
ramifications.  Ibn Arabi’s metaphysical system does incorporate notions of judgment 
and consequence that can even be said to occur over a myriad of states that the soul finds 
itself in (something that is akin to the idea of samsaric rebirth).643 The Shaykh believed 
that one’s spiritual status could be manipulated to better display God’s self-revelation.644 
Upon death, the nature of one’s soul becomes their outward and continued form, thereby 
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solidifying that soul’s situation in the afterlife.645  This resonates in Ibn Arabi’s belief that 
“…God will bring the works of the children of Adam [on the Day of Resurrection], even 
though they are accidents (a’rad), as self-subsistent forms placed in the Scale to establish 
justice.”646  Reference to the previously examined eschatological chapter will 
demonstrate that Ibn Arabi employed his mystical system within a specific theological 
context, which understands the soul as living an earthly life that is followed by an 
afterlife where the implications of one’s actions are played out (such as one’s residence in 
heaven or hell and the nature of these resting places).647  Similar to Sankara, Ibn Arabi 
uses the Islamic idea of life, death, and afterlife as a touchstone for his mystical system.  
One can also see Ibn Arabi’s cognizance of how his system functions within the larger 
religious structure (the Islamic exoskeleton): “Simply put, useful knowledge leads to 
deliverance (najat), which is none other than happiness of ‘felicity’ (sa‘ada) and the 
avoidance of ‘wretchedness’’ (shaqa) in the stages of existence after death.”648  Ibn 
Arabi’s ideas on judgment and death can act as a measuring stick, whereby useful 
knowledge benefits the adherent and ignorance results in “wretchedness” and by no 
means should we consider the Shaykh’s own system as being above his measure of 
fruitfulness.  Islamic orthodoxy provided a meta-structure in which Ibn Arabi constructed 
a sub-system that would help one achieve the best possible outcome within the meta-
structure.   
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The Shaykh believed that each soul had a unique experience within the afterlife, 
and that each reunion with God was tempered by that soul’s disposition.649  A 
combination of belief and preparedness affects this process: “The state after death are 
determined not only by works, but also by the ideas and thoughts that bring work into 
existence.  Hence beliefs about who we are, where we can go, and what we can become 
play a major role in determining the actual manner in which human potential holds.”650  It 
is possible to interpret this statement as promoting a God of belief that corresponds to 
one’s afterlife experience; and preparedness is an undeniably important feature that Ibn 
Arabi employs in understanding religious diversity.651  Human beings are claimed as 
natural servants that possess the ability to reflect God’s manifestation, and this reflective 
ability is tempered by the specific revelatory system that they employ.652 Such a position 
may be able to reconcile Ibn Arabi and Sankara; however, we will demonstrate that there 
exists fundamental difference in the way each worldview functions and the conceptual 
mechanics that are built upon these differing principles.     
The difference between Sankara’s ideas of karma/samsara and Ibn Arabi’s notion 
of death/judgment has hopefully become apparent.  It is crucial that we look to the 
surrounding theological environment, for each mystic has inherited a set of beliefs from 
their tradition.  Furthermore, the mystical systems they constructed paid heed to the 
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principles that were established within these larger traditions.653  In pointing out these 
differences we find ourselves in a tumultuous position, for we cannot forget that both 
mystics understood reason (including religious philosophy) as being nullified in 
consideration of the non-dual Absolute.  We can turn to William James once again to 
provide us with the warning that “… the existence of mystical states absolutely 
overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of 
what we may believe.”654  It is important that the logical categories we employ are 
recognized as foreign impositions and not organic constructions, yet this need not bother 
us greatly because our proposed disagreement is based upon the supplementary level (the 
theological level that is later negated).  The differences between Hindu samsara and the 
Islamic afterlife indicate a difference in conceptual mechanics that would subsequently 
require different mystical tools.  This is less a mystical difference than a difference 
extracted from the employment of theological logic; however, such a observation would 
comply with Ibn Arabi’s assertions that “…the Divinity and the Lordship (rububiyya) can 
be understood by this faculty [reason]…”655  Sankara is equally clear that karma and 
samsara are matters of the nescient world, which permits a degree of conceptual 
understanding.656  Difference between Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s worldviews should 
include reference to samsara and the afterlife as different conceptual mechanisms that 
were employed.  Clooney is adamant that the doctrinal assertions made within Advaita 
                                                 
653 By physics I mean that every system of thought has suppositions and rules.  These 
principles establish philosophical physics that loosely dictate how that system will 
function.  
654 James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 465.   
655 Ibn Arabi, The Sufi Path of Knowledge, trans. William Chittick, 60.   
656 Sankara, “Texts on: The Self Can Only Be Known Through The Veda,” in Sankara A 
Source Book vol. 5, trans. A.J. Alston, 207. 
 168 
(and by Sankara) must be understood as attempting doctrinal congruity with a larger set 
of Hindu orthodox beliefs.657  We can therefore imagine both mystics as building 
philosophies that sought to encompass and understand a myriad of orthodox principles 
(and it is equally important that both mystics are seen as approaching certain orthodox 
principles as being a priori to their own thought).  Both Sankara and Ibn Arabi made 
reference to ideas and principles outside their own traditions, and we have even seen that 
Ibn Arabi made an effort to account for religious diversity in the afterlife.  However, 
samsara and the Islamic afterlife should be viewed as fundamental issues that result in 
strong divergences in the way both mystics viewed death and the nature of life.   
Another point of divergence between Ibn Arabi and Sankara can be found within 
the area of prophecy and the implications that are associated with the revelatory process.  
It is appropriate to start this discussion with Ibn Arabi because the Shaykh maintains a 
multifaceted position that requires some initial explanation.658  A major feature in Ibn 
Arabi’s understanding of revelation can be found in the Quranic verse 10:47, which is 
interpreted as claiming that a prophet was sent to every nation.659  This is a major point of 
departure for Ibn Arabi’s explanation of religious diversity.  At the base of every revealed 
religion is a “…message of tawhid, which declares that experienced reality comes from 
the One and returns to the One.”660  This does not mean that all religions are believed 
equal avenues onto knowledge of God; rather, each religious revelation is believed to 
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possess aspects of truth that relates knowledge of God.661  This is not problematic to the 
Shaykh, for he believed that “To maintain the particular excellence of the Koran and the 
superiority of Muhammad over all other prophets is not to deny the universal validity of 
revelation nor the validity of revelations appearing in particularized expressions.”662  Ibn 
Arabi believed in a singular reality that was inhabited by humanity and their different 
belief systems.663  Furthermore, all knowledge was thought to lead back to God, which 
requires all revelatory systems to be imbued with a degree of reality and correctness.664  
Expressions of belief are regarded as unified in essence and “[t]hrough its own specific 
nature -- its own special limitations that distinguish it from other colors -- each color 
delimits and defines the invisible light [God], thereby making it visible.”665  Because of 
Ibn Arabi’s pluralistic stance we cannot accredit the Shaykh’s ideas of revelation as being 
unable to account for Vedic revelation.  We must actually do the opposite at this moment 
and claim Ibn Arabi’s notion of revelation as being a unitive aspect that sought to 
incorporate instead of negate; furthermore, Ibn Arabi’s belief that revelatory truth was 
displayed in other traditions corresponds to God’s self-disclosure and is not believed a 
mere display of verisimilitude. 
When we turn to Sankara we are able to witness a much more divisive approach 
to revelation.  We have already shown that Sankara, like Ibn Arabi, did not believe that 
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reason could ascertain metaphysical truths.666 The Hindu mystic believed that knowledge 
of one’s Brahmanic nature required the Vedas, for “…The Veda is eternal and the one 
source of right knowledge, and hence that which it teaches can be a fixed reality.”667  
Sankara sees little chance for the attainment of liberation outside Hindu orthodoxy and 
specifically states the need for Vedic revelation.668  Furthermore, Sankara is dismissive of 
“Buddhists nihilists” because of their rejection of the Vedas and their dismissal of the 
atman.669  Sankara places himself squarely in the Vedic tradition and makes a great effort 
to harmonize his Upanisadic emphasis with other claims throughout the Hindu corpus.670  
Much of Sankara’s effort was focused on his exegetical projects and we can readily see 
the mystic’s fancy footwork when it comes to matters of contradiction and hermeneutic 
congruity.  Like the Sufi Shaykh, our Hindu mystic was primarily concerned with the 
effects of his system, speaking of higher and lower forms of knowledge based upon 
realization.671  “The ‘higher knowledge’ here means immediate awareness of that 
Imperishable Principle which is to be known of (in the first instance) from the 
upanishadic texts. It does not mean mere committing to memory of the words of the 
Upanishads, whereas ‘knowledge of the Veda’ always means mere knowledge of the 
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series of words contained in the Vedic texts.”672  Sankara saw very little chance for the 
individual to better their metaphysical status outside of the Vedic prescriptions.  It is 
clearly stated that the most beneficial result (realization) can only be discovered through 
the Vedas (and more specifically the Upanisads).673  Sankara further states that the 
attainment of realization by a Sudra (a member of the lowest class in the Hindu caste 
system) is a product of their proximity to the Vedas and the benevolent deeds they had 
performed in past lives (Sudras were not allowed direct access to Vedic knowledge).674  
In regards to the Indian mystic, we are able to observe an ethos that embeds realization 
within a strongly Vedic context.675 
The last divergence examined will be in regards to renunciation.  The two mystics 
lived lives that were marked by religious devotion, with both Ibn Arabi and Sankara 
traveling great distances to expand and hone their spiritual practices.  When we contrast 
their opinions on renunciation it should be observed that the two were more similar than 
distant.  However, their positions on the need for renunciation present a stark contrast 
(especially in regards to sexuality and marriage).  Sankara was a strong proponent of 
renunciation, which he believed would aid in detachment.676  The metrical part of the 
Upadesasahasri informs the guru that the pupil must abandon the desire for sons, wealth, 
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and worlds if they are to become true ascetic.677  Mayeda recognizes this in Sankara’s 
choice of pupils and the people he chose to expound his theories to: “Sankara would not 
teach his doctrine to city dwellers…Consequently he propagated his teachings chiefly 
among samnyasins, who had renounced the world, and intellectuals in the villages…”678 
City dwellers were believed to be under the sway of Buddhism and imbued with 
hedonistic values that limited their spiritual faculties.679  Sankara believed it possible for 
individuals to become realized without renunciation, yet these are rare instances and 
depended heavily on divine grace.680  Insistence on the need for renunciation is clear, 
because “…wandering forth from one’s house as a homeless monk (parivrajya), being 
the renunciation of all means to (ritualistic) action, is implicitly entailed as part of the 
discipline.”681  Despite the allowances made by Sankara for the bestowal of divine grace, 
we can still find the mystic insisting on renunciation and viewing renunciation as the best 
disposition within his metaphysical system. 
Ibn Arabi did not believe renunciation as important when compared to his Hindu 
counterpart.682  Renunciation was viewed as a possible step towards realization but he did 
not believe that severe asceticism constituted a spiritual station or an overly beneficial 
endeavor.683  The biographical accounts of Ibn Arabi claim the Shaykh as being fully 
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immersed within his social environment.684  Upon the death of his parents Ibn Arabi was 
endowed with custodianship of his two younger sisters.685  This forced the young mystic 
to stop his wanderings and make provisions for his sisters.686  We also know that Ibn 
Arabi married and fathered children, with the Shaykh eventually settling down in 
Damascus for the last 17 years of his life.687  Ibn Arabi believed that total subsistence in 
God and complete renunciation “…may serve rhetorical purpose and alert some people to 
the direction in which efforts should be directed, but such renunciation is impossible and 
in any case, since to renounce the cosmos is to renounce the possibility of increasing 
one’s knowledge in God.”688  In this quote we can detect Ibn Arabi’s concern with the 
immanent manifestation of God, and such immanence was thought to demand worldly 
interaction (for renunciation would constitute a turning away from God).689 
Relationships between people are viewed as theomorphic symbols that find their 
origins in God and become manifest between people (the most significant being love); in 
describing the love between individuals Ibn Arabi claims that “[t]here is nothing in 
himself which does not find its corresponding part in his beloved.  There remains nothing 
left over within him which would allow him to remain sober.  His outward dimension is 
enraptured by his beloved’s outward dimension, and his inward dimension by his inward 
dimension… Hence love of God and love of his similar absorbs man totally…”690 The 
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Shaykh’s approach to love and human relationships should be seen as different than the 
renunciation proposed by Sankara.  Human emotions are assigned a religious nature and 
fostered as symbols rather than vices.  Such a difference need not be labeled as being 
radical or overly important, yet it can serve as another instant of hermeneutic re-
appropriation between the two.  Sankara rooted such emotions in attachment while Ibn 
Arabi believed the correct understanding of love finds itself divine in origin.             
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CONCLUSION 
The intention in this project was to engage Sankara and Ibn Arabi as mystical 
philosophers who constructed particular systems of thought that were built upon premises 
found in their respective religious traditions.  In comparing these two mystics we were 
able to identify their usage of a number pre-existing principles, concepts, and teachings 
that are expanded upon and placed within a systematic philosophy or theology that is 
intended to lead others to realization.  This examination used a contextualist approach 
that relied on comparison to provide further clarifications to both systems of 
philosophical/theological thought.  The study was grounded upon various descriptive and 
prescriptive statements attributed to the two mystics and there was no intent to extend 
beyond these materials.691  
Despite the contextualist nature of this study it is vital that our discussion is not 
understood as postulating on what can be subjectively experienced.  There was no intent 
to opine on the validity or nature of the subjective mystical experience.  This is why this 
contextual approach theoretically differs from Katz, who binds the personal experience to 
its surrounding social constructs.  For example, Katz simply states that “…what is being 
argued is that, for example, the Hindu mystic does not have an experience of x which he 
then describes in the, to him, language and symbols of Hinduism, but rather he has a 
Hindu experience, i.e. on what will be experienced, and ruled out in advance and what is 
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inexperiencaeble in the particular given, concrete context.” 692  This study employed a 
contextualist approach that shares some commonalities with Katz’s perspective, yet it 
does not extend its observations into the realm of experience.  Moreover, it does not bind 
the mystical experience to its cultural and linguistic surroundings.693  Rather, this project 
has sought to understand the “thought” of Sankara and Ibn Arabi within their 
epistemological landscape, which was then used to provide orientation in regards to the 
subjective mystical accounts.  To be more specific, this study demonstrated that the two 
mystics engaged in system building philosophies (or theologies) that make use of ideas 
found within their respective traditions.   
According to Sankara and Ibn Arabi, these philosophical systems may then be 
used, by others, for transcendent realization.  This project did not extend to evaluating the 
reality or nature of the purported realizations, but restricted itself to each mystic’s 
foundational philosophies. Such a self-imposed limitation respected the ineffable, noetic, 
transient, and passive aspects that James believed essential to mysticism.694  An analysis 
of the ineffable elements within mystical experience would have required different 
methodologies than those utilized in this study.  Remaining within Sankara and Ibn 
Arabi’s theological/philosophical levels of discourse assented to Underhill’s assertion 
that mysticism “… shows itself not merely as an attitude of mind and heart, but as a form 
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of organic life.  It is not only a theory of the intellect or a hunger, however passionate, of 
the heart.  It involves the organizing of the whole self, conscious and unconscious, under 
the spur of a hunger…”695 The study’s focus was on a few aspects of this self-
organization in mysticism, namely, the intellectual articulation of certain principles 
concerning reality, and the methods of discerning it clearly.  The boundaries set by James 
and Underhill proved beneficial for they have allowed one to focus on the theological and 
philosophical beliefs that underpin the thought systems of these influential mystics.   
Sankara’s thought revealed multiple instances of system building that makes use 
of philosophical scaffolding.696  His discussion of the principles of karma, and the 
resultant samsaric rebirths, is one such example.  This study demonstrated that these 
principles are implicit in Sankara’s mystical system and that much of his thought was 
directed towards the cessation of the cosmological process of rebirth in samsaric reality.  
In other words, Sankara accepted the reality of these principles at the outset, principles 
that derive from systems of thought pre-existing in Hindu philosophies.  True, Sankara 
did ultimately question the ontological status of karma and samsara.  However, these 
considerations result from a realized perspective that ultimately transcends many of the 
principles governing transmigratory existence.697  Put differently, Sankara accepted a 
variety of the concepts and principles utilized by his predecessors in the construction of 
his system, and only questioned their validity from the vantage point of liberation or 
realization.  However, the pre-realization, system-building Sankara retained a collection 
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697 Sankara, “Texts on ‘The Self Can only Be Known Through The Veda’: Group C,’ in A 
Sankara Source Book vol. 5, trans, A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sadan, 2004), 216. 
 178 
of situationally specific concepts and principles (as seen in the notion of samsara and the 
operation of karma).  Much of Sankara’s hierarchical ranking is in respect to the relative 
value and nature of theistic statements, spiritual practice, and the material world.  Our 
discussion of Sankara’s theistic statements provides an example of this ranking.  Alston 
recognizes this interpretive order when he claims: “Sankara differentiated the 
performance of prescribed Vedic meditations (upasana) from knowledge on the one hand 
and from ritualistic action on the other.”698  Our discussion of hierarchal organization 
identified Sankara as a system building philosopher that made use of certain key 
presuppositions.           
The provisional nature of these scaffolding concepts in the light of realization 
should not cause them to be summarily dismissed as trivial.  They are important to 
Sankara for we noted the Hindu mystic repeatedly refer to his philosophical system as an 
essential base, which leads to the attainment of realization.  In this regard, it is crucial to 
recognize that Sankara’s system is functionally directed, for as he pointedly states: “It is 
not the question whether a text proclaims a matter of fact or enjoins an action that settles 
whether or not it is authoritative.  The real test that has to be applied is ‘Does it produce 
knowledge that is of undeniable practical benefit to man?”699  Sankara, as previously 
discussed, even approaches the Vedas as being functional guides that derive value from 
the truths they convey.700       
                                                 
698 A.J. Alston, “Meditation in the Context of the Vedic Ritual,” in A Sankara Source 
Book vol. 6. trans. A.J. Alston (London: Shanti Sedan, 2004), 1. 
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700 Ibid., 252.  
 179 
Sankara was undoubtedly a system builder who made use of a wide variety of pre-
existing philosophical distinctions and conceptual categories that were understood as 
being vital to his mystical system.  His references to the Vedas are another indicator that 
Sankara’s mystical system was firmly rooted in certain presuppositions.  He mounts a 
strong defense of the Vedas as being the only means to realization and as being the only 
conduit to the metaphysical knowledge that escapes reason.701  There is a surprising lack 
of ecumenical sentiment when Sankara launches into his criticism of Buddhism, 
materialism, and other darsanas.702  Despite commonalities in worldviews, Sankara is 
often critical of those he believed as misinterpreting the theological/philosophical 
foundation that Hinduism rests upon.703  These instances should be viewed as Sankara 
vehemently defending the basic principles that are incorporated into his mystical system.  
One might reasonably suggest that the nod to orthodoxy was merely Sankara’s attempt to 
stay firmly within the framework of orthodoxy, rather than risk criticism or ostracism 
from those quarters.  However, it was beyond the scope of this study to look into the 
historical social contexts of Sankara’s period.      
Like Sankara, Ibn Arabi situated himself firmly within orthodoxy.  He spent a 
substantial amount of time and effort in defending and interpreting the classical tenets of 
Islam that encapsulate his mystical theories.  References to the Islamic cycle of prophesy, 
and the importance of Muhammad as the Prophetic Seal, illustrated the Shaykh’s reliance 
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on foundational pre-existing Islamic theological points of reference.704  The Quran stands 
at the center of Ibn Arabi’s system of thought, and it acted as the point from which his 
hermeneutic ventures began.  As we have seen, the Quran even served as the foundation 
for Ibn Arabi’s notion of religious diversity.705  The specific verse that we examined Ibn 
Arabi as employing is 10:47, which states: “An Apostle was sent to each community.”706 
The Shaykh found a great deal of plasticity within this verse and our examination found 
that a similar ecumenically hermeneutic ethos pervaded the rest of his work.707  This 
study has not been overly concerned with the practical ‘work’ that Ibn Arabi’s 
interpretations might have performed, namely, how these ideas might have led or 
continue to lead others to a state of realization.  Rather, attention was directed towards 
Ibn Arabi’s objects of interpretation (the principles extracted from the Quran).  Our focus 
is centered on the foundation of Ibn Arabi’s interpretive system, and when these premises 
were thoroughly examined we were able to make better sense of the epistemic 
mechanisms extracted from the Quran.  The hierarchy that Ibn Arabi assigns to the 
Divine Names provided us with an example of Quranic declarations (The Names of God) 
that were organized and then integrated into a larger cosmological system.708   
Even matters of behavior, such as the value of renunciation, can be seen as 
indicators that provide shape to Ibn Arabi’s underlying structuring principles.  The 
relative value of renunciation and the importance of human/divine love were specific 
notions that Ibn Arabi identified within his theomorphic worldview.  Our discussion of 
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love and the metaphysical properties Ibn Arabi assigned to love provided an example of 
human sentiment being highlighted within philosophical principles.709  Chittick further 
states that when the universe is viewed as being identical to God (as Ibn Arabi did), 
“…the object of human love can only be God.  And since God in His Essence is forever 
nonmanifest, unknowable, and unattainable, the true object of love is always nonexistent 
in relation to human beings.”710  Basic suppositions (such as the metaphysical role of the 
Names) found within the Quran and other sources enabled us to understand the Shaykh as 
a builder of an intellectual, philosophical, or theological system, which is conducive to 
the highest states of divine realization.  This system building legacy of Ibn Arabi’s is 
often neglected and subordinated to his mystical raison d’être, for which he is 
appropriately renowned.  Our discussion of Ibn Arabi, as the Seal of the Saints, and 
Muhammad, as the Prophetic Seal, identified spiritual embodiment as being highly 
important within the Shaykh’s system of thought.711  
When Ibn Arabi and Sankara are compared as system builders it is important that 
we take notice of the great number of similarities, with especially attentive recognition 
that their emphasis on subjective experience is one of their greatest commonalities.  
Another similarity discussed was the mystics’ use of illusion as being a phenomenal 
cause of action and as also having a degree of objective reality.712  Related to the power 
of illusion is the need for revelation, something that was identified in both mystical 
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philosophies.713  Ignoring these crucial similarities would have been detrimental to our 
project and would have limited our understanding of both mystical philosophies (and 
non-dual mysticism as a whole).  Kazemi, in comparing Ibn Arabi, Sankara, and Eckhart, 
is correct to make general observations regarding the primacy of non-dualism and how 
non-dual experience is the pinnacle of the three mystical philosophies: “The methodic 
efficacy of this interiorization is grounded in a metaphysical principle of the utmost 
importance, a principle affirmed by all the mystics: the inmost essence of the individual 
is not other than the transcendent Essence of the Absolute.  It is because of this 
preexisting identity at the inmost degree of being that interiorization is put forward as the 
principle means of realizing the Transcendent.”714   
Both Ibn Arabi and Sankara constructed systems that were “meant to do 
something”, and to approach either mystic as engaging in idle speculation would have 
been a distortion of their agendas.  Commonalities became abundant when we viewed the 
two mystics as constructing systems of thought that are directed towards realization of 
the non-dual Absolute, and all our observations were tempered by this recognition.  
Underhill describes this as being the dichotomy that combines religion and mysticism, 
and it is through this amalgamation that we can see a myriad of shades and degrees that 
diversify how mystical goals are understood.715  When religion is rooted in personal 
experience, as believed by James, the role of mystical commonalities becomes that much 
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more prominent.716  It is for this reason that some scholars accept experiential 
suppositions as foundational, which leads to studies on the ineffable experience as a 
universal commonality.717   
It has been our methodological goal to avoid the pitfalls that surround contexualist 
approaches to mysticism that center on experience, while still being able to make 
observations about the nature of Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s mystical systems.  The previous 
methodological chapter illustrated the problems with such an approach, but we have also 
established that the theological and philosophical contextualization, when employed 
correctly, has merits.  The contextualist method, which recognizes itself and the 
limitations to which it must adhere, is able to provide fruitful insights into the nature of 
these mystical systems.  By limiting our discussion to philosophical principles, and 
avoiding metaphysical speculation, we were able to elicit features within the structures of 
mystically oriented thought systems that are notoriously elusive.   
William James is highly skeptical about the philosophy of religion and deems it of 
secondary importance in understanding direct experience.718  However, James does 
recognize a role for religious philosophy if it “…will abandon metaphysics and deduction 
for criticism and induction, and frankly transform herself from theology into science of 
religions, she can make herself enormously useful.”719  This is the methodological 
tightrope that this project has sought to walk, and by avoiding direct metaphysical 
speculation we are able to achieve this.  When theology and philosophy are treated as 
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conceptual aids, and not deterministic statements, we become better able to study 
mystical systems.  The theoretical context that lies at the heart of our methodology seeks 
to demonstrate how mystical philosophies are dynamic conceptual systems that 
simultaneously embed and transcend their conceptual surroundings. Our dualistic 
approach is able to locate itself between reductionism and essentialism by balancing 
philosophical statements with the perceived endgame that both mystics believed their 
systems were directed towards (the non-dual Absolute as discussed in our analysis).  
Furthermore, this methodological technique can be applied to alternative forms of 
mysticism that do not correspond to Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s idea of non-dualism.  The 
adaptability of this method resides in the fact that our approach does not place all its eggs 
in one basket; by this I mean that the combination of theoretical contextualization with 
subjective recognition is able to identify structures within mystical worldviews, while 
still allowing the system to function as intended by the mystic (for we have not divorced 
the subjective experience through theoretical speculation). 
This theoretical working space, provided by our methodology, has allowed us to 
make some crucial distinctions in regards to the two mystics and their systems of thought.  
Reference to the differences between Sankara and Ibn Arabi’s thought, witnessed within 
their theological/philosophical systems, can lead to the conclusion that the two mystics 
inhabited different conceptual universes.  The conceptual artifacts that are left by Sankara 
and Ibn Arabi show many variations, particularly in the form of presuppositions, which 
were examined in our comparison.  It is these presuppositions, inherent in each mystical 
system, that lead us to the conclusion that the two systems inhabit different theoretical 
worldviews.  The discussions of karma, samsara, death, and judgment illustrated some of 
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these presuppositions, and it is important that these conceptual categories and principles 
are viewed as emanating from and belonging to fundamentally different notions of the 
metaphysical make-up of manifest reality.      
This conclusion contrasts somewhat with Kazemi’s claim that “[i]n respect of 
conceiving and realizing transcendence the evidence presented here leaves no doubt that 
the sages are indeed speaking of the selfsame reality.”720  It has been the purposes of this 
project to demonstrate that the methods used to conceive of each respective transcendent 
reality find their roots in radically different environments.  These environments have 
differing theoretical mechanics for the attainment of the transcendent realities, which 
indicates that the two mystics possessed worldviews that were built upon differing 
cosmological schemes.  We cannot render an opinion on matters of transcendence and 
spiritual experience, which has been stated throughout this paper, yet the presuppositions 
that Sankara and Ibn Arabi employ suggest a difference in initial outlooks.   
It is conceivable that the two mystics experientially describe near identical 
transcendent realities that suggest a similar (or even identical) mystical summit.  
However, the conceptual notions that we have examined in their philosophical writings 
force us to the conclusion that these described realities have differing philosophical 
foundations that demand explicit recognition.  These foundational differences resulted in 
Sankara and Ibn Arabi constructing systems that were adapted to unique challenges 
within their perceived environments.  Like the limitations imposed on William James, we 
are forced to construct a base camp at the foot of this cloud-shrouded, mystical mountain 
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range and render opinions (and not factual conclusions) about the summit or summits 
through reference to the mountaineers’ (the mystics) accounts.721  However, the differing 
techniques used by these mountaineers and descriptions rendered upon their return force 
this study to focus on the differences between the two accounts.  To continue the analogy, 
the base camps are different (Hindu and Islamic traditions), the equipment different 
(conceptual categories, such as rebirth, or the afterlife), the scaling techniques varied (to 
become a wandering ascetic or not), and articulated outcomes diverging (non ecumenical 
versus ecumenical).  The metaphysics that govern one’s ascent can be partially credited 
to the suppositions that each mystic employs before the mystical journey is embarked 
upon, and such foundational differences lead to further difference in spiritual techniques 
(the methods used to attain realization).   
Ultimately, however, we are forced to side with William James and declare 
mystical experiences as being beyond our speculative abilities.  This handicap is nicely 
captured by James when he claims that it is “[i]n all sad sincerity I think we must 
conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the 
deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless.”722  It is our intellectual 
burden to remain at the foot of the mystical mountain and receive secondhand accounts, 
yet these testimonies and prescriptive statements can grant us the ability to locate each 
mystical system within the multi-dimensional universe of thought systems.  Furthermore, 
our comparison of Sankara and Ibn Arabi has allowed for important insights into each 
respective philosophy and has also provided a methodological approach to help 
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understand mysticism within its native conceptual environment.  The methodological 
technique employed within this project has allowed us to examine the philosophical 
similarities and differences between Sankara and Ibn Arabi, while not making direct 
comments on their subjective experiences.         
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